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FOREWORD
In my career as a psychologist I have worked with many unique, troubled,
interesting and courageous clients. I remember the first time I met a self-confessed
pathological liar. In our initial session together he openly admitted that for as long
as he could remember he struggled with a burdensome impulse to lie. By the time
this client walked into my office he was battered and bruised by life, marked by
parental rejection, childhood bullying, and social ostracism. His scars ran deep and
when he talked about his past, his fragility was instantly felt, his pain obviously
intolerable. Over his life he had engaged in a range of unhelpful but understandable
strategies to avoid this pain - drinking was one, shunning relationships was another but the one he struggled with most was lying.

This client took centre stage in his fabrications, often playing the role of someone
rich, handsome, intelligent, strong and successful. He lived vicariously through the
wondrous feats of his stories, helping him to avoid facing the reality of what his life
had become - one failure after another. I saw the ingenuity of this man’s strategy, he
had found a way, albeit a maladaptive way, to bridge the gap between the life he
yearned for and the life he had. As time passed he despaired at how his stories
unravelled and collapsed around him, leading him to retreat further and further into
his fantasies. Eventually, after losing family, friends, credibility and his career, he
slowly steered himself away from telling people his fantastical stories. Curiously,
however, he still narrated the stories to himself, seemingly for his own private
pleasure and self-soothing. It was at that moment I realised this man was not so
much trying to disguise himself from the world as he was from himself.
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Meeting this client reinforced to me how important it is to understand pathological
lying so that the people it affects can discover a sense of understanding, empathy
and hope for change. Hence, this thesis is not intended to judge or marginalise the
person who pathologically lies, but is intended to help the reader and practitioner
unearth the inner vulnerable person, who, like a timorous hermit crab, retreats
behind their outer shell whenever someone gets close to their fallible essence.
Through their lies the pathological liar carves out a pseudo-self, which offers
temporary protection from inner demons and outer scrutiny; but what starts out as
protective armour eventually turns into a prison, with the pathological liar trapped
within a cycle of telling, maintaining and protecting their mendacities. By avoiding
life’s realities the pathological liar never learns how to heal whatever shame or
intolerable distress lies beneath their stories and thus they become imprisoned by
them. Through the repeated telling of their fantastical stories the pathological liar
forfeits a life of authenticity and for that reason he or she bears the biggest cost of all
– sacrificing ever being truly connected to themselves or the world around them.

My hope is that this thesis helps to illuminate the very real and human struggles
faced by people who pathologically lie, and that the information shared across the
pages provides pathological liars and/or their families encouragement to find
professionals who can help. I also hope the insights gained from my research
provide practitioners with a clearer understanding of the psychological mechanisms
underpinning pathological lying, and that those insights can guide treatment
provision in the future.
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ABSTRACT
Pathological lying, otherwise referred to as pseudologia fantastica, has not been
adequately defined, validated or conceptually anchored in a way which provides a
sound basis for its measurement, or which allows for conclusions to be produced and
applied to real-life cases. The absence of a clear, consistent, and scientifically
ratified definition impedes and, it could be argued, prevents systematic, empirical
research into this phenomenon. The aims of this thesis, therefore, are to elucidate
and stabilise the construct’s elemental features, provide an operational definition,
and identify valid and distinguishable diagnostic criteria. To achieve these aims
four separate but complementary investigations were undertaken. The first involved
a review and meta-analysis of the existing literature, with a particular focus on
published definitions of pathological lying. Thirty-two definitions were identified,
cross-analysed and reduced into one synoptic definitional description. This process
corroborated that while no universally endorsed definition exists it is a construct that
has global recognisability.

The second investigation thematically analysed 64

international and cross-generational case studies. The outcome was a nomothetic
profile of pathological lying outlining the construct’s core symptom and aetiological
constellations. An important finding was that there was enough between case-study
consistency to support the stance that pathological lying represents an autonomous
condition underpinned by a number of key behavioural and cognitive markers. The
third and fourth investigations formed the empirical arm of this thesis, capturing
current views of pathological lying as held by practising mental health clinicians.
Using a semi-structured interview protocol developed by a targeted focus group of
psychology experts, participants were asked to outline their experiences with
pathological liars.

The qualitative data extracted from these interviews was
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thematically analysed, providing an integrated account of the construct’s core
features. The collective findings of all four investigations indicate pathological liars
represent a sub-population, which can be distinguished from other clinical and nonclinical populations. A set of diagnostic criteria modelled on a DSM framework was
generated from the data. Systematic comparisons were drawn between pathological
lying and a target group of DSM-IV-TR diagnoses, providing an overview of
construct divergence and convergence.

Limitations and directions for future

research were discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
“He who permits himself to tell a lie once, finds it much easier to do it a second and
third time, till at length it becomes habitual.”
- Thomas Jefferson
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Rationale of thesis
The initial interest to study the phenomenon of pathological lying was propelled by
my own experiences as a psychologist working with clients who repeatedly
fabricated stories for no discernable reason, despite the endangerment to their own
reputations and relationships. I found these clients utterly fascinating and above all,
I found their proclivity for lying perplexing. It was with this confusion and curiosity
that I picked up the diagnostic manual (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychological
Association, 2000), first handed to me during my training, to look up pathological
lying, hoping to acquaint myself with the intricacies of the “disorder”. I soon
realised that no such disorder existed in the DSM-IV-TR or the ICD-10, and that in
fact, pathological lying held no position as a formally recognised psychiatric
condition. I was caught off guard by this finding, as I was confident pathological
lying was a recognised disorder. It was certainly a term I had heard and used many
times and I believed that I, and some of my colleagues, had identified clients who
would qualify for this label.

In reading about other forms of lying, I was

unconvinced that pathological lying, as I had seen it, could be explained by other
constructs, such as Factitious Disorder, malingering, confabulation, impostership,
manipulation, swindling, psychopathy or “conning”.

Many people I spoke to

informally shared a similar opinion and often felt compelled to tell me their stories
of known pathological liars, reinforcing that this was a phenomenon of distinct,
baffling and recognisable quality. As my literature search progressed, I discovered
pathological lying had been a concept formally pondered since the last part of the
19th Century, and that it was a “condition” commonly referred to as pseudologia
fantastica; a term I, and many of my colleagues, had never heard before.
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As a researcher I was captivated by the lack of formal recognition of pathological
lying and as I dug deeper into the topic I became intrigued and concerned by the
paucity of dedicated literature and research. I was acutely aware that such a dearth
of understanding would prevent clinicians from developing evidence-based
treatment formulation and practice. I was struck by several of my own rhetorical
questions: surely, this is a condition sparking interest for other people and not just
me? Surely pathological lying is observed in other people’s clients and not just
mine? And surely, this is a behaviour that causes distress and damage to people’s
lives which, indubitably makes it a worthy “condition” to study and understand?
Such questions formed the motivation for this research.

Current status of research
Our understanding of pathological lying rests upon a weak theoretical foundation,
which has resulted in inadequate definition, insufficient measurement, loosely
formed assumptions and unsubstantiated conclusions. While the current literature
generates some insight into this phenomenon, it does not provide a consistent, robust
definition or operationalisation of pathological lying and as a result the parameters
of the construct remain cursory, under developed and vague. Important questions
for defining pathological lying include: how should it be operationalised given
difficulties quantifying psychological phenomenon; how should it be distinguished
from other constructs and what symptoms and what severity thresholds must be met
for this label to be applied.
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Despite the best efforts of clinicians who have reported their case studies when
available (e.g., Snyder, 1986) and researchers who have revived and kept alive the
topic in recent and less recent years (e.g., Dike, Baranoski & Griffith, 2005; Ford,
1996; King & Ford, 1988), the conjectures and theories of these experts have been
diluted by the shortage of empirical evidence to support them. It is not entirely clear
why more literature on pathological lying does not exist; one can only speculate that
it could be due to the intangible nature of the construct, or that it is too complex to
study, or too rare and elusive to recruit adequate samples, or alternatively, the topic
may have been overlooked because it does not exist formally as a distinct and
identifiable construct. While the current literature fails to explain adequately the
paucity of available research, it does reveal that clinicians do report, both in case
studies and anecdotally, that they are dealing with “pathological liars” as distinct
from other conditions.

Little-by-little, publication-by-publication, the area of

pathological lying research is expanding. However, there is still a very long way to
go before this concept is recognised as a condition or syndrome with formal criteria.

“A liar by any other name…” – terminological considerations
It is generally agreed that the phenomenon of pathological lying was first described
in published format by Anton Delbruck (1891), a German physician who was, by all
accounts, fascinated by a subset of patients whom he observed engaging in grossly
abnormal and disproportionate fabrications. The literature indicates that it was
Delbruck who first coined the term pseudologia fantastica, a term used to demarcate
this patient group from other clinical presentations.

Since that time, the term

pathological lying has been used pervasively throughout the literature as a synonym
for pseudologia fantastica, but not without criticism. There has been some debate
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about the appropriateness of using the two terms interchangeably with several
authors arguing pseudologia fantastica is a variation of pathological lying and that
pathological lying is a broader umbrella term that encompasses all forms of
problematic lying including Factitious Disorder, malingering, confabulation,
swindling, impostership, false accusation and pseudologia fantastica (e.g., Birch,
Kelln & Aquino, 2006; King & Ford, 1987; Sharrock & Cresswell, 1989; Snyder,
1986; Wiersma, 1933). Another argument for delineation of terms was made by
King and Ford (1987) who referred to Wiersma’s (1933) distinction that lying
should be viewed on a continuum with “normal lying” on one pole and pseudologia
fantastica representing the most extreme form of lying on the opposite pole, a
position that was reiterated a year later by Ford, King and Hollender (1988).
Conversely, authors such as Dike, Baranoski and Griffith (2005) acknowledge that
there may be semantic differences between terms like pseudologia fantastica,
pathological lying, mythomania and morbid lying, but that for the purposes of their
paper they made no distinction and saw interchangeable use as appropriate. From
my extensive reading of the literature I was unable to locate any evidence to support
the argument that the two terms, pathological lying and pseudologia fantastica,
should be positioned separately.

None of the authors mentioned, for instance,

provided differential definitions of the two concepts, nor did they provide case
illustrations to demonstrate perceived differences in terms. The only real difference
appears to be one of national origin, with pseudologia fantastica originating from
Germany, and pathological lying originating from English speaking authors. When
comparing articles written on pathological lying to articles written on pseudologia
fantastica there is almost no difference in the core constellation of symptoms, and
where differences exist they do not significantly impact on the construct’s central
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identity.

Therefore, in the absence of any conclusive evidence that the term

pseudologia fantastica is distinct from the term pathological lying, the two terms
will be used interchangeably in this thesis, a position supported by Dike (2008) and
Dike, Baranoski and Griffith (2005). I was also unable to locate sound evidence that
pathological lying should be considered and used as an umbrella term to encompass
all forms of problematic lying. For instance, across all of my research I only found
one author, Yang et al. (2005; 2007), who used the term pathological lying when
discussing a spectrum of lying conditions; a decision that was later criticised by
other commentators (e.g., Dike, 2008; Dike, Baranoski & Griffith, 2006; Spence,
2005). With the exception of Yang et al. (2005; 2007) there were no articles found
that used the term pathological lying to denote instances of confabulation,
malingering, factitious disorder, swindling, false accusation, or impostership.

In 2006 Adetunji, Basil, Budur and Oladinni submitted a letter to the Journal of the
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law in critique of Dike, Baranoski and
Griffith’s (2005) decision to use the term ‘pathological liar’. Adetunji et al. (2006)
felt the term was pejorative and failed to reflect a disease viewpoint; in their mind,
“pathological lying” represents a moral judgement that thwarts efforts to find
medical interventions for sufferers. Adetunji et al. (2006) does not suggest an
alternative label to use in its place but does feel investigators need to establish
whether pathological lying represents an ego-syntonic or ego-dystonic behaviour
and whether or not the behaviour is primary or secondary to other psychiatric
conditions. Adetunji et al.’s (2006) advocacy for this type of categorisation is made
in the context of treatment considerations, where they recommend SSRI and
anticonvulsant medication for those pathological liars who exhibit impulsive or
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compulsive predispositions. Dike, Baranoski and Griffith (2006) argued that the
term is consistent with a disease viewpoint of psychiatric disorders and that it is
useful because it stays consistent with the literature. Dike, Baranoski and Griffith
(2006) acknowledge that Adetunji et al.’s (2006) support for a new, less stigmatising
term may be valid but that the aim of their article in 2005 was to develop uniform
criteria for the phenomenon rather than explore the merits of the term.

While respecting and seeing the merits of the pejorative viewpoint, there are
utilitarian motives behind using the term pathological lying for this thesis, the first
of which is recognisability. When the search term pathological lying was entered
into the internet search engine, Google, there was an estimated 483,000 web pages
dedicated to the topic, suggesting that there is a reasonable number of people sharing
an interest in the subject. It also indicates that, at a lay level, there is a broad
selection of people who hold a sense of the term’s meaning, which sits consistently
with my anecdotal observation that pathological lying is a term with which people
are familiar. In contrast, pseudologia fantastica is a term rarely used outside of
scholarly circles and has relatively fewer dedicated web pages (24,000). Informally
I came across no colleagues who recognised the term, nor could they deduce the
term’s meaning by simply hearing or sighting it.

The second motive behind using the term pathological lying was an empathic one;
when the word “pathological” is paired with the word “lying” it conjures images of
someone who fabricates falsehoods in a manner that is appreciably atypical and
maladaptive. The Macquarie Dictionary (1998) defines pathological as “due to or
involving disease” and the same dictionary defines pathology as any abnormal state,
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which contradicts Adetunji et al.’s (2006) claim that the term fails to reflect a
disease viewpoint. The word “pathological” should denote to audiences that the
behaviour generates clinically significant distress, and/or causes impairment to
important areas of the person’s functioning, similar to the way psychiatric disorders
are distinguished by the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000). The term “pathological” should
also signify that the behaviour in question is not necessarily volitional or
controllable. To remove or replace “pathological” from the term would potentially
minimise the seriousness of this “psychological condition”, which can,
paradoxically, perpetuate further vilification of the pathological liar. The power of
using such a term is that it carries an awareness that people with pathological lying
tendencies suffer from a cluster of symptoms that greatly impair their capacity to
function according to normal societal standards and that the decision to lie is not
always made consciously, deliberately or happily.

From across the literature there has been a range of expressions considered as
alternatives for pathological lying including compulsive lying, problematic lying,
habitual lying, chronic lying, serious lying, abnormal lying, morbid lying,
mendacity, and mythomania. It was decided that pathological lying was the most
commonly used term amongst non-experts and would therefore be the most
recognisable term for readers and our research participants.

Developing the research project
My initial attempts to study pathological liars through experimental research
methods were thwarted by definitional uncertainty. While a number of definitions
have been published there has been a lack of evidence provided to support or justify
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their constructions. It became clear that until a stable definition of pathological
lying and corresponding diagnostic criteria were reached there could be no way to
reliably or validly recruit pseudologues (pathological liars) for controlled
experimental study. Any research project founded on a poorly construed definition
would be plagued by uncertainty around whether the researcher had actually tapped
into the construct or something else entirely. For this reason, it was decided to step
back and re-evaluate what defines pathological lying so that a stronger conceptual
foundation could be built and a more valid basis for research achieved. With this
aim in mind, I planned an extensive review of the existing literature focusing on a
conceptual analysis of the ways in which the term had been used and understood,
followed by a qualitative interview-based study into the experiences of
psychologists and psychiatrists who have treated or have had contact with people
they identified as pathological liars. The decision to interview clinicians rather than
a population identified as pathological liars was made for several reasons. Firstly,
the absence of diagnostic criteria prevented me from locating, diagnosing and
ethically recruiting the target population for study. Secondly, even if a population of
pathological liars were accessible, their penchant for lying would cast doubt onto the
credibility of their insights.

The first part of this research process would help stabilise the construct by
identifying the ways in which it has been historically used and understood. The
second part of the process would ascertain how the construct is currently being used
and understood. I anticipated that the data obtained from both methods would
enable me to reach and present a clearer understanding of the defining symptoms
and characteristics of pathological lying and its distinguishing features – or else
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come to the conclusion that the construct could not be distinguished from other
conditions and hence could not be stabilised in any meaningful way.

Thesis structure
The remainder of this thesis is organised into five chapters, more specifically:
Chapter One describes Study 1, Part 1, which identifies the quality and quantity of
available research on pseudologia fantastica and the ease with which researchers and
clinicians can access that research. Chapter One also serves as a literature review
detailing the main findings and research dilemmas surrounding pathological lying,
looking specifically at how researchers have defined and conceptualised pseudologia
fantastica throughout the ages. At the conclusion of this chapter a description of
pathological lying was generated from the more commonly referenced definitional
themes. The outcome of Study 1, Part 1 laid the groundwork and direction for all
subsequent chapters. In particular, the results of this study indicated that a metaanalytical approach would be the most useful method for consolidating and
understanding the case study material uncovered in the database searches. This then
became the aim of Chapter Two.

Chapter Two presents Study 1, Part 2, a meta-analysis designed to make sense of the
fragmented case study material found across the wider literature. In Chapter Two
these case studies underwent methodological scrutiny and thematic analysis, the
purpose of which was to create an empirically-based nomothetic profile of
pseudologia fantastica. The conceptual analysis spanned across 64 case studies, and
comprehensively detailed the factors consistently linked to pathological lying to a
degree not previously published.
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Chapter Three describes Study 2, Part 1 where a panel of psychology experts
formed a focus group to create the interview questions and structure for Study 2,
Part 2. Participants were asked, as a group, to create a set of questions that could tap
into and illuminate the construct of pseudologia fantastica. The questions created by
the focus group became the basis of a semi-structured interview protocol used in
Study 2, Part 2.

Chapter Four describes Study 2, Part 2, the final study of this series. This study is
an empirical and theoretical examination of pathological lying based on interviews
with 13 psychologists and one psychiatrist. These 14 clinicians were interviewed
about their experiences with persons whom they believed to be pathological liars.
Repeated clinical impressions were extracted, thematically analysed and combined
to create a nomothetic profile and definitional description of pathological lying.

Chapter Five takes the form of an annotated results section designed to guide the
reader through the combined learning from all four chapters. This chapter firstly
reflects on the pathological elements of the construct and organises data from
Chapters Two and Four into provisional diagnostic criteria modelled on a current
DSM-IV-TR frame.

The chapter concludes with a systematic comparison of

pathological lying and a target group of psychiatric conditions, a process that
supports the understanding that pathological lying is a unitary and distinct construct.
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Lastly, the Conclusion summarises the key achievements of the research, considers
the intrapsychic function of pathological lying, discusses limitations and provides
directions for future research.
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CHAPTER ONE
A systematic, critical review of the existing literature on
pseudologia fantastica - Study 1, Part 1
“Sometimes the lies you tell are less frightening than the loneliness you might feel if
you stopped telling them.”
-

Brock Clarke
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While providing an extensive literature review, this chapter also takes the form of a
study where the data consists of peer-reviewed publications.

1.1 Aims
The aims of this preliminary study were to:
1. Identify the volume and type of literature covering the topic of pathological
lying/pseudologia fantastica;
2. Provide an overview of the literature, outlining the key findings and research
dilemmas to date, and
3. Identify and compare how researchers define pathological lying/pseudologia
fantastica and look for consistency around terminology and meaning.

1.2 Research questions
The above aims yielded the following research questions:
1. What does the literature tell us about pathological lying/pseudologia
fantastica and its treatment?
2. What dilemmas have plagued research endeavours into this phenomenon?
3. Has pathological lying/pseudologia fantastica been identified as a distinct
concept within published research?
4. Has

pathological

lying/pseudologia

fantastica

been

defined

and

operationalised in a manner that is consistent and relevant in the available
research?
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1.3 Method
An exploration of the literature was carried out by systematically entering key
search terms into four commonly used scientific databases: Firstly, “PsycArticles”;
secondly “ProQuest Dissertations and Theses”; thirdly “PsychInfo”, and finally
“Pubmed”.

The terms entered were: pathological lying; pathological liar;

pathological lies; pseudologia fantastica; mythomania; chronic lying; chronic liar;
compulsive lying; compulsive liar; impulsive lying; impulsive liar; habitual lying;
habitual liar; abnormal lying; abnormal liar; problematic lying; problematic liar and
lying.

References retrieved were then analysed for relevance to the construct of
pseudologia fantastica, as opposed to other clearly identified forms of lying such as
malingering. Articles were categorised as irrelevant if there was no mention of any
related terms within the body of the text or if there was only a glancing allusion to
one of the associated terms without elaboration.

For instance, many articles

pertained to the construct of psychopathy, and within these articles there were often
brief mentions that an element of psychopathy is the presence of pathological lying.
Generally speaking these articles were categorised as irrelevant because they
provided no exploration of the concept of pathological lying, nor did they make
efforts to define or explain the term.
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1.4 Results and discussion
1.4.1 Type and breadth of literature available
The results from the database searches have been arranged into two sections; the
first section is presented here in prose, while the second section can be found in the
first Appendix, and has been structured across four tables. The tables found in
Appendix One show the way in which the key search terms listed in the method
section (e.g., pathological lying, chronic lying etc.,) were used within the literature,
the number of results overall, the number of search results that were relevant to
elucidating the concept and the number which were irrelevant. The tables can be
viewed as a visual accompaniment to this results section.

The first part of these results addresses the first three research questions. Overall,
the impressions taken from the database searches indicate that there is a relatively
small amount of relevant material available in the broader psychiatric literature and
what is available is difficult to locate quickly.

These findings support the

observation made by Dike, Baranoski and Griffith (2005) that interest in the topic of
pathological lying has waned drastically in recent years and that the psychiatric
literature available sheds a mere “modest light” on the construct.

An overview of the number and type of articles yielded from the “PsychArticles”
database is presented here in illustration of the typical difficulties encountered
across database searches. For example, when the search term, “pathological lying”,
was entered 56 search results were recovered. Forty of these were relevant to
psychopathy or violent offenders or dealt directly with the “Hare Psychopathy
Checklist”.

None dealt specifically or meaningfully with pathological lying
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although the articles would often make minimal reference to the term without
explaining it or using it as a term of interest. Two articles dealt with the construct of
hypocrisy, four articles explored Munchausen Syndrome, two search hits were
reviews of Charles Ford’s book ‘Lies, lies, lies!!!’, one article was written about
malingering and six articles fell under a miscellaneous category that had no real
connection with pathological lying. Out of the 56 possibilities only one article was
directly written about pathological lying; this article was a review written by Meyer
Solomon in 1916, which looked at the work of Healy and Healy (1915). Other
search terms yielded no relevant articles except for “pseudologia fantastica” which
was the most successful with regards to information and relevance. This term
generated 14 search results, one of which was relevant to malingering and deception,
and a second, which was relevant to factitious disorder combined with pseudologia
fantastica. Five of the remaining articles covered the disorder known as Factitious
Disorder, while the remaining six were a miscellaneous assortment of topics
including psychopathy and automatism, all of which had questionable relevance to
the construct of pseudologia fantastica.

The figures from the four database searches indicated the PsychInfo database was
the most sensitive to detecting and retrieving articles across all search terms except
for one; Pubmed database actually found two relevant articles for the search term
“habitual liar” compared to one search result from PsychInfo. The described
endeavours to locate useable research illuminated just how difficult it would be for a
practitioner, with limited time, to amass a meaningful clinical picture of pathological
lying. What’s more, it became evident that there is nowhere for clinicians to go to
find a shortcut consensus definition of pathological lying, let alone a reliable set of
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treatment recommendations. This very finding was vitally useful for paving the way
forward for this thesis and providing an overarching aim – to consolidate and make
sense of the fragmented and elusive literature.

In relation to the question, what is the type of research available on this concept,
there were eight literature modalities found including: single and multiple case study
reports; single-case experimental designs; randomised controlled multiple subject
experimental studies; an archival investigation; meta-analyses; commentary papers
reviewing the literature; discussion letters, and books. The following discussion of
findings is presented in the form of a literature review and provides detail about
what the major research modes revealed about the construct of pathological lying.

1.4.2 Single and multiple case study reports
The most popular form of published research was single and multiple case study
reports. From the 43 relevant case study papers published from across the globe,
more than 132 unique case studies were identified. The majority of these were
located in English language journals. Nineteen foreign language papers were
discovered but only one translated into English. This was an article composed by
Dutch authors, Janssens, Morrens and Sabbe (2008) and it contained two case
studies both of which proved informative.

Despite the invaluable clinical information provided by these case studies, a number
failed to present an anchoring definition of pathological lying, and even more failed
to explain the rationale for categorising their case study as a pseudologue. Only a
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small handful of published case studies would meet criteria for a scientific study, an
issue that is explored in greater detail in Study 1, Part 2.

1.4.3 Single-subject experimental design studies
Three single-subject studies with testable research hypotheses were reported in the
literature. The first was published by Stones (1976) and aimed to identify some of
the factors that underlie pathological lying and explicitly test the hypothesis that
pathological liars possess construct systems that are atypically loose over a wide
range of conventional, socially relevant constructs. Their hypothesis was derived
from Kelly’s (1955) Personal Construct Theory.

In order to test out their

hypothesis, Stones (1976) administered the Grid Test of Thought Disorder to their
single subject as a way of measuring the degree of tightness/looseness of their
construing. The test scores from their participant were then compared to normative
standard scores derived from non-thought disordered populations selected from
earlier studies. Stones postulated that the results from the Grid Test supported the
hypothesis that an unreliable understanding of the social environment might underlie
the tendency to emit inconsistent verbal statements.

A second single-participant study came from Powell, Gudjonsson and Mullen
(1983) who utilised a test called the guilty-knowledge technique to investigate the
hypothesis that pathological liars deceive with complete ease, and without any of the
typical physiological responses traditionally associated with distress and guilt. Their
findings rejected this hypothesis with the authors arguing that pseudologues can
experience far more unease and guilt when engaging in acts of deception than
previously assumed.

34

The third and final single-participant study came from Modell, Mountz and Ford
(1992) who tested the hypothesis that the inferior portions of the frontal lobe, the
heads of the caudate nuclei and the thalamus, play a role in pathological lying
behaviours. They used functional imaging methods to compare CT scans of their
subject with the scans of nine normal control volunteers who had no history of
mental illness or neurological disease. They concluded that the decreased functional
activity of the right hemithalamus of their patient, along with the lesser decrease of
the right inferior frontal cortex, may be responsible for their patient’s tendency to lie
impulsively and may also account for the difficulty their patient displays in
recognising the veracity of their speech until after they had lied. Modell, Mountz
and Ford (1992) did, however, admit their results and interpretations could not be
interpreted as causal evidence that pathological lying is a behavioural response to an
underlying neurological deficit.

1.4.4 Meta-analyses
Across the literature three meta-analytical reviews were located (Healy & Healy,
1915; King & Ford, 1988; Wiersma, 1933). Healy and Healy’s (1915) landmark
work analysed the case study histories of 19 “mentally normal” juvenile offenders
who pathologically lied in the absence of any discernible psychiatric or
neurobiological defect. Wiersma (1933) collected 30 case descriptions from across
the literature and proceeded to note the properties of pseudologia fantastica and the
frequency in which those properties presented.

It is unclear, however, where

Wiersma collected the case studies as no reference list was provided. King and
Ford’s (1988) article was a more traditional meta-analysis that collated and
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interpreted data from 72 published and non-published case study reports. The
combined wisdom from these reviews sheds light on aetiological determinants,
including hereditary vulnerabilities, medical abnormalities, neurocognitive profiles,
psycho-social factors, intrapsychic pathways, and ego-centrism. The reviews also
give consideration to symptomatological characteristics and differential diagnostics.
A number of these topics overlap with the topics explored in the commentary papers
discussed below and so the two research modalities will be combined to create a
more coherent discussion.

1.4.5 Commentary papers and reviews of the literature
Seven English-written commentary papers spanning a period of 66 years (1942 to
2008) were located in the database searches. Another 10 non-English articles were
retrieved which, from their abstracts, appeared to provide commentary on the
concept of pathological lying. All in all, there were potentially 17 commentary
papers designed to discuss the intricacies of pathological lying.

A paper was

categorised as a commentary piece if it discussed the phenomenon without
providing a case study or any experimental results.

The first commentary paper found was authored by Selling in 1942; the next
commentary paper was written 46 years later by Ford, King and Hollender (1988).
It took another fifteen years for Ken Hausman to write about pathological lying in
2003. Hausman’s article was essentially an overview of a presentation he saw given
by Dike and Griffith in 2002 at the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law.
Since that time another four commentary papers have been published all with
varying opinions about definitional construction, the degree of control involved in
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pathological lying, level of impairment to reality testing, choice, responsibility,
consistency in symptoms and links to other psychiatric conditions (Dike, 2008;
Dike, Baranoski & Griffith, 2005; Grubin, 2005; Turner, 2006). While useful, such
discussions were weakened by the lack of clarity around the central concept. An
overview of the main observations and arguments from both the meta-analytical
literature and commentary papers follows.

1.4.5.1 Problems with definition
Healy and Healy (1915) prefaced their review by stating “better definition goes hand
in hand with better understanding”. In recognition that no clear definition existed,
Healy and Healy (1915) created their own defining criteria, which included:
falsifications that are entirely disproportionate to any discernable end and rarely
about a single event; most commonly manifesting over a period of years, or even a
lifetime; representing a trait rather than an episode, and involving extensive, very
complicated fabrications. However, despite Healy and Healy's (1915) definition,
modern commentators, such as Dike, Baranoski and Griffith (2005), argue that a
significant amount of vagueness and confusion continues to permeate people’s
understanding and study of pathological lying. The outcome of poor understanding
is that researchers are not exploring the construct in formal mediums.

Dike,

Baranoski and Griffith (2005) held that the lack of published research was not
necessarily commensurate with the real world prevalence of the construct and that
professionals should not confuse research paucity with phenomenonological rarity.
According to Hausman (2002), Dike and Griffith espoused that the dearth of
literature more likely reflects a knowledge deficit, which makes it difficult for
psychiatrists to recognise pathological lying in clinical practice, an opinion that was
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again raised by Dike, Baranoski and Griffith in 2005. Dike (2008) reiterated that
pathological lying remains a controversial topic whose definitional constitution
remains vague and unclear. By 2008, however, he was slightly more optimistic that
psychiatry was starting to converge on a uniform definition of pathological lying and
that there was now an agreed sense of its core elements.

1.4.5.2 Unified and distinct construct
Healy and Healy (1915) opened their review by stating that a formal, detailed
contemplation of pathological lying would need to take place before new lines of
demarcation could be defined. The issue of differentiating pathological lying from
other constructs has been a long-standing and difficult problem. A number of
commentators have distinguished pathological lying from other identifiable
disorders (e.g., Dike, 2008; Dike, Baranoski & Griffith, 2005; Hausman, 2002)
however, there are consistent citations in the literature that link pathological lying to
other constructs.

While Healy and Healy (1915) relay the observation that

pathological lying should be separated from other diagnoses, they believe
pathological lying can occur alongside other forms of deception such as swindling,
stealing, absconding and impostureship. According to Healy and Healy (1915) there
were “wonderfully strong” correlations between absconding, itinerancy and
pathological lying; the two veteran authors claim that all three behaviours probably
emanate from general character instability, an unwillingness to meet the realities of
life and an inclination to escape adverse consequences. King and Ford (1988)
observed a similar trend in their data with at least half of the cases reviewed
showing tendencies towards peregrination. King and Ford (1988) also identified
that nearly one quarter of pseudologues will simulate signs of illness and half will
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engage in various crimes of deception such as theft, swindling, forgery and
plagiarism.

The viewpoints showcased here illustrate the ongoing dilemma of how

to consider pathological lying when it sits alongside a multitude of other generalised
behaviours and psychiatric conditions.

While pathological lying has been observed co-morbidly alongside other psychiatric
conditions and while it has been speculated that it is rarely a symptom by itself,
research-practitioners such as Healy and Healy (1915), Dike (2008) and Dike,
Baranoski and Griffith (2005) have also observed that persons can meet informal
definitions of pathological lying without any noticeable defect or disease of another
kind. Not all commentators are in agreement with this position; for instance Grubin
(2005) argues that it is doubtful pathological lying can be distinguished from
Factitious Disorder. He also hypothesises that closer examination of pathological
lying cases would likely reveal an underlying personality disturbance, such as
narcissism. Grubin (2005) cautions others about categorising pathological lying as a
distinct pathology, especially when there is a marked shortage in knowledge and
research.

To distinguish or not to distinguish pathological lying from other diagnoses has been
a hotly debated question for a long time now. The question potentially remains
unanswered because pathological lying manifests both in the presence and absence
of other delineable diagnoses. When a pathological liar meets diagnostic criteria for
other conditions it becomes difficult to determine whether the person's mendacities
are being driven by that condition or whether pathological lying is still a principal
diagnostic consideration. Dike, Baranoski and Griffith (2005) brought this thinking
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into the modern arena when they revived the theorisations of Healy and Healy
(1915). Healy and Healy (1915) postulated that a distinction should be drawn
between persons who fabricate in the absence of any discernible psychiatric
condition (which Dike, Baranoski & Griffiths, 2005, categorise as primary
pathological liars) and persons who fabricate as a direct complication of a
psychiatric condition (which Dike, Baranoski & Griffiths, 2005, categorise as
secondary pathological liars).

Healy and Healy (1915) were so adamant that

pathological lying needs to be considered in its own right that they incorporated
differential diagnosis recommendations into their definition. In contrast, Selling
(1942), felt pathological lying could be divided into five subcategories and that four
of these categories could be definable by an underlying psychiatric cause, such as
psychosis, psychotoidism, psychopathic personality, and neurosis. Selling (1942),
did, however, postulate that it is possible for pathological lying to manifest without
an underlying psychiatric cause, calling this form of pathological lying, “lying as a
habit pattern”.

In Selling’s paper (1942) he looks at the behaviour of lying and its various
manifestations within five different psychiatric conditions accepted at that time,
which included the psychotic lying process; the psychotoid liar; compulsive or
neurotic lying; lying as a habit pattern and lying within psychopathic personality. In
reading his paper it becomes clear that Selling’s (1942) sense of psychopathic
personality, psychosis and neurosis is qualitatively different to current
understandings, which makes cross-comparisons with more contemporary articles
difficult. With this limitation in mind, Selling’s (1942) paper highlights the complex
overlap between various psychiatric conditions and evokes considered thought about
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the question, what are the core elements of pathological lying that set it apart from
other constructs? And conversely, it raises the question, are commentators simply
over pathologising a behavioural symptom of other conditions and calling it
pathological lying?

In the end Selling (1942) puts forth his position that

pathological lying possesses enough specific characteristics to justify its position as
a unique condition, and that persons classified under this banner can be demarcated
from other groups. Selling (1942), does, however, temper this position by saying
the population is not homogeneous and should be broken down into sub-groups and
evaluated according to the disorder of the psyche that lies behind each individual
case, a statement which seems to throw contradiction to his previous assertion.

Ford, King and Hollender’s (1988) review article resuscitates the debate around
differential diagnosis. Ford, King and Hollender (1988) specifically outline the
association between lying in general and Antisocial, Histrionic, Narcissistic,
Borderline and Compulsive Personality Disorders as per the third edition of the
DSM; their descriptions detail the unique ways in which lying would manifest and
function within each of these clinical groups. They also look at the reciprocal
relationship between lying and personality disorders, where the personality disorder
may provide a driving force for the act of lying, but that lying may in turn evoke
central dilemmas within the personality structure, thus perpetuating the core
symptoms of the personality disorder.

For example, a patient with Borderline

Personality Disorder may lie to prevent their partner abandoning them but when the
lie is discovered it places the patient at greater risk of rejection and abandonment. It
is important to highlight that in their article Ford, King and Hollender (1988)
seamlessly transition between talking about non-pathological and pathological lying
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with no clear demarcation given between the two concepts, which is problematic.
For instance, Ford, King and Hollender (1988) speak about pathological lying in
their brief discussion of Borderline Personality Disorder, but when discussing
compulsive personality disorder they refer to general forms of lying and again when
discussing Narcissistic Personality Disorder they talk about exaggeration and
manipulation, with no mention of pseudologia fantastica.

The overarching

conclusion drawn by Ford, King and Hollender (1988) is that lying is a normative
part of individuation, but when it takes on a persistent and compulsive quality it may
be indicative of pathological narcissism reflecting super-ego deficits, as well as
attempts to master experiences of powerlessness and regulate self-esteem. They also
concluded by saying pathological lying may reflect core ego deficits. This last
comment may provide support for the argument that pathological lying could be
categorised as another variation of personality disturbance, underpinned by the same
ego impairment that theoretically underlies most personality disorders. This raises
the question of whether pathological liars should be classified under the Personality
Disorder Not Otherwise Specified diagnosis of the DSM-IV-TR.

In 2005, Dike, Baranoski and Griffith looked at pathological lying and its links with
various psychiatric conditions, including Malingering, Confabulation, Ganser’s
Syndrome, Factitious Disorder, Borderline, Antisocial, Histrionic and Narcissistic
Personality Disorder and delusion. They outlined that pathological lying can be
differentiated from malingering on the basis that the purpose of the lie in
pathological lying is often unclear, whereas the purpose behind malingering is often
distinct and identifiable. They also outlined that while pathological liars are rarely
motivated by an external incentive, malingerers are almost exclusively driven by
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external incentives. Dike, Baranoski and Griffith (2005) also held that pathological
liars often fabricate with impaired awareness, whereas malingerers engage in
deliberate and conscious acts of deception.

They repeated the process of

differentiating pathological lying from Factitious Disorder, Confabulation, Ganser’s
Syndrome and delusion, with clear rationales for why each construct is unique and
separate from pathological lying. Their conceptualisations added weight to the
emerging opinion that pathological lying should be earmarked for its own diagnostic
category.

In 2008 Dike re-examined the differential diagnosis debate; this time he wrote about
how it is becoming clearer to him that there are documented cases of pathological
liars who have no pre-existing or co-existing psychiatric disorder. Dike (2008)
argued for stronger differentiation between pathological lying and other psychiatric
conditions, in particular, he believed there was a qualitative difference between the
lying habits of pathological liars and the lying habits of individuals diagnosed with
personality disorders.

At one point, Dike (2008) even espoused that certain

psychiatric disorders, presumably the Cluster B Personality Disorders, malingering
and confabulation, have been “confused with pathological lying” (p. 72). It is
interesting to note where authors perceive demarcation points. In the example of
Dike (2008), he perceived that pathological lying could be demarcated from lying
within Borderline Personality Disorder on the basis that lies amongst the latter
diagnostic group often lack the elaborate, fantastic and complicated flavours so
consistently observed amongst pathological liars, nor does the pseudologue struggle
with emotional dysregulation or suicidal ideation and self-harm in the same way that
a person with Borderline Personality does.

Dike (2008) also concluded that
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pathological liars are different to persons with Antisocial Personality Disorder on
the basis that they are not lying to secure external gains, nor do they hold a
childhood diagnosis of Conduct Disorder. Even though in 2005, Dike, Baranoski
and Griffith believed pathological lying was linked to Factitious Disorder, in Dike’s
(2008) commentary he distances the two constructs by saying pathological lying
covers a more diverse range of falsifications than deceiving to assume the sick role.

1.4.5.3

Attempts to address diagnostic criteria

Turner (2006), advocated for a revision of current diagnostic systems and their
manner of dealing with Factitious Disorder and pseudologia fantastica.

He

critically examined the DSM-IV-TR criteria for Factitious Disorder and surmised
that the diagnostic layout failed to capture the essence of pseudologia fantastica and
excluded many pseudologues from qualifying for this diagnostic category. Turner
(2006) argued that the DSM needs to be reformulated to reflect greater nosological
sensitivity and provide guidance and consideration for pseudologia fantastica, false
confessions and impersonations. He also levelled criticism at the decision by the
DSM-IV committee to limit the scope of the Factitious Disorder diagnosis to
persons who feign or intentionally induce physical symptoms. Grubin (2005) was
another author who felt separating pathological lying from Factitious Disorder was
not necessarily appropriate as he questioned whether “assuming the sick role” was a
sufficient way to differentiate the two constructs.

While the majority of authors argued pathological lying can and should be
distinguished from other conditions and psychiatric phenomenon, it is probably
important to give consideration to the enthusiasm of the published author. It is quite
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likely that persons supporting the position that pathological lying is a distinct
construct are more motivated to publish their opinions because it is a position that
deviates from current diagnostic classifications.

In contrast, the clinician who

believes pathological lying should remain as an informal descriptor of an unusual
behaviour may not feel the same impetus or urgency to publish their viewpoint
because it is not yet threatened. Perhaps if pathological lying were accepted into the
next version of the DSM one would see an influx of articles contesting its inclusion.

1.4.5.4 Aetiological determinants – hereditary vulnerabilities
Healy and Healy (1915) reviewed hereditary pathogens and found only three or four
of the 19 “normal cases” came from families with striking defects.

Later on,

however, Healy and Healy (1915) documented the incidence of parental psychiatric
aberration and the figures from this discussion indicate that this figure should be
higher. Within the 19 “normal cases” Healy and Healy found six cases who had a
direct family link to insanity, six cases who had parents with severe alcoholism, four
cases who had parents with criminal or very dissolute backgrounds, one case whose
parent had suicided, another whose parent was extremely neuropathic, two who had
parents with syphilis and one case who had a parent with epilepsy. In the end, Healy
and Healy (1915) surmised that only two of the pseudologues originated from
“normal family stock”. King and Ford (1988) also explored prevalence rates of
familial mental and neurological instability and came to the conclusion that 10% of
pseudologues had parents with a history of alcoholism, and 30% of pseudologues
had parents or siblings with neuropsychiatric illnesses such as insanity, epilepsy,
sociopathy, nervousness and/or neurosyphilis. If future research were to indicate
strong genetic loading for mental instability amongst pseudologue’s families it
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would be important to tease out what is genetically caused and what is emotional
disturbance as a consequence of being raised around mental illness and what is
mental disturbance as a consequence of social learning.

There was minimal and inconsistent evidence of a hereditary basis for pathological
lying from Healy and Healy (1915) and King and Ford (1988), however, the data
from both reviews indicated that general types of mental illness predominate the
pseudologue's genetic and social history.

In King and Ford’s (1988) review they

only found one pseudologue who had a parent with pseudologia fantastica. Five of
Healy and Healy's (1915) 19 cases had a relative who chronically prevaricated. Two
of Healy and Healy's cases had parents who prevaricated, but it was discovered that
there was no genetic relationship between the pseudologue and identified parent,
giving rise to Healy and Healy’s (1915) theory that “psychic contagion” is a more
reasonable aetiological explanation than inheritable factors. The area of genetic
predisposition was not explored as an area of key interest across the commentary
papers, but there were strong indications from Healy and Healy's (1915) data that
pathological lying originates in childhood.

1.4.5.5 Aetiological factors – neurobiological and/or medical substrate
Another question explored across the commentaries and meta-analyses is whether a
neurobiological substrate underlies pathological lying (Dike, 2008; Ford & King,
1988; Ford, King & Hollender, 1988; Grubin, 2005; Healy & Healy, 1915). Healy
and Healy (1915) conducted one of the first systematic investigations into the
correlation between ill health, head trauma and pathological lying. They found, for
instance, a number of their cases had documented illnesses or significant physical
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disruptions during their birth or early childhood. They also found a correlation
between epileptic mental states and pathological lying, especially in cases cited by
foreign writers, adding weight to the argument that there is a possible neuro-physical
abnormality underpinning this “syndrome”. Based on the frequency in which it has
been referenced, it appears as if King and Ford’s (1988) meta-review fuelled much
of the modern thinking on neurobiology and its relationship to pathological lying.
Quite often articles will cite King and Ford’s (1988) finding that 40% of 72 cases
had evidence of central nervous system dysfunction as a way of supporting the
stance that neurobiology plays an important role. King and Ford (1988) identified
several forms of central nervous system abnormality including epilepsy, abnormal
EEG, head trauma and central nervous system infection. The neurobiological angle
was re-invigorated by Modell, Mountz and Ford (1992) when they found right
hemithalamic dysfunction in a single case of pseudologia fantastica and again in
2005 and 2007 when Yang et al. (2005; 2007) found pre-frontal white matter
differences between pathological and non-pathological liars. There is not much in
the way of a debate about this topic, more a recognition that there is evidence of
neurological abnormalities amongst a proportion of pseudologues (e.g., Ford, King
& Hollender, 1988). Dike (2008) makes reference to all three papers mentioned
above, but only critically considers Yang et al.’s (2005) MRI study. Dike (2008)
asserted that the observations from Yang et al.’s (2005) work is problematic and
misleading because they have confused the constructs of malingering and
pathological lying, and the design of their study assumes pathological liars are
psychopaths.

While Grubin (2005) does not comment on the neurobiological

literature he does maintain that unless there is evidence of brain dysfunction,
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compulsivity or excessive impulsivity then pathological lying should be considered
plain lying.

1.4.5.6 Aetiological factors – neurocognitive profiles
The question of whether pathological liars' brains are wired or structured differently
to others is a difficult one to answer. One of the more traditional ways to measure
neurology is to look at performance on cognitive capacity tests, such as intelligence
tests.

Across Healy and Healy’s (1915) dataset they found an unusual number of

pathological liars displaying great aptitude for expressive language, both verbal and
written. A large share of Healy and Healy’s 19 normal cases possessed average
intellectual abilities and showed no cognitive peculiarities. Healy and Healy (1915)
do wonder whether it was the combination of good verbal ability together with other
mental defects which gave rise to prevarication. King and Ford (1988) found similar
intelligence patterns within their data, with the majority of cases showing either
slightly below average to average intelligence or superior intellectual capacity. King
and Ford (1988) also found evidence of five pseudologues possessing significantly
better verbal IQ over performance IQ, supporting Healy and Healy’s (1915)
observation that pseudologues possess advanced verbal skills. King and Ford (1988)
feel the discrepancies observed between verbal and performance capabilities have
been commonly accepted by others as evidence of non-dominant hempispheric
dysfunction. When considering cognitive assessment measures, such as intelligence
tests, it is important to remember that these are indirect measures of brain structure
and functioning and cannot be held as solid proof of a neurological deficit. For
instance, research into the use of cognitive assessments have shown that many
variables, unrelated to brain function, can influence test performance, including
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language of origin, cultural background, socio-economic status, educational
attainment and exposure to learning opportunities, nutrition, anxiety, sleep, mood,
motivation and level of concentration on the day of testing, as well as errors relevant
to the administration, scoring and interpretation of the tests (Broman & Fletcher,
1999; Hinkle, 1994; Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004; Nelson, 2000; ShuttleworthEdwards, Kemp, Rust, Muirhead, Hartman & Radloff, 2004; Shuttleworth-Edwards,
Donnelly, Reid & Radloff, 2004; Van de Vijver & Hambleton, 1996).

1.4.5.7 Aetiological factors – psycho-social determinants
Healy and Healy (1915) gave due consideration to childhood environmental factors
and within this they found five out of the 19 cases came from good homes, while
two were born into poverty, two were raised by “ignorant parents”, six were raised
in households marked by “immorality”, six were parented by persons who lacked
appropriate parental control and one was considered to come from an erratic home
situation. Healy and Healy (1915) knew of eight cases who had been exposed to
“early untoward sex experiences”, which presumably means they were sexually
abused in adolescence or childhood. None of the other reviews or commentary
papers explored or considered environmental pathogens, but the strength of the
evidence seen in Healy and Healy’s (1915) data, gives sway to the importance of
looking into the occurrence of environmental stressors and/or traumas and exploring
their relationship to pathological lying.

1.4.5.8 Intrapsychic and motivational pathways
Healy and Healy (1915), Wiersma (1933) and Ford, King and Hollender (1988)
explored and considered some of the intrapsychic and motivational factors that
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potentially underscore pathological lying. Their decision to explore such factors
may be best surmised by Ford, King and Hollender's (1988) rationale that because
pathological lying repeats itself in the absence of any useful purpose, a more subtle,
unconscious explanation must be sourced. Healy and Healy (1915), for example,
linked pathological lying to the repression of emotional distress, which for several of
their cases was triggered by an event carrying a “deep emotional context”. Healy
and Healy (1915) argued that pathological lying is influenced by changes in the
person’s internal and external stress experience, with lying behaviours increasing in
response to increased levels of stress. With this stress-inducement theory in mind,
Healy and Healy (1915) considered whether the physical and psychical changes seen
in adolescence play a role in the development of pathological lying, as this is
typically seen as both a period of increased stress and the onset of pseudological
symptoms.

Wiersma (1933) explored the characterological nucleus of thirty

pathological liars and came to the conclusion that a nervous temperament and high
emotionality is common amongst them.

Wiersma (1933) speculated that

pathological lying is potentially a consequence of an exaggerated nervous
temperament but does not agree with the supposition that pseudologia fantastica is
always a by-product of hysteria, mostly because he has found traditional forms of
hysteria are often absent from patients presenting with pseudological symptoms.
Wiersma's (1933) observations complement Healy and Healy's hypothesis that
pathological lying compensates for or at least correlates with increased levels of
stress and emotionality. In Ford, King and Hollender's (1988) commentary they
examined four different motivational pathways and their association with
pathological lying and lying in general. One of the theories put forward was that
lying acts as a form of repression or denial; the premise being that lying may
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displace or disguise intrapsychic conflict and/or events that cannot be assimilated
into the person's psyche. This motivational theory appeared to echo the sentiments
of the previous two authors.

Ford, King and Hollender (1988) proposed three additional motivational pathways,
the first of which was that when the person lies they may be attempting to express
needs for autonomy as a way of seeking or maintaining independence, especially in
the face of controlling or intrusive actions from someone else. They also theorised
that the act of lying may be in pursuit of power and control, the rationale being that
knowledge equals power and the act of deception and secrecy denies others of
information. Ford, King and Hollender (1988) further speculated that individuals
who feel depleted of power may resort to lying in an attempt to secure control over
their environment. The next motivational theory considered was that lying, such as
what is seen in pseudologia fantastica, is a form of wish fulfilment or self-esteem
regulation.

With regards to the wish-fulfilment and self-esteem enhancement

theory, Ford, King and Hollender (1988) turn to the writings of Davidoff (1942)
who said the fantasy or lie involves some sense of gratification for persons who lack
the ability to sustain the effort to create or produce accomplishments of their own.
Ford, King and Hollender (1988) commented that this form of lying is more
commonly witnessed in persons who aspire to heights which exceed their abilities;
as such, they hold an ambition to present themselves as more successful than they
actually are.

From Healy and Healy’s (1915) observations the intrapsychic matrix of the
pathological liar appears to be inherently ego-centric, with pathological liars
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displaying undue amounts of self-assertion, very little sympathy or concern for
others, and little apprehension of other people’s opinions. Added to this ego-centric
observation, Healy and Healy (1915) believe that inherent in the majority of their 19
cases is a projection of a heroic image of the self, where the pathological liar
occupies a central stronghold in their false stories.

Healy and Healy’s (1915)

observation is corroborated by Wiersma’s (1933) finding that 70% of the thirty
reviewed pseudological cases were “vain” and 83.3% of their sample were found to
become engrossed in talking about themselves. Wiersma (1933) speculates that the
pseudologue’s extreme vanity and inclination to speak exclusively about themselves
means they will be mesmerised by the content of their own fictions; what’s more,
Wiersma (1933) views the pseudologue as someone who plays an important and
noble part in the stories they produce. In King and Ford’s (1988) review they found
all pseudologues told “aggressive lies”, which means the essence of the lie was to
serve a purpose of vanity, revenge, exaggeration and/or false accusation, while only
9% of their 72 cases produced “defensive lies”, which includes mendacities around
concealment, denial to secure sympathy, or to avoid punishment. King and Ford’s
(1988) figures appear in keeping with Healy and Healy (1915) and Wiersma’s
(1933) observation that pseudologues fabricate in an ego-centric fashion. King and
Ford (1988) also noted that their pool of case studies showed a propensity to make
false claims of achievements or connections to famous or influential people. They
did not specially relate this to vanity, but prevarications of this design do appear to
feed ego-centric and self-decorating desires.
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1.4.5.9 Volitional and delusional features of pathological lying
In the first half of the 20th century authors Healy and Healy (1915) and Wiersma
(1933) noted that amongst pseudologues there was evidence of reality testing
disturbances, resembling, in some cases, delusional belief systems. In more recent
times, commentary papers have formally pondered whether or not pathological liars
have control over their lying habits. Subsumed under this question are related
considerations around whether pseudologues have reality testing impairments,
whether they have the capacity to rein in the impulse or compulsion to lie, whether
or not they have conscious awareness of their lies, and whether or not they come to
believe their own falsehoods. An overview of the commentary and wider literature
indicates that none of the answers to these questions are black or white and that the
most accurate conclusion to draw, at this point, is pseudologues, as a general
population and on an individual level, oscillate between normal and impaired selfregulatory and reality-testing functioning.

Healy and Healy (1915) offered the observation that reality disturbances can be so
pronounced amongst pseudologues that it can be difficult for observers to
distinguish pseudology from delusion, although it was also held by Healy and Healy
(1915) that such a distinction was imperative as pathological lying should only be
considered in the absence of delusion. Wiersma’s (1933) interpretation of the case
study material was such that he believed the pseudologue’s extreme vanity and selfpreoccupation predisposes them to losing sight of reality, hindering their ability to
distinguish fact from fiction. Dike, Baranoski and Griffith (2005) considered the
issue of delusion by alluding to the works of earlier writers such as Koppen (1898),
Meunier (1904), Stemmerman (1906) and Vogt.

It was Koppen (1898) who
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speculated that pathological lies are by nature delusional because they represent a
real experience for the pseudologue. Meunier (1904) espoused that pseudological
lies can overwhelm and consume the identity of the pseudologue, where the
pseudologue becomes the lie. Stemmerman (1906) echoed Koppen's and Meunier’s
sentiments, voicing that the pseudologue has a nebulous hold on reality. Similarly,
Vogt (1910) interpreted the pathological liar as someone who indulges in a form of
wish-psychosis whereby they unwittingly find themselves believing their own
mendacities. However, Dike, Baranoski and Griffith (2005) raise, in support of the
argument that pathological liars wilfully lie, the observation that most pseudologues
have intact judgement in most other areas of their life. Collective opinion would
suggest that the pathological liar's conviction and sometimes temporary belief in
their lies can give an external impression of delusion but this is firmly discounted
once the pseudologue is vigorously challenged and they come to relinquish their
stories.

One step down from the delusion debate is the question of whether pseudologues
can possess awareness of their lying habits. According to Dike (2008) this question
has dogged the phenomenon for decades.

Dike (2008) opines that impaired

awareness is characteristic of the pseudologue as evidenced by their repeated
engagement in purposeless, self-injurious lying behaviours. Dike's (2008) theory,
however, is not solid evidence of impaired awareness, as it is feasible that someone
could repeatedly engage in self-destructive patterns, as long as there are sufficient
short-term rewards to reinforce the behaviour (Ford, King & Hollender, 1988); just
because someone repeatedly engages in an unhealthy, purposeless behaviour, like an
addiction, does not necessarily mean that the person lacks awareness.
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With regards to volition, Hausman's (2003) paper referenced Dike and Griffith's
(2002) observation that many pseudologues fabricate in a manner that is reminiscent
of someone who lacks behavioural control and awareness.

In 2005, Dike,

Baranoski and Griffith referenced earlier writers as a way of bolstering their
argument that pathological liars have limited control over their prevarications, for
instance, Stemmerman (1906), who observed pseudologues lying in an unplanned
and impulsive manner. It may well be the case that pathological liars fabricate in an
adhoc fashion, this does not necessarily mean they have no capacity to control their
mendacities.

Ultimately questions pertaining to volition, delusion and self-deception need to be
answered using empirical methods, such as large-scale experimental studies; a
process that cannot be pursued until definitional clarity is reached.

1.4.5.10 Treatment considerations
Commentators and researchers have highlighted that one of the most striking gaps in
the literature is a clear set of treatment recommendations. No commentator feels
confident espousing a particular treatment model, although most say this is an area
needing immediate address (e.g., Dike, 2008; Selling, 1942).

Dike (2008)

confirmed that there is no perceptible recommended treatment option nor are there
any treatment efficacy studies, however, the most common form of treatment to date
has been psychotherapy.

Dike (2008) considered whether pharmacology could

become a useful adjunct to treatment, especially when there is evidence of impulsive
or compulsive features to the person's lying. He also wondered whether medications
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would be warranted in light of the emerging evidence of neurological abnormalities
underpinning the condition.

Ford, King and Hollender (1988) spoke about their difficulties engaging this
population in treatment. They recommended interpreting the lies that emerge within
the therapeutic process as a way of understanding the client's internal experience.
Healy and Healy (1915) provided a fairly comprehensive overview of some of the
“dos and don'ts” of treatment. They emphasised the importance of helping the
pathological liar acquire greater social awareness and a greater appreciation of how
people see their lies and how their lies impact the people around them. Healy and
Healy (1915) also spoke of the value of challenging the lie immediately after it is
uttered.

1.4.6 Experimentally designed studies
A more recent research trend in the area of pathological lying has been to employ
neuro-imaging equipment to scout out physiological differences in the brains of
identified pseudologues as compared to non-lying controls. The most cited work of
this kind was conducted by Yang and various colleagues in 2005 and 2007, and has
formed the basis for lively discussion amongst researchers and clinicians. From this
research methodology there have been two experimentally designed studies, both
exploring possible neurological structures of identified pathological liars (Yang,
Raine, Lencz, Bihrle, Lacasse & Colletti, 2005; Yang, Raine, Narr, Lencz, LaCasse,
Colletti & Toga, 2007).
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In Yang et al.’s (2005) study the aim was to assess whether deceitful individuals
have structural abnormalities in pre-frontal grey and white matter volume using
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). In their results and discussion section, Yang et
al. (2005) proclaimed their data reflected significantly higher verbal relative to
performance IQ in liars compared to their control groups, and that the liar group
possessed increased prefrontal white matter volumes and reduced grey/white ratios
compared with normal controls. Yang et al.’s (2005) study appears to be a valid
empirical attempt to investigate a group of pathological liars; however, closer
scrutiny of their study design indicates significant problems with recruitment, which
ultimately jeopardised the validity of their findings. The main problem stems from
definitional confusion over what constitutes pathological lying. While the title of
Yang et al.’s (2005) article uses the term “pathological liars”, the body of the article
uses the term “liars”, giving rise to confusion over whether this article relates to
persons who generally lie or to persons who pathologically lie. Adding to construct
confusion is the way in which Yang et al. (2005) defined and classified their “liar”
group which was determined according to whether participants fulfilled one of four
symptom criteria including: (1) the criteria for pathological lying on the
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL; Hare, 1991); (2) the criteria for
conning/manipulative behaviour on the PCL; (3) the deceitfulness criterion for
Antisocial Personality Disorder in the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association,
1994), which outlines “lifelong repeated lying, use of aliases or conning others for
personal profit or pleasure”; or (4) the criteria for malingering as indicated by telling
lies to obtain sickness benefits in a self-report crime interview. The concern with
Yang et al.’s (2005; 2007) four alternative selection criteria is that they all describe
disparate constructs, with questionable relevance to pathological lying, a view
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shared by other commentators (Dike, 2008; Dike, Baranoski & Griffith, 2006;
Spence, 2005). Pathological lying, for instance, has repeatedly been demarcated
from malingering, conning and from lying instigated to procure personal profit, but
in Yang et al.’s (2005) experimental design all four constructs are combined into one
miscellaneous “liar group”. It is unconvincing therefore, that any of the MRI results
would be a valid indictment of pathological lying as it is currently understood.
Yang et al.’s (2005) results would be better viewed as an insight into an eclectic mix
of deceivers, con artists, manipulators, malingerers, and impostors. In 2007 Yang et
al. released a short report entitled, “localisation of increased prefrontal white matter
in pathological liars”. An examination of their method section indicated that they
used the same data that formed the basis of Yang et al.’s 2005 study; so again, there
is strong doubt that these results are in fact relevant to the construct of pathological
lying. Once more, Yang et al.’s (2007) results seem more relevant to a melting pot
of deceivers, most notably, deceivers with strong links to antisocial personality
traits. This view is supported by a couple of discussion letters that critiqued Yang et
al.'s studies (Dike, Baranoski & Griffith, 2006; Spence, 2005)

1.4.7 Remaining literature
There were five short discussion letters retrieved, each of which was located in the
correspondence or letter section of a designated journal. These discussion letters
were generally a couple of paragraphs long and took the form of peer conversation
and critique; three of these pieces discussed the work of Yang et al., (2005),
indicating the level of thought stimulation produced from this work. Relevant points
from these include two main criticisms by Spence (2005), the first of which was that
Yang et al.’s criteria for defining pathological lying differs from the defining criteria
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used in other studies and the second questions how representative the sample of liars
could be when recruited from a population of underprivileged, unemployed,
antisocial liars who willingly admitted to being liars in order to participate in the
study.

In another letter Kruesi and Casanova (2006) compared results from a

previous study (Kruesi, Casanova, Mannheim et al., 2004) to Yang et al.’s (2005)
study. Kruesi et al. (2004) compared MRI results across three groups - a group of
identified liars, a group of youths diagnosed with Conduct Disorder and a group of
healthy volunteers. They found no difference in white to whole brain ratios across
all three groups, nor did they locate any prefrontal differences with the lying youths,
but they did find a suggestion of corpus callosum differences. Kruesi et al.’s (2004)
results do not replicate Yang et al.’s study but Kruesi and Casanova (2006) do not
discount that prefrontal differences, like those observed in Yang et al.’s data, may be
linked to the maintenance of lying.

In the next issue of the British Journal of Psychiatry, Dike, Baranoski and Griffith
(2006) submitted a letter to raise their concern that Yang et al.’s (2005) study did not
examine pathological liars per se, but a broader category of liars. Dike, Baranoski
and Griffith (2006) critiqued Yang et al.’s recruitment and classification of subjects,
stating that it was problematic because non-pathological liars, such as malingerers,
were mixed in with pathological liars. Dike, Baranoski and Griffith (2006) believe
the definition used by Yang et al., (2005) to identify pathological liars was
inconsistent with the wider literature’s definition of pathological lying.

On a

positive note, the three authors commended Yang et al., (2005) for their contribution
to the topic. Yang et al., (2006) provided an immediate response to Dike, Baranoski
and Griffith’s concerns, stating that they did investigate one form of pathological

59

lying, and that their participation pool consisted of both primary and secondary
pathological liars as per Healy and Healy’s (1915) model. Yang et al., admit that
their study is preliminary but that they hope it stimulates interest in the understudied
phenomenon.

An archival study looking into the phenomenon of pseudologica fantastica within
combat-determined PTSD sufferers was published in 2005 by Van Atta, and appears
to be the only archival study on this topic. The purpose of the study was to reduce
the frequency in which sufferers of PTSD with pseudologia fantastica are
misdiagnosed as malingerers. Van Atta (2005) examined the psychiatric records of
144 combat-related PTSD sufferers, looking for indications of lying and deception.
From this review Van Atta (2005) identified eleven cases of malingering and two
cases of PTSD with concurrent pseudologia fantastica. Within this article, Van Atta
observed pseudologues with PTSD often have legitimate and verifiable trauma
experiences but elect to share false or exaggerated trauma stories instead.

In

reaction to this observation, Van Atta asks “why lie when the truth would do so
well”? In answer to this question, Van Atta (2005) hypothesised that some PTSD
sufferers engage in pseudology because it provides a distraction from the intolerable
aspects of their real trauma. From Van Atta’s perspective pseudologia fantastica is a
psychological defence system that guards the conscious parts of the self from
intolerable and/or narcissistically affronting events. Van Atta’s (2005) hypothesis is
similar to a later hypothesis made by Langer (2010), who felt his client denied the
horrible reality of his genuine molestation by creating an exaggerated and distorted
story of molestation.

This shared hypothesis has interesting implications for

clinicians interpreting pseudologies; rather than just dismissing pseudologies as
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wholesale falsehoods, they should also be considered as potential diversions from
truths considered too unbearable.

Van Atta suggests referring to service history records to corroborate patient selfreports and determine the underlying pathology.

According to Van Atta,

pseudologues have documented trauma, engage in obvious acts of exaggeration, and
produce valid MMPI profiles. In contrast, malingerers often have undocumented
trauma histories, their stories commonly include several implausible events that
cannot withstand reasoned analysis, and they tend to produce invalid psychometric
profiles. Van Atta's (2005) study adds substance to the stance that pathological lying
should be differentiated from other conditions, such as malingering. It also adds
weight to the observation made by Healy and Healy (1915), Wiersma (1933) and
Ford, King and Holldener (1988), that pathological lying represents a psychological
strategy designed to protect the individual from experiencing emotionally intense
and/or traumatic phenomena.

1.4.8 Bringing the definitions together
Research Question Four asks whether definitional constructions of pathological
lying have varied or remained consistent over time and between authors. To answer
this question, definitions from the literature were identified and cross-analysed. A
total of 32 definitions were located, 17 of which were original to the author and 15
of which were adopted from other studies or were a mixture of original and
referenced work. These definitional references were tabulated in chronological
order and placed in a table that can be reviewed in Appendix Two. They were then
broken down into elemental themes, conceptually analysed according to thematic
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analysis principles (Braun & Clarke, 2006) and placed in a table in Appendix Two.
Each time a definitional theme was cited or endorsed by an author it was counted, so
that if three authors incorporated a particular theme into their definition, that theme
would be given a score of three out of 32 and a percentage score of 9.375%. This
process highlighted the frequency with which definitional elements were cited or
endorsed, giving an overall impression of consensus.

Once themes were

conceptually analysed and their scores tallied, they were placed in a colour coded
theme wheel, which can be viewed in Figure 1. In total 59 themes across 32
definitions were identified.

The overall impression from the data is that Dike, Baranoski and Griffith’s (2005)
statement was correct - there is no consensus when it comes to defining pathological
lying. The most striking way to substantiate this claim is to compare the number of
repeatedly endorsed themes to the number of singularly endorsed themes. Three
themes attracted an endorsement level of 37.5% (12 endorsements), one of which
was taken from Healy and Healy’s (1915) definition, “falsification entirely
disproportionate to any discernible end in view”, another referred to the
pseudologue’s impaired ability to distinguish between fiction and reality, which
sometimes results in self-deception, and the third was an amalgamated theme that
brought together all of the various “inner dynamics” postulated to drive pathological
lying, such as bolstering self-esteem, providing narcissistic gratification, and
delivering wish fulfilment. These three themes were the most cited across the 32
definitions. In contrast 21 of the 59 themes had the backing of just one author.
Perhaps most arresting is that 79.66% (47 of 59) of definitional themes garnered a
consensus rating of 19% or less. Only 20.33% of themes (12 out of 59) attracted an
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endorsement rating between 20% and 37.5%, which is promising, but still falls short
of desirable consensus.

No theme was endorsed more than 50% of the time

indicating that there is no clear majority viewpoint when it comes to defining
pathological lying/pseudologia fantastica.
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pseudologue’s
life.
(12.5%)
Lack remorse
(3.1%)
Wish
psychosis/Wish
Fulfilment
(12.5%)

Questions
answered with
fluency
(3.1%)

Characterised
by gross
falsifications
(6.25%)

Can be
distinguished
from
delusion
(15.6%)
Disregard
for rights
of others
(3.1%)
Lie for
sake of
lying and
take
pleasure
in the
process
(12.5%)
Involves
representing
fantasies as
real
occurrences
(9.37%)
Always
putting
themselves
in the
centre of
the story
(15.62%)

Can acknowledge
falsity of stories
when confronted
(18.75%)

Fabrications may
be improbable but
not so bizarre as
to defy reality
(3.1%)
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In summary, it is now evident that there is a paucity of robust studies and the result
is shaky scaffolding around the construct’s essential meaning. While definitions
identified throughout the literature, such as Healy and Healy’s (1915), hold good
face validity and make intuitive sense, their legitimacy is undermined by poor
empirical and/or theoretical justification, with no author providing an explanation of
how they came to construct or choose their definition.

In an attempt to promote

systematic definitional process that can create a foundation for more compelling
research, the author of this thesis has combined definitional themes that attracted an
endorsement rating of 20% or more into one description; a total of 12 themes were
yielded from this process:
“Pathological lying is the habitual, extensive and repeated
production of falsifications often of a complicated and fantastic
nature, which are entirely disproportionate to any discernible end
in view. Often the lies can be easily verified as untrue and the
possibility that the untruth may at any moment be demolished
does nothing to abash the liar. Such lying is not determined by
situational or external factors, the pseudologues’ falsehoods are
not told for personal procurement or profit and material reward
or social advantage do not govern the pseudologue’s motivation
to lie.

Instead unconscious internalised motivations, such as

self-esteem enhancement, defence, narcissistic gratification, and
wish fulfilment predominate. When an external reason for lying
is suspected the nature of the lies told are often far in excess of
the parameters of that reason. The pseudologue can be held
hostage to their lies and cease to be master over them. The
pseudologue demonstrates an impaired ability to distinguish
between fiction and reality and may partially convince him or
herself that their fabrications have some basis in fact. The lying
behaviours manifest over a period of years or even a lifetime and
the onset can be traced back at least to adolescence or early
adulthood.

The pseudologue cannot be declared insane,

feebleminded or epileptic and the lying cannot be accounted for
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by an intellectual defect, illness, organic memory impairment or
delusion.”

All remaining themes can be viewed in Figure 1 and Appendices 2 and 3.

The analysis of definitions demonstrated most themes were complementary;
however, there were several themes that offered conflicting views on the topic.
These included themes related to delusion, acknowledgement, and control. Table 1
below outlines each of the contradictory themes and the number of supporting
citations. Interestingly these are some of the same themes identified in the literature
review as having variable backing. With regards to delusion, the more common
opinion was that pseudologues possess an impaired ability to distinguish fiction
from reality, however, one author, Koppen (as cited in Healy & Healy, 1915),
postulated that in its final stages a pathological lie cannot be differentiated from
delusion. Koppen’s point of view is at odds with 15.6% of authors, who define
pathological lying as something that can be distinguished from delusion. It also
contradicts the assertion of 18.75% of authors, who define pathological liars as
people who can acknowledge their falsehoods when confronted, a feat considered
impossible for someone in the grips of a florid delusion.

With regards to

acknowledgement, Koppen (as cited in Healy & Healy, 1915) again holds a minority
view, being the only author to postulate that remonstrances against the lies make no
impression on the pathological liar. This position goes against 18.75% of authors’
who define pathological liars as persons who can acknowledge their falsehoods
when confronted. Control and intent were two other contiguous themes marked by
contradiction; while 25% of authors define pathological lying as an event that is
uncontrollable and 37.5% of authors define pathological lying as an act that is
disproportionate to any discernible end in view, Leung, Lai, Shum and Lee (1995)
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proposed an opposite view, one where the pseudologue is defined as someone who
lies as a conscious act with preconceived goals. It is interesting to note that two of
the contradictions came from the same pre 1915’s author, Koppen, and that in all
instances where there was theme inconsistency there was only one author espousing
an opposite view. In summary, delusion, acknowledgement and control are not
topics dividing experts down the middle; in fact no definitional theme has experts
significantly divided.
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Table 1
Definitional themes with variable endorsement

.

Definitional themes supporting the Definitional themes supporting the
presence of reality testing impairments:
presence of non-delusional thinking:
Impaired ability to distinguish fiction from reality/
may believe own lies
(37.5% or 12 citations)
Difficult to delineate whether lies are conscious,
unconscious or result of a delusional system
(9.37% or three citations)
Consciousness of the real situation is clouded in their
minds
(6.25% or two citations)
At the most extreme end the pathological lie cannot be
differentiated from delusion
(3.1% or one citation)

Can acknowledge falsity of stories when confronted
(18.75% or six citations)
Can be distinguished from delusion
(12.5% or four citations)
There is special weakness in judgement, which for
general purposes is sound
(6.25% or 2 citations)
The essential psychopathology includes conscious
lying and denial, with a preconceived goal
(3.1% or one citation)

Intended primarily to be self-deluding
(3.1% or one citation)
Inadequate insight
(3.1% or one citation)

Definitional theme supporting the Definitional theme supporting
absence of reaction to remonstrances:
presence of acknowledgement:
Remonstrances against the lies make no impression
(3.1% or one citation)

Definitional themes
absence of control:

supporting

Can acknowledge falsity of stories when confronted
(18.75% or six citations)

the Definitional themes
presence of control:

He has ceased to be master of his own lies, the lie has
won power over him/ lying is uncontrollable/ the
desired personality may overwhelm the actual one
(25% or 8 citations)

the

supporting

the

The essential psychopathology includes conscious
lying and denial, with a preconceived goal
(3.1% or one citations)

Lying appears compulsive
(15.62% or 5 citations)
Impulsive and unplanned
(6.25% or 2 citations)

68

The second part of research question four asks whether definitional constructions
from the literature are related. While no definition to date has provided a stable
identity for the construct, they all make contributions towards an evolving
understanding. The variation observed across definitions confirms consensus has
not yet been reached and that systematic investigation into the phenomenonological
aspects of pathological lying is still warranted. At the same time, the absence of
contradiction across all remaining definitional themes provides preliminary support
for the postulation that pathological lying is, for the most part, a distinguishable
construct with reliable features. In the next chapter, 64 published case studies will
be examined for their use of the concept and how consistent this is with the
description formed from the literature reviewed so far.
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CHAPTER TWO
An exploration of case studies for conceptual
consistency - Study 1, Part 2
“The hardest tumble a man can make is to fall over his own bluff.”
- Ambrose Bierce
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It is now evident that idiographic approaches to understanding pseudologia
fantastica have been the dominant research method used, with the majority of
publications falling into the single-case study category. Understandably when these
case studies, together with single-subject experiments, are examined in isolation,
external validity and generalisability characteristics greatly diminish. Appreciating
the potential richness of information contained within these published case studies
however, it was decided to synthesise all locatable case studies and single-subject
experiments into one meta-analytic conceptual study; the hope being that metaanalytical methods would generate a clinically useful, nomothetic understanding of
pseudologia fantastica that is based on repeated clinical presentations. There was
also interest in seeing how this compares with the description formed from the
previously discussed research.

Insight into the symptomatology and aetiology

underlying and influencing the occurrence of pseudologia fantastica will also be
sought from the case studies to provide a provisional profile of the typical
pseudologue. Variables pertaining to demographics, childhood pathogens, present
day triggers, maintaining factors and social and occupational functioning will also
be identified where possible.

2.1 Aims
1. Systematically critique and analyse published case study reports and singlesubject experiments considered relevant to pathological lying.
2. Using thematic analysis extract and collate symptom and aetiological themes
consistently presenting within and across case studies and single-subject
experiments.
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3. Construct an empirically supported profile of pseudologia fantastica that
highlights the key demarcating features of the construct.
4. Provide a critical review of the case study and single-subject experimental
literature, identifying the main methodological limitations.

2.2 Research questions
1. Is it possible to establish a clear, consistent picture of pathological lying that
is based on repeated clinical presentations found within the literature and is
this picture consistent with the description arrived at in Chapter One?
2. If this is possible, what key symptom and aetiological constellations are
replicable across case studies and what sort of profile emerges?

2.3 Method
Of the 132 case studies accessed in the literature, 64 met inclusion criteria. Case
studies were excluded for the following reasons: 1) if the case study concerned
children under 10 years of age; young children were excluded to avoid confounding
normative child behaviour with aberrant lying, 2) if there was insufficient detail
given to justify a case of pseudologia fantastica, 3) if the information provided was
markedly different from current understandings of pseudologia fantastica, 4) if the
deceit described could be better explained by delusion, psychosis, feeblemindedness,
pathological false accusation or psychopathic swindling, or 5) if unable to locate an
English translation of a non-English text.
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Once case studies were deemed to meet these minimum inclusion criteria they were
analysed using inductive thematic analysis principles (Braun & Clarke, 2006).
Inductive analysis is considered a bottom-up approach, whereby the themes
identified are not driven by the researcher’s theoretical interest in the area, but rather
a “blind” extraction of any theme that presents itself, making it a process of data
coding that is not focused on making the data fit into a preconceived idea or
hypothesis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). While it is acknowledged that no data can truly
be analysed without influence from the researcher’s theoretical perspective, the
thematic analysis carried out in this study is inclusive and takes on an inductive
quality as the data (the articles), were written prior to and separate to any theoretical
perspective endorsed by the current author. In keeping with this inductive approach
it was important to be as inclusive of different themes as possible and not focus on
or dismiss certain themes because of pre-existing interests, or because of ideas
espoused by other, influential writers. For instance, there was no explicit intention
to refute or support King and Ford’s (1988) claim that 40% of pathological liars
have associated central nervous system impairments, however, once the themes were
extracted and synthesised there were efforts made to link the current findings to the
findings of previous authors. An important part of the analysis was to highlight any
contradictory themes so as to not misrepresent the dataset.

After the first case study had been analysed and verified for themes, each unique
theme was tabulated and given a descriptive title to reflect the essence of the theme,
such as, “the pseudologue admitted to fabricating when confronted”. This process
was then repeated for each subsequent case study report. If a subsequent case study
expressed or demonstrated a theme already identified by a previous case study then
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the theme was considered to be endorsed twice. Eventually, after every case study
was analysed, it was possible to see how many times a theme was endorsed or
supported by the data.

Themes were then collapsed if considered to have

overlapping meaning, and themes were excluded if there was not enough data to
support their inclusion. After all the case studies were analysed, the descriptive
titles given in the initial tabulation process were revised to ensure they accurately
reflected the true character of the theme.

Two additional phases of quality control were implemented to assure themes were
not missed or misrepresented.

The first phase involved creating an electronic

Microsoft Word document containing written summaries of every relevant case
study and single-subject experiment. To enhance objectivity, this word document
was searched using the “find and replace” function available through Microsoft
Office. Key search terms, which were considered to reflect each theme, were then
entered into this “find and replace” tool. For example, all case study summaries
were double checked for the theme, “the pseudologue admitted to fabricating when
confronted” by searching for the following words, “confess”, “admit”, “recogn”, and
“acknowled”. “Recogn” was searched for so that all derivatives of the word, such as
“recognition”, “recognised” and “recognise” would be picked up by the process. In
any instance where a search term was found the relevant case study was closely reexamined to determine whether it reflected that particular theme.

The second

quality control phase involved a close examination of all original documents, where
each and every case study and single-subject experiment was re-read to capture any
themes that had been missed in the previous two analytical methods. Once this final
phase of checking was complete, all themes were tabulated, counted and presented
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in written form, thereby providing an opportunity to comment on and theorise about
the theme while linking the theme back to the wider literature.

As this was

essentially a “find and collate” task, aimed at describing the extent to which the
concept has been defined and researched, rather than an interpretative one, it was not
considered necessary at this stage to include a second researcher to replicate these
findings. The author’s supervisor, however, did closely monitor the process.

2.4 Results
One of the most striking and inhibiting limitations, which has already been raised by
Dike, Baranoski and Griffith (2005), is the lack of a unified consensus definition
that is used consistently by researchers and professionals alike.

Indeed, in the

analysis of the 132 case studies, there was no single definition endorsed across the
board; however there was some evidence of consistency, with most researchers
using definitions that reflected similar core features.

The main concern that stems

from this definitional issue is that it impedes our ability to compare, contrast and
synthesise case studies because unless the different definitions share a high degree
of overlap, one could argue that the authors are discussing disparate constructs.
While authors using different definitions was a matter for concern, of even more
concern was the absence of any definition at all. Several case study articles were
written without providing any definition, which means readers have to rely on the
clinical judgement of the author and trust that the nominated case study does indeed
represent a typical case. An equally problematic issue is that some authors provide a
definition but fail to communicate on what basis their patient meets this definition.
While some of these case studies were included for the information they contributed,
reports that were considered more reliable were the ones that provided a definition,
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explained in detail what elements of that definition applied to their patient, and
corroborated those conclusions with illustrative and representative examples of the
patient’s thinking and behaviour.

The findings of this study represent the number of times a theme was reported, it
does not represent the number of times a theme presented in real life.

This

distinction must be drawn as the figures reported in the case study data may in fact
misrepresent real life prevalence. Symptom and aetiological markers will be under
represented, for example, if an author fails to identify or report it. In other words,
just because an author fails to report a symptom does not mean the symptom was
absent from the pseudologue’s presentation.

Figure 2 (page 96) provides a diagrammatic view of the most dominant themes to
emerge from the data and their relative strengths. A similar diagram for aetiological
themes can be viewed in Figure 3 on page 117.

Following the demographic

information below, the strongest themes are discussed under the same subheadings
shown in the diagrams.

2.4.1 Demographics: Gender, age and nationality
Healy and Healy (1915) made the claim that only one out of their 19 “mentally
normal” cases of pathological lying was male, supporting their assertion that
“females tend to deviate from the truth more readily than males” (Healy & Healy,
1915, p. 186). King and Ford (1988) found their gender analysis at odds with Healy
and Healy’s (1915), finding the gender split closer to 50:50. In the current analysis
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the gender split starts to lean the other way with 55% of cases being male and 45%
being female.

Of the 64 cases analysed where information on age was available, the mean age of
the subject at the time of report was 24 years, with a range of 10 to 56 years and a
median age of 19.5 years. This is comparable to King and Ford’s (1988) literature
review, which showed a mean age of 22 years. It should be noted, however, that
children younger than 10 years of age were excluded from the current dataset.

Twelve different countries were represented in the literature, including Scotland,
England, Austria, Poland, Holland, United States of America, Canada, China,
Finland, Germany, Australia, Spain and France, highlighting the international nature
of the phenomenon.

2.4.2 Key symptom characteristics of pathological lying
2.4.2.1 Chronicity
Just over 79% of cases showed clear indications of chronic lying behaviour, making
this one of the key characteristics of pathological lying. In order to be considered
chronic, the authors of the case study needed to describe a pattern of lying spanning
a period of years (at least one year or more). To be certain that chronicity was
indeed a factor, the author needed to have either known the patient for a period of
years or sought confirmation of prolonged lying from third parties such as family
members.

The case studies that utilised corroborating family reports generally

indicated that aberrant lying patterns had been evident as early as childhood and/or
adolescence. Kern’s (1986) case study, for instance, was described as “an inveterate
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liar since childhood” by his brother. The dataset reflects that pseudologia fantastica
is a syndrome that most commonly emerges in childhood and/or adolescence, and it
is the continuation into adulthood, which makes it pathological.

There was a small minority of case studies (three out of 64) where the lying was
restricted to an isolated, discrete episode and therefore did not confirm the
chronicity observation. Despite these three cases, the dominant clinical picture
amongst pseudologues is one of recurrent, ingrained lying behaviour. If there was
more diffuse evidence of one-off lying amongst the dataset there could be a proposal
for introducing diagnostic specifiers demarcating between recurrent and discrete
pathological lying, for example: pathological lying (single episode) or pathological
lying (recurrent).

However, the data from this study does not support the

introduction of such diagnostic classification.

2.4.2.2 High frequency
One of the themes found to reliably emerge across case studies was that
pseudological falsehoods are generated at a frequency far in excess of normal lying.
In Healy and Healy’s (1915) words, their 21st case study displayed “a constant
tendency to deviate from the truth” (p. 154). Of the 64 case studies analysed, just
under 80% showed evidence of a firmly entrenched and highly frequent pattern of
deception. Of the remaining 13 case studies none showed behaviours that
contradicted this theme. The findings of this study support Healy and Healy’s (1915)
definitional assertion that pathological lying represents a trait rather than an episode,
and with such solid support for this theme it is concluded that lying to an excessive
degree is a defining element of pseudologia fantastica.
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2.4.2.3 Recognition of Falsehoods
In the previous chapter it was revealed that commentators have struggled to
determine whether or not pseudologues possess awareness of their mendacities
(Dike, 2008).

It is, as Dike (2008) puts it, a question that has dogged the

phenomenon for decades. In the current study many of the pseudologues showed a
capacity to recognise their falsehoods when presented with strong and irrefutable
evidence, with 29 being characterised in this way. An additional seven case studies
were described as showing an awareness or some degree of insight into their lying
habits, meaning 36 (56.52%) case studies showed evidence of being able to
recognise their lies. Kerns (1986) provides a generalisable example of this selfreflective capacity:
Kerns (1986): Although he may have begun to believe the
stories, when confronted with reality he was able to
recognise their spuriousness and make adjustments when
required (p. 16).

Two case studies, both of which were published by Deutsch (1921), went against
this trend and demonstrated persistence in their denials even after their deceptions
were strongly challenged.

2.4.2.4 Initial failure to acknowledge falsehoods
Denial is a powerful defensive and self-protective behaviour, and in this dataset
there were 11 cases who used denial strategies when challenged about the
genuineness of their statements. Two of these 11 cases maintained their denials in
the longer term even in the face of vehement challenging. When it came to denial,
Henderson’s (1917) case study displayed evasion tactics typical of these 11 cases:
Henderson’s (1917): he at first stoutly denied that such was
the case, maintained that he had told the previous stories
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because he did not feel that it was necessary for him to give
the details of his life to the medical officer, and asserted
that the last story was a true and faithful account” (p. 227).

In addition to denial, the literature shows pseudologues using a variety of deflective
behaviours when confronted. Five case studies were noted to show anger or outrage
when confronted, while 13 case studies responded by generating a litany of further
deceptions to cover up the original lie. All three behaviours: denial, displaying
anger, and further embellishing the truth to cover initial falsehoods were considered
by this researcher to fall under the umbrella of deflection.

These behaviours

presumably reflect an inability on the part of the pseudologue to take responsibility
for their deceptions. When all three themes were combined to represent “initial
failure to acknowledge falsehoods”, a total of 21 case studies epitomised this
feature. The following case excerpt details the varying attempts made by Kerns’
(1986) case study to protect himself from exposure and is representative of other
case studies:
Kerns (1986): When confronted with the conflicting
evidence, Mr. K alternately insisted that we contact
another, inevitably unreachable party to corroborate his
story, altered his story, denied that he had made a given
statement, or proceeded without hesitation to construct
another version of the story (p. 15).

2.4.2.5 Awareness and self-deception
The issue of awareness and self-deception has drawn varied opinion in the literature
(e.g., Dike, 2008).

In the present study there were 17 cases who reportedly

fabricated without full awareness at times.

Fourteen cases demonstrated a

vulnerability to self-deception, with all 14 becoming completely engrossed and
momentarily convinced of their own fabrications at some point.

Powell,
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Gudjonsson and Mullen’s (1983) case study represented this tendency to be swept
away by one’s own romances:
Powell, Gudjonsson and Mullen’s (1983): He describes
himself as becoming ‘encapsulated in the part I’m
playing’. He said he knows when he begins to lie ‘but as
it goes on I’m taken over and believe my own
propaganda.’ He claims his happiest and most satisfying
experiences have been when he has been ‘carried away
totally in one of these roles.’ (p. 142)

Interestingly, and what appears typical within the dataset, is that pseudologues
oscillate between being cognisant of their fabrications, and then being entirely
enmeshed in the wonders of their own fantasies.

An important distinguishing

feature, however, is that the pseudologue’s belief in their lies is not usually
permanent. It is possible that the pseudologue struggles to differentiate reality from
fantasy at a neurological level, which is discussed further on.

2.4.2.6 Admissions of lying once confronted
Thirty-six of the 64 case studies were described as persons who showed a capacity
to acknowledge their falsehoods when vigorously challenged with undeniable
evidence. And so, while the data provided evidence that some pseudologues believe
in their lies, the repeated observation that they can, given time, and albeit
reluctantly, admit to their lies, was generally held as evidence that their fantastical
spinnings are not the result of a pervasive delusionary belief system. The general
experience of clinicians working with this client group was that to be successful,
challenges to the pseudologue’s truthfulness must be compelling and backed up with
irrefutable evidence.
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2.4.2.7 Distortions in reality perception
Authors Healy and Healy (1915) and Wiersma (1933) were among some of the first
to write about reality disturbances amongst pathological liars (see also Koppen,
1898, Meunier, 1904; Stemmerman, 1906). While there is no discernible consensus
about this topic, there is a general sense amongst authors that pathological liars have
a reduced capacity to differentiate reality from delusion, but that their capacity to
reality test is greater than persons who are floridly psychotic. Because of the
uncertainty surrounding this topic it was considered meaningful that 20 or 31.25%
of cases in this study were identified as showing evidence of abnormal reality
perception. In the main, these cases were described as vacillating between lucidity
and reality disturbance. The essence of this theme is that pseudologues go in and
out of awareness around what’s real and what’s fantasy, but when jolted by external
stimuli, they have the capacity to reorientate themselves to reality, which essentially
delineates this experience from psychosis. While this theme was differentiated from
that of pseudologues believing in their lies, there is a case for seeing the underlying
mechanism of reality disturbance as the same for both. When both themes were
combined the dataset showed 27 instances, comprising 42% of the dataset. In
general discussion, Powell, Gudjonsson and Mullen (1983) described the process of
reality distortion:
Powell, Gudjonsson and Mullen (1983): pseudologia
fantatsica patients are seen clinically to proceed from the
conscious lie to a more extensive elaboration ending in a
complex fantasy in which they are totally enmeshed. In
these later stages the pseudologue cannot, it seems,
distinguish where the truth ends and the fabrications
commence” (p. 145).
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Powell, Gudjonsson and Mullen’s (1983) sentiment was echoed by Hoyer’s (1949)
commentary that:
Hoyer (1949): the productions of pseudologia fantastica lie
somewhere in the no-man’s land between consciousness and
unconsciousness.

They are analogous to the fantasies and

daydreams which we have all experienced, but from which we
may snap back to reality at will (p. 205).

Given the combined themes represent just over 42% of the dataset, there is good
emerging evidence that temporary reality perception impairment may be an
underlying abnormality driving, or at minimum associated with, this phenomenon.

2.4.2.8 Guilt, shame and ego-dystonia
While there were six case studies showing some degree of guilt, shame or egodystonia, there were almost an equal number, five cases, showing the capacity to lie
with no noticeable signs of guilt or remorse. A good example of this divide is seen
in Snyder’s fourth case study, who was described by his family as someone who
could at times lie without compunction, but at other times showed evidence of
remorse. This divergence demonstrates that “guilt” is an area requiring further
systematic investigation, and at this stage it is prudent to say there is no unequivocal
answer as to whether pseudologues experience guilt and/or remorse when they
fabricate and there is no indication that those who do experience guilt or remorse
experience this consistently. In addition, given its complex psychological nature,
guilt is a difficult construct to measure reliably.
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2.4.2.9 Lying as a psychological defence
In 1915 Healy and Healy proposed that pathological lying facilitates the repression
of emotional distress and fluctuates in accordance with the person’s exposure to
stress. This postulation was again supported by Ford, King and Hollender (1988)
who believed pathological lying functioned to displace or disguise intrapsychic
conflict. In the current study, there were 20 case studies and one non-case specific
commentary, by Snyder (1986), providing support for the view that pseudologia
fantastica represents a psychological defence strategy. For cases to be classified as
exemplifying this theme there needed to be evidence that the lies protected the
pseudologue from experiencing some form of intrapsychic distress such as
emotional pain, traumatic memories, and/or cognitions. There also needed to be
evidence of the case study using lies to deny reality, avoid emotional experiences,
and/or cope with intolerable anxiety. For example, in a case presented by, Dithrich
(1991), it was formulated that the “pseudologia fantastica represented primarily a
defensively motivated effort to mask neurotic concerns” (p. 659).

Dithrich

concluded his paper by saying:
Dithrich (1991): pseudologia fantastica is discussed from the
classical viewpoint as a defensive effort based primarily on
denial and directed towards unacceptable wishes and impulses.

2.4.2.10 Impoverished Self-Esteem
Ford, King and Hollender (1988) are one of several author groups to propose that
self-esteem enhancement underpins the motivational drive of pathological lies.
Given poor self-esteem has been linked to pathological lying in the literature it was
interesting to see 17 case studies identified as having low self-esteem, and that in the
majority of these cases it was further hypothesised that pseudologia fantastica
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operated as a strategy for self-esteem enhancement. The following excerpt from
Sharrock and Cresswell’s (1989) article represents the general essence of the overall
dataset:
Sharrock and Cresswell’s (1989): it was a classic example
of ego-enhancement secondary to a poor self-esteem
conditioned by his scholastic difficulties. The concept of a
low self-esteem is required to explain how the behaviour
was maintained without any tangible rewards (p. 326).

There was no reference or indication in the remaining case studies that pseudologues
have intact self-esteem structures, leaving open the possibility that poor self-esteem
is a wider-spread phenomenon than reflected in these figures.

2.4.2.11 Self-aggrandisement
In the current study, just over 54% of case studies were found to express selfaggrandising statements aimed at making the pseudologue look more successful,
wealthy, educated, intelligent, stronger, braver and more noble.

Powell,

Gudjonsson, and Mullen’s (1982) male case study best illustrates the inner dynamic
driving the boastful aggrandisements that often weave and thread through
pseudological fantasies:
Powell, Gudjonsson, and Mullen’s (1982): He claims he
finds no satisfaction in how he really is, so has to ‘present a
super image’ and must never be a ‘bit player’ but always
‘the centre of the stage’ (p. 142).

While over half of the case studies (35) showed self-aggrandising features, there was
one case that did not. Authors, Leung, Lai, Shum and Lee (1995), expressly pointed
out that while their case study upheld many core symptoms of pseudologia fantastica
his fabrications lacked a self-aggrandising quality. Leung, Lai, Shum and Lee
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(1995) felt there may have been cultural factors that made boastfulness unacceptable
to the case study.

2.4.2.12 The depiction of heroism and victimisation
Healy and Healy (1915) noted that there was an ego-centric quality to pathological
liars and that built into this ego-centrism is a proclivity for telling heroic tales. As
was the case for Healy and Healy (1915) it was repeatedly noted in the present
dataset that pseudologues take centre stage in their narrated fantasies. There were
exceptions to this, with at least eight documented case studies engaging in false
accusations, where the primary focus was shared between the pseudologue and the
object of their accusations. The remaining cases, however, demonstrated that
pseudologues themselves are the central focus of their fabrications. Within this
theme many lies can be divided into one of two categories; either the pseudologue is
painted as the heroic protagonist, or alternatively, the pseudologue is depicted as the
unfortunate victim. Altogether 34 or 53% of case studies demonstrated a proclivity
for producing falsehoods that depicted them as either the victim or hero, with 23
case studies presenting themselves as a victim, four case studies representing
themselves as the hero, and another seven case studies integrating both forms of
misrepresentation.

Hoyer’s

(1959)

case

conceptualisation

is

considered

representative of the hero-victim-type fabrications of the 34 pseudologues in this
dataset and a quote from his article is presented here:
Hoyer (1959): Essentially, he is either the hero of
tremendous exploits or the unfortunate victim of life’s
trickery (p. 215).

In addition to the figures already outlined, there were another six case studies
identified in the dataset who produced fabrications in order to garner sympathy from
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others. These figures were not combined with the “victim” statistics because it was
unclear whether these fabrications involved telling stories that made the
pseudologue look like a hapless victim, but the themes are considered contiguous.

While it may be possible that victimisation lies are attempting to elicit sympathy
from others, it is also conceivable that lies about victimisation are a diversion tactic
designed to conceal genuine and painful traumas from the pseudologue’s conscious
awareness, a conceptualisation that is hypothesised by both Langer (2010) and Van
Atta (2005).

2.4.2.13 Military and espionage themes
In the literature review it was found that nine different case studies engaged in
fabrications involving some type of military service or a close derivative. In the
analysis of these case studies, it seemed military stories provided an avenue to
engage in a mixture of both heroic and victim-based fabrications. Seven of these
nine case studies used a major historical war as a context for producing untruths.
The eighth case study generated fantastic stories about school war games and his
paramilitary organisation, while the ninth case study fabricated his involvement with
the FBI. Often embedded within the lie was some bona fide history of service, but
the stories told greatly embellished and exaggerated their involvement, often in an
effort to make themselves sound more masculine, more valuable and more
courageous. One such example was taken from Newmark, Adityanjee and Kay’s
(1999) case study report:
Newmark, Adityanjee and Kay (1999): Despite reports of the
patient being a noncombat veteran, he allegedly reported
serving as a Green Beret and working for the CIA for 37 years.
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He also claimed that he was a martial arts expert. He states he
was drafted into the Army in 1965 and trained as a combat
medic. (p. 91).

2.4.2.14 When You Wish Upon a Star…wish-fulfilment
In 1940, Walt Disney brought to life the fictionally created inveterate liar,
Pinocchio.

Disney immortalised Pinocchio’s central plight through the lyrics,

“when you wish upon a star, makes no difference who you are. Anything your heart
desires will come to you”. Here is a fictitious character who struggled so much with
who he was, always wanting to be something different, who in his battles with truth
reflects in this song a central dilemma shared by pathological liars in real life – the
desperate desire to vicariously live out their heart’s wishes through their fantastical
and publicly propagated stories. In 1988, Ford, King and Hollender proposed that
pathological liars are driven by wish-fulfilment motivations. Within the current
dataset 12 case studies were identified as producing wish-fulfilment falsehoods.
Thematic analysis indicates that for these 12 cases the act of lying somehow bridged
the gap between their real world and their desired world. Six authors noted that their
case studies brought their fantasies to life, or lived out the fantasy in a meaningful
way. Helene Deutsch (1921) provides one of the more comprehensive explorations
of the wish-fulfilment concept:
Deutsch (1921): A pseudology is actually a daydream
communicated as reality. All those things that provide the
content of a day dream – proliferating wishes of an ambitious
or erotic nature, apparent complete independence of the wishfulfilment produced in the fantasy from the conditions of real
life – also provide the raw material for the making of a
pseudology…. The pseudologist lies, creating his wishfulfilment edifice, ranging from banal love affairs and the
satisfaction of minor ambitions to the most complicated of
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involved romantic adventures, always putting himself in the
centre of the fantasy, just as the daydreamer does.

2.4.2.15 Lack of discernible purpose
Thirty case studies, comprising 47% of the dataset were identified as individuals
who prevaricate without distinct purpose or motivation to gain in the materialistic
sense or get themselves out of hot water. According to these figures, just under half
of all pseudologues lie in order to serve an inner, psychological dynamic, rather than
lie in order to commit fraud, swindle, harm others, or escape military duty. These
findings corroborate Dike, Baranoski and Griffith’s (2005) comments that the
purpose of the pathological lie is often unclear and without motivation to secure
tangible incentives. Even though there is a function to the lying, the function is not
immediately obvious to outside observers or the pseudologue, as the lying satisfies
unconscious psychological drives. Some authors describe it as “purposeless and
internally driven”, while others describe it as unnecessary and without discernible
purpose. Witnesses to this form of fabrication are often left questioning why a
person would risk their integrity in exchange for a farcical story. Hardie and Reed’s
(1998) case study was representative of the nonsensical fabrications observed across
pseudologues:
Hardie and Reed’s (1998): During his teenage years he
would frequently lie about trivial day-to-day occurrences,
which offered him no apparent gain (p. 199)

While there is some agreement amongst authors that this is an irrational and
purposeless form of lying, when the motivation of the liar is comprehensively
explored there is often, but not always, some discernible psychological function
influencing the lying behaviour; this is evidenced in the 20 case studies that were
identified as lying as part of a psychological defence (e.g., Synder, 1986).
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2.4.2.16 Small and/or trivial lies
While pseudological lies can vary in scale and complexity, one of the interesting,
less significant observations that emerged from four of the case studies was that
pseudologues can also indulge in small, trivial lies. For these four cases it was as if
their default style of operating in the world was to deceive and this manifested
through their “compulsion” to lie about numerous things, even matters that were so
mundane and small it was difficult to fathom a motivation for it.

2.4.2.17 Self-injurious and detectable lies
One of the more interesting themes, which potentially speaks to the pathology of this
construct, is that pseudologues fabricate despite the inherent risks to their
reputations, relationships and employment. Eighteen case studies were identified as
persons who routinely jeopardised their reputations because of their proclivity for
lying. The plethora of deleterious consequences that accompany pathological forms
of lying affirms to practitioners that this is indeed a maladaptive and therefore
pathological way of operating. Healy and Healy (1915) best represented this theme
with their 10th case study, Robert:
Healy and Healy (1915): His continuous lying proves to be
directly inimical to his own interests and, indeed, his own
satisfactions are thwarted by the curious unreliability of his
word (p. 95).

Building on the premise that pseudological lies tend to be self-destructive, there
were 24 case studies within the dataset that were considered to disseminate
falsehoods without adequately protecting themselves from exposure. Birch, Kelln,
and Aquino’s (2006) clinical formulations about their case study reflects both the
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failure on the part of the pseudologue to adequately conceal her deceits but also the
self-destructive nature of pathological lying:
Birch, Kelln and Aquino (2006): As is sometimes common
among pseudologues, Lorraine failed to take even minimal
precautions against her lies being detected in this situation,
indicating that it was difficult for her to resist the immediate,
internal gratification afforded by her lying (p. 313).

The emerging evidence that pathological lies are easily detectable provides a
platform for hypothesising about the potential existence of skills deficits within the
pseudologue. Firstly, pseudologues may be inherently impulsive and this interferes
with their ability to foresee the consequences of their actions and/or inhibit the
impulse to lie.

Secondly, pseudologues may possess inadequate systems for

concealing their deceptions. Thirdly, pseudologues potentially lack the necessary
skills to produce and deliver believable stories. Fourthly, the pseudologue may be
unconvincing in their portrayals and/or exhibit obvious signs of insincerity; and
finally, the pseudologue may lack the requisite memory skills needed to maintain a
consistent lie across time. With regards to the last point, 12 case studies were
identified as frequently changing the details of their stories, which may lend
credence to the ‘poor memory hypothesis’. There was at least one inconsistent
finding within the data, with Lidz, Miller, Padget and Stedem (1949) stating that
their patient was mindful of covering his tracks to avoid detection.

Not all case studies fell into this category, with 17 case studies demonstrating an
ability to convince audiences to accept their spurious stories as truth, although
eventually, all 17 of these case studies were eventually discovered as chronic liars.
In summary, the dataset supports that a certain proportion, approximately 27%, of
pathological liars are skilful enough at fabricating that they can successfully dupe
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audiences, sometimes only momentarily and sometimes for extended periods. Often
the pseudologues who proved successful in their deceptive endeavours were credited
with the ability to tell falsehoods with demonstrable conviction and/or possessed the
skills needed to maintain a consistent narrative across time and context.
Henderson’s (1917) case study report is quoted here to demonstrate this believability
quality:
Henderson (1917): The above story corresponded in the main
so well with the account given at Netley, that no special
suspicion was aroused by it, and any discrepancies which did
occur seemed to be accounted for by the supposition that his
general condition since he had been at Netley had improved.
(p. 225)

Of course, the treating team’s belief in Henderson’s case study was short-lived. The
finding within the literature that a certain proportion of pseudologues are capable of
telling believable stories does not necessarily negate the finding that many of the lies
are detectable. Ultimately, 100% of pseudologues comprising this dataset were
eventually unveiled as liars. A common notation within the literature was that the
pseudologue would fluctuate between being believable/consistent in their stories and
then being inconsistent and easily verifiable as a liar (for instance Newmark,
Adityanjee & Kay, 1999). What is important to consider, however, is the significant
methodological limitation regarding measurement of this particular theme. Firstly, it
is normally required that a person be repeatedly caught out in their transgressions to
be classified as a pathological liar. Without this classification it is highly unlikely
that such a person would be written up as a case study or included in a research
paper. What this therefore means, is that there could be a subset of pathological
liars who are very successful at avoiding detection who are excluded from research
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studies, and what the data is in fact reflecting is a lower-functioning variation of
pseudologia fantastica.

2.4.2.18 Possibility and probability
In 1909 Dupre distinguished pseudologia fantastica from other psychological
constructs by coining three essential criteria, the first of which stated pseudological
stories must be probable and maintain a certain reference to reality. While only 10
case studies were found to make explicit mention of this theme, careful examination
of the remaining 54 case studies showed that every case study except one engaged in
fabrications that maintained a semblance to the “possible”. The only exception to
this was Casey and Corcoran (1989), who presented a case study of a woman who
lied about being pregnant with 67 babies.

The element of “possibility” was

repeatedly held by authors as evidence that pseudologia fantastica does not represent
a delusional substrate. Sharrock and Cresswell (1989) bring this theme to life with
their illustration of how pseudologia fantastica is distinguishable from psychosis:
Sharrock and Cresswell (1989): the greater, usually total,
improbability of the beliefs held by deluded patients, rather
than the implausible, but not wholly dismissible, tales of
the pseudologue may be one important difference (p. 323).

Sharrock and Cresswell (1989) then provided this reference about their case study to
demonstrate how pseudologia fantastica looks different to delusion in real time:
Sharrock and Cresswell (1989): the degree of improbability
of the lies, though high, was not absolute: catering for the
monarchy

cannot

be

totally

ruled

out

whereas

communicating with a man from Mars can (p. 326).

Sharrock and Cresswell’s (1989) reflections were echoed by Newmark, Adityanjee
and Kay’s (1999) who found their patient’s stories always “maintained a certain
reference to reality and a degree of probability” (p. 92).

93

With regards to this theme Casey and Corcoran’s (1989) case study is an obvious
outlier falling outside the trend observed in all other case studies, bringing into
question whether Casey and Corcoran are actually describing a case of pseudologia
fantastica or something else entirely.

Despite this one instance of thematic

divergence the data overwhelmingly supports that a core feature of this construct is
that the lies maintain a certain reference to possible events.

2.4.2.19 Unusual complexity and intricacy
One of the features that emerged from the data was that pathological liars can create
falsehoods that are intricately woven over time, with elaborately complex details
beyond the average mistruth. Twenty-six case studies were found to support this
theme. Dithrich’s (1991) case study demonstrates just how complex and involved
pseudological lies can become:
Dithrich (1991): “Tom’s stories became increasingly elaborate
and sequentially linked from session to session. He told me of
war games he played at school, and how the whole school was
divided into two camps. He was one of the lucky ones who got
to ride in his own one-man tank, equipped with harmless
splurge bombs that he could without worry fire at his fellow
students” (p. 659).

In the current study an interesting observation amongst identified pseudologues was
the repeated occurrence of “out of nowhere” fabrications. These are the types of lies
that have no discernible provocation, nor are they simple exaggerations; these “out
of nowhere” lies are entirely generated from scratch. Take Dithrich’s (1991) case
study as an example; there was no need to fabricate a complex school war story, the
story goes well beyond simple exaggeration and it appears to provide no sanctuary
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from scorn or punishment, so what is its point? This is a question begging to be
pondered, but for now, the complex and unnecessary nature of the pseudological lies
found in the data provide some sense of demarcation from “normal” lies, with
pseudological lies often lacking the ad hoc simplicity or reactivity of “normal lies”.

2.4.2.20 Kernels of truth
In King and Ford’s (1988) overview of the literature they came to the conclusion
that one of the key elements of pseudologia fantastica is that “the stories… often
contain kernels of truth imbedded in the matrix of falsehoods (p.5).” Sixteen case
studies showed some evidence that pseudological lies have a basis in fact or at least
contain trace elements of truth. In addition to this, authors Mitchell and Francis
(2003) referred to King and Ford’s (1988) definition, which stipulates that
pseudological lies contain kernels of truth, without explicitly linking this element
back to their case study. Additionally, Weston and Dalby’s (1991) case study and
two of Korkeila et al.’s (1995) case studies were noted to show signs of blurring
between imagined worlds and reality, which could indicate that the stories held
elements of truth. Teaford, Shaw, Reiss and Lotspeich’s (2002) case study was
considered to reflect this element throughout many of her false stories as illustrated
by this extract:
Teaford, Shaw, Reiss and Lotspeich’s (2002): after
interviewing B’s parents, it was ascertained that most of her
exaggerated stories had some element of truth.

For

example, B had wanted to become class secretary, but did
not run for office; (p. 166).
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2.4.3 Aetiological and underlying risk factors
Three aetiological pathways are analysed in this literature review, the first is
neurological impairment, the second is psychosocial trauma and the third is
attachment disruption.

2.4.3.1 Neurological abnormalities
In King and Ford’s (1988) analysis they found 40% of cases reviewed had a history
of central nervous system abnormality, primarily epilepsy, abnormal EEG, head
trauma or central nervous system infection.

For the purposes of ascertaining

prevalence statistics around neurological anomalies, the current study has included
any author who posited that a neurological or medical issue was somehow related to
the condition. This has been done in respect of the authors’ clinical opinions and in
acknowledgement that the authors are privy to a variety of information that this
researcher is not.

In total, 12 case studies were categorised as persons who

possessed physical and/or neurological impairments concurrent with pseudologia
fantastica. In addition to this, seven case studies from Healy and Healy’s (1915)
paper, two case studies from Stemmerman (1906) (as cited in Healy & Healy, 1915)
and one case study from Wendt (as cited in Healy & Healy, 1915) were reported to
suffer from headaches.

Of the 12 case studies reported, the various types of

physiologically-based anomalies included: a pancreatic tumour, a head injury and
meningitis, disturbance in regional cerebral blood flow, an epidural hematoma
following an accident with contusions to the right temporal and left frontal lobes, an
arachnoid cyst of the cerebellar vermis, brain fever and spinal meningitis, and four
cases of epilepsy. Further to these physiological abnormalities, there were cognitive
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irregularities that were interpreted by the respective authors as potential
representations of underlying neurological impairment, such as dyslexia, general
learning difficulties, and discrepant performance and verbal intelligence scores on
standardised intelligence tests.

The listing of these different neurological and

cognitive aberrations elucidates the heterogeneity of these findings, in that no one
impairment, apart from epilepsy which was cited four times, was consistently found
to correlate with pseudologia fantastica. Overall there were 10 different forms of
biological and/or cognitive abnormality cited in the literature. The variance in these
findings casts doubt on the hypothesis that a common neurobiological deficit
underpins the phenomenon of pathological lying.

While the initial figures would suggest 12 case studies support the notion that there
is a potential neurobiological pathogenesis underscoring the phenomenon of
pathological lying, the evidence presented is not wholly convincing for at least four
of the case studies. Conversely, it was felt that Mitchell and Francis’ (2003) case
study should have been considered for this theme because of their case study’s
demonstrated learning difficulty.

As previously mentioned, four cases were

identified as having histories of epilepsy at varying degrees of severity (Healy &
Healy, 1915), but before accepting the diagnosis of epilepsy in these four case
studies, two concerns regarding the validity of those diagnoses need to be raised.
The first concern is all four cases of epilepsy predate 1915 and medical
understanding and standards for defining and diagnosing epilepsy have evolved
since that time (Fraguas & Breathnach, 2009), which means these same patients may
not qualify for a comparable diagnosis today. The second issue, which relates
strongly to the first, is that Healy and Healy (1915) have not operationalised their
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definition of epilepsy, meaning researchers have no way of cross-checking the
criteria used to substantiate an epileptic diagnosis. Cases described in Healy and
Healy’s (1915) text as suffering from headaches were excluded from this theme on
the basis that the descriptions of headache symptomatology were relatively vague,
there is enormous variance in applied definitions of what constitutes dispositional
headaches and the presence of headaches does not necessarily indicate neurological
pathology. With these concerns in mind, 13 or approximately 20% of cases showed
indications of neurobiological abnormality, which could be related to the
manifestation of pseudologia fantastica. Interestingly this figure is significantly
more conservative than King and Ford’s (1988) finding that 40% of pseudological
cases showed evidence of central nervous system dysfunction. King and Ford’s
(1988) prevalence statistics may be higher than the current study’s because they
were using a different dataset, or because they applied a different threshold for
defining central nervous system dysfunction, or because they were inclined to find
evidence to confirm their neuro-physiological explanation.

2.4.3.1.1 Evidence of neurological impairment - discrepant intelligence index
scores
In King and Ford’s (1988) review their dataset suggested a bimodal grouping of
patients, with one group demonstrating average or slightly below average general
intelligence, and the other group showing superior intellect. It is unclear in King
and Ford’s (1988) report how many cases this summarisation is based. According to
King and Ford (1988) only eight cases reported verbal and performance IQ
discrepancies, and it was found that five of these eight cases possessed significantly
better verbal ability than performance. King and Ford (1988) did not state whether
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the remaining three cases had a converse pattern of superior performance IQ relative
to verbal IQ or if there was simply no divergence in performance to verbal IQ
scores. King and Ford (1988) interpreted these discrepancy scores as evidence of
potential non-dominant hemispheric dysfunction.

In this current study eight cases were found to report IQ scores from standardised
test protocols, namely the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales (WAIS). A further 16
cases had their intelligence described without reference to standardised measures,
for instance, Wiersma (1933) stated:
Wiersma (1933): The examination of his intellect did not
yield any abnormal symptoms. Neither in his memory nor
in the associations nor in the judgment could any defect be
demonstrated by means of an experimental investigation (p.
52).

Once standardised test scores and clinical opinion were combined there were a total
of 25 case reports containing information about intellectual functioning. Of those 25
cases, 19 were considered to demonstrate normal intellectual functioning, with no
measurable and/or observable difference in verbal and performance ability. One of
these cases achieved a “superior” Full Scale Intelligence Quotient (FSIQ) (Korkeila
et al., 1995).

Of the remaining six cases, five showed evidence of verbal-

performance IQ discrepancy on standardised measures, however, these were not
necessarily discrepant at the 95% significance level. Unfortunately, many of the IQ
scores reported were not done in ranges in accordance with current reporting
standards, which limits retrospective capacity to interpret these discrepancies as true
performance discrepancies or discrepancies of measurement error. Also, there is no
indication given as to whether the authors have tested to see if the score
discrepancies are statistically or clinically significant. Interestingly, unlike Ford and
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King’s (1988) finding that the majority of pseudological cases show greater verbal
ability relative to performance ability, the results of this study showed a 50-50 split,
with two cases presenting with a superior performance IQ compared to verbal IQ,
and two cases showing superior verbal IQ compared to performance IQ.
Technically there was a third case study reported to show superior verbal intellectual
functioning but the authors of this case study, Healy and Healy (1915), were unable
to base this observation on any neuro-cognitive testing. One interesting anomaly
within the dataset was the case presented by Teaford, Shaw, Reiss and Lotspeich
(2002); their case study, “B”, was subjected to multiple neuropsychological tests
over four years. The series of tests revealed a marked deterioration in performance
over time, with B first demonstrating average range intellectual functioning (FSIQ
on WISC-R was 92 with VIQ = 95 and PIQ = 92), but four years later the same test
placed B in the borderline range of intellectual functioning with a FSIQ of 78 and no
discrepancy in index scores.

While King and Ford (1988) believed discrepant Verbal to Performance IQ scores
indicated non-dominant hemispheric dysfunction amongst a proportion of
pseudologues, the current dataset does not indicate an obvious pattern of
neurological dysfunction. In fact, 76% of cases, where intellectual functioning was
reported, were classified as normal, average or above average by their authors. In
contrast, only 20% of cases were considered to possess divergent Performance
versus Verbal Intelligence capabilities.

Furthermore, in the cases where

Performance and Verbal Index scores were given, the direction of discrepancy was
not uniform and it was not entirely clear whether these discrepancies met clinically
significant thresholds. The data from this study, therefore, supports a conservative
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link between atypical neuropsychological test scores and pseudologia fantastica. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, neuropsychological testing is an indirect and
imprecise measure of brain functioning, which means there can be many possible
subject-related and non-subject related explanations for atypical test score profiles.
Because of the fallibility of neuropsychological methods test scores alone should not
be relied upon when making neurobiological assumptions. In summary, further
systematic and multi-modal investigations would need to be conducted to
corroborate and interpret these test findings. In the meantime, there should be a
partial moratorium on King and Ford’s (1988) position that a non-dominant
hemispheric dysfunction is aetiologically related to pathological lying.

2.4.3.1.2 Evidence of Neurological Impairment - Impulsivity
There has been converging evidence from non-invasive imagining techniques (e.g.,
MRI, fMRI, PET) and pharmacology supporting the hypothesis that impulsivity is
underscored by an atypical neural substrate (e.g., King, Tenney, Rossi, Colamussi &
Burdick, 2003).

Given the repeated observation that persons with clinically

significant impulse control difficulties have irregular serotonin and monoaminergic
systems (King et al., 2003), one can deduce that an extremely impulsive individual
is likely to have an underlying neurological deficit. Research into impulsivity
becomes relevant when considering arguments that poor self-regulation is a central
impairment underlying pseudologia fantastica. Authors such as Ford (1996) have
postulated that pathological lying is an impulse control disorder and that this
dispositional weakness renders pseudologues ill equipped to resist urges to lie (e.g.,
Ford, 1996). This view is eloquently reflected in Henderson’s (1917) commentary
of pseudologia fantastica:
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Henderson’s (1917): Although they may be adults in years,
(they) retain their childishness in that they sacrifice their
future for the gratification of their immediate needs, and
thus act with utter lack of foresight and total irresponsibility
(p. 230).

In this current section, two questions regarding impulsivity are explored - firstly, are
pseudologues temperamentally impulsive by nature, and secondly, are pseudological
lies created and dispersed impulsively?

In answer to the first question, 16 cases were described as being temperamentally
impulsive. Arguably these 16 patients lacked the requisite superego strength needed
to inhibit self-defeating yet hedonistic impulses while promoting adaptive, goaldriven behaviour. This was demonstrated by Birch, Kelln and Aquino’s (2006) case
study, Lorraine:
Birch, Kelln and Aquino’s (2006): Lorraine failed to take
even minimal precautions against her lies being detected in
this situation, indicating that it was difficult for her to resist
the immediate, internal gratification afforded by her lying
(p. 313).

The perspective that pseudologues are inherently impulsive across a range of
functions gives sway to the argument made by Ford (1996) that pseudologia
fantastica could be categorised as an impulse control disorder. Obviously, being
impulsive does not automatically predispose someone towards prevarication, but if
the inclination to lie actively exists in someone’s makeup and the normal selfcontrol receptors are absent or impaired, it would conceivably make it difficult for
someone with both predilections to resist the urge to lie.
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In 1915 Healy and Healy presented a synopsis of Stemmerman’s (1906) work on
pseudologia fantastica. It was within this synopsis that Stemmerman (1906) was
credited with saying, “the pathological liar lies, not according to a plan, but the
impulse seizes him suddenly” (p. 20). It was of interest to this study to see whether
this theme emerged from the data and whether Stemmerman’s (1906) words would
remain valid after thematic analysis. So, with regards to the second question - are
pseudological lies created and dispersed impulsively – there were 13 case studies
which were shown to lie either compulsively (10 cases) or without deliberate
intention to do so (five cases). Given the similarity in constructs, if the three themes
of “temperamental impulsivity”, “compulsive lying” and “automaticity in lying”
(otherwise referred to as “no deliberate intent to lie”) were subsumed under a central
“dyscontrol” theme, the current dataset would suggest 21 separate case studies have
demonstratable impairments to their superego functions, and self-control impairment
could potentially be, as Ford (1996) suggests, one of the key vulnerabilities to
developing pseudologia fantastica.

2.4.3.1.2.1 Impulsivity marker – forensic history
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) General Theory of Crime hypothesises that it is the
combination of opportunity and lack of self-control that leads to criminal activity. It
is also well documented that there is a high proportion of criminal offenders,
especially recidivists, who possess impulsive temperaments (e.g., Mathias, MarshRichard & Dougherty, 2008), which is why forensic history is cited here as a
behavioural marker of impulsivity. King and Ford’s (1988) review found half of the
observed cases in their dataset engaged in criminal behaviour such as theft,
swindling, forgery and plagiarism, with 20% holding criminal arrest histories. The
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figures from the 64 studies were lower than Ford and King’s (1988), with just under
30% (or 19 cases) of reported pseudologues possessing a reported forensic history.
Within the current dataset, 84% of all criminal acts accounted for related to petty
theft, two cases pertained to arson, there were two cases of property damage and
only one physical assault. Conceptually the incidence of concordant petty crime
with pseudologia fantastica begs the question of whether this is further evidence of
an underlying impulse control disorder or simply an aberration of morality.
Hypothetically, it is possible that the same impaired impulse restraint mechanisms
that are failing to rein in lying impulses are also failing to curb the impulse to
commit petty crimes. It may also speak, however, to an underlying and pervasive
moral deficit.

The lack of criminal recidivism observed across the 19 identified

forensic cases falls short of thresholds reserved for Antisocial Personality Disorder,
where the DSM-IV-TR specifies that a person considered for the latter diagnosis
needs to repeatedly perform acts that are grounds for arrest.

2.4.3.1.2.2 Impulsivity marker – vocational instability
Fourteen of the 64 case studies found in the literature demonstrated a penchant for
unstable employment. While this only makes up approximately 22% of the dataset
it exceeds Australia’s overall unemployment rate for the period 1978 to 2010, which
averaged out to 7.11%.

Even though unstable employment and unemployment are

two distinct constructs, the figures from the dataset represent an interesting
emerging pattern that warrants future examination. Again, as with the co-existence
of criminal behaviour amongst a proportion of pseudologues, the issue of unstable
employment can be indicative of an underlying self-control deficit. Alternatively
unstable employment could point to an underlying restlessness, boredom and/or
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subjective sense of discontent with the status quo, and/or it could be indicative of a
poorly developed sense of self. It is well documented, for instance, that persons
with underdeveloped self-identities frequently make shifts to their life direction
including vocational pursuits (McWilliams, 1994; Millon, 1996). Wiersma’s (1933)
first case study illustrates some of the difficulties experienced by pathological liars
in maintaining regular and sustained employment:
Wiersma (1933): From his history we learnt that from his youth
our patient showed a great instability. He had been not only a
sailor, but successively a warehouse laborer, commercial
traveller, hatmaker, barber’s apprentice, and many other things.
Most of them were of very short duration; generally he left his
job because he did not like it after a few days or took to
quarrelling with his patrons. (p. 50-51).

2.4.3.1.3 Hereditary vulnerabilities
Healy and Healy’s (1915) data indicated that the overwhelming majority of
pathological liars descend from families with striking psychiatric and behavioural
defects. When King and Ford (1988) assessed their sample they found 10% had a
parent with a history of alcoholism and 30% had a first-degree relative with a
neuropsychiatric illness.

The findings from both authors have been used as

indicators of a genetic vulnerability to psychological illness, but are viewed here as
evidence of both genetic and environmental instability. Unlike the seemingly strong
evidence for genetic loading in these earlier reviews the current study only found
two case studies with reports of psychiatrically unwell parents. While this may not
reflect the real-life prevalence of parental mental illness, it does mean that there is
not enough evidence here to support a theory of genetic vulnerability. Parental
alcoholism is discussed under traumatogenic aetiology.
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2.4.3.2 Aetiological pathways: Trauma and attachment disruption
The majority of pathological liars identified in Healy and Healy’s (1915) study were
reportedly exposed to adversive environmental factors and/or traumas, which
provides a preliminary basis for linking childhood trauma to the development of
pathological lying.

In the present study a spectrum of destabilising pathogens

emerged including death of a first degree relative, adoption, foster care and/or
institutionalisation, separation from a primary attachment figure, childhood abuse in
all of its forms, geographical relocations, child/adolescent absconding, parental
substance abuse and parental psychiatric illness. Each of these themes has been
categorised as both traumatic and disruptive to attachment, although with varying
degrees of impact.

Attachment theoretically occurs when two people are observed to share a reciprocal
connection characterised by mutual attunement and the sharing of love and comfort
(Bowlby, 1988; Gray, 2002; Hughes, 1997; Levy & Orlans, 1998). Levy and Orlans
(1988) define it as “the deep enduring connection established between a child and
caregiver in the first several years of life” (Levy & Orlans, 1998, p.1). Attachment
fails to develop or is disrupted when the environment and caregiver(s) fail to meet
and nurture the child’s needs and manage their distress (Kagan, 2004). Trauma, on
the other hand, is defined as mental or emotional stress or physical injury producing
a disordered psychic or behavioural state. According to the wider literature trauma
and attachment disruption are inextricably entwined (e.g., Kobak, Cassidy, & Zir,
2004).

Those exposed to trauma, inadequate care and attachment rupture risk

developing schematic representations that others cannot be trusted, that their needs
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will go unmet and that intimate connection is dangerous (Bowlby, 1988; Perry,
2001). While reactions to trauma may serve a protective function in an unsafe
environment, it can place the young person at a disadvantage when generalised out
to safe environments (Snyder & Pulvers, 2001). It is interesting to consider whether
or not pathological lying can be classified as a “trauma response” that serves an
adaptive function initially, which expires as environmental contingencies change
and the person enters adulthood.

Significant pathogens identified within the

literature will be discussed under the following subheadings.

These pathogens

correspond with Kobak, Cassidy, and Zir’s (2004) conceptualisation that attachment
trauma occurs when one of four scenarios present themselves: there is an
unanticipated and/or prolonged separation with little communication and no shared
plan for union; physical and sexual abuse of a child by an attachment figure; loss of
an attachment figure; the abandonment by an attachment figure in a situation of
urgent need.

2.4.3.2.1 Death of an attachment figure
The most common disruptive developmental event within the dataset was the death
of a first-degree relative, with 18 or 28.12% of pseudologues experiencing the
unexpected death of a parent, sibling or child at a young age. Most commonly it
involved the death of a parent during the pseudologue’s childhood or adolescence
(12 cases), but there were also four cases where the death pertained to a sibling(s),
one case which related to a 19-year-old female undergoing an abortion and another
who experienced three still births, presumably in early adulthood. Even though
some of these deaths may not have been witnessed directly by the pseudologue, it is
conceivable that the unexpected death of any family member would have a
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devastating effect on both the emotional and attachment systems of a family and one
would expect to see a sequelae of side effects for any child growing up in such an
environment (Kagan, 2004).

One such side-effect may be the development or

exacerbation of pathological lying. Such aetiology is observed in Deutsch’s (1921)
paper where a young boy turned to pathological lying upon hearing of his father’s
death:
Deutsch (1921): The originator of the pseudology was the
boy, who produced the following story after the news of his
father’s death. A very distinguished man occupying a high
position in the world had adopted his mother and provided
her with a villa and a motorcar and the most beautiful
dresses…. This gentleman had discovered that his father
was still alive and was in Siberia, communicated with him
by telephone via Norway, and passed on his father’s
greetings to the boy by this means (p. 383).

This boy’s fantasy appears to be meeting a deeper, psychical function: rather than
face the reality of his father’s death and the consequent threats to the family’s
financial stability, he invented a story that not only allowed him to fantasise about
his father being alive, but allowed him to propagate a falsehood that enhanced the
economic standing of his family, unburdening him from any responsibility to protect
or provide for his mother and sister (Deutsch, 1921).

2.4.3.2.2 Adoption, foster care, institutionalisation and/or separation from a
parent
Thirteen case studies were adopted, fostered, placed in an orphanage or
institutionalised in some way, making this one of the more common forms of
attachment disruption identified.

Many of these cases reportedly experienced

multiple placement breakdowns. Only one of these 13 cases reported having an
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adoptive mother who “treated him with great kindness”. Lidz, Miller, Padget and
Stedem’s (1949) case study was one that experienced protracted separation from his
family:
Lidz et al. (1949): He had lived in an orphanage between the
ages of 6 and 17. One brother had been adopted by an aunt and
uncle in infancy, and the other siblings had been placed in
foster homes. The patient had completed high school while in
the orphanage and had then lived with his aunt and uncle in
Baltimore. He never fitted into the family and was clearly
jealous of his cousin and his brother.

In addition to these figures, 10 case studies were found to have an absent parent(s)
or primary attachment figure, often from an extremely young age.

2.4.3.2.3 Peregrination and absconding
In Healy and Healy’s (1915) observations of pseudologues they came to the
conclusion that there are “wonderfully strong” correlations between itinerancy,
running away and pathological lying. This link was again observed and reiterated
by King and Ford (1988), with at least half of their cases showing peregrination
tendencies. In the current study 12.5% of cases had home and/or school lives that
were marked by instability and frequent moves, with many of these having the
experience of being moved between family households.

One such case was

observed by Hoyer (1959):
Hoyer (1959): When D.B. was between 10 and 18 years old,
there was a series of moves back and forth between Michigan and
Texas, with the patient occasionally living for short periods with
relatives. With schooling frequently interrupted, he was behind
for his age, and this was evidently traumatic socially.
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In addition to peregrination, 17% of pseudologues were identified as repeat
absconders including this case:
Henderson (1917): He describes himself as always having
been of a roving disposition, his family could never keep
control of him, and even at the early age of 7 years he had run
away from home and gone to relatives.

The themes of peregrination and absconding have been discussed within the topic of
attachment disruption because of the potential bi-directional relationship between
peregrination/absconding and attachment insecurity; not only does moving
frequently inhibit one’s ability to foster deeper interpersonal connections, it can also
signify or reveal an attachment difficulty (Anzieu-Premmereur, 2004).

2.4.3.2.4 Childhood physical, sexual and emotional abuse
According to experts on attachment trauma, exposure to childhood abuse is strongly
linked to ruptures in attachment (Kagan, 2004), and so the figures on abuse seem
relevant here.

Childhood abuse was noted to dominate the developmental

landscapes of 10 case studies. An additional case study was identified as someone
who experienced regular physical abuse at the hands of her husband, bringing the
lifetime total up to 11. Various forms of abuse were identified with physical, sexual
and emotional forms represented across the data. Two of these 11 case studies did
not have third party corroboration, which is methodologically troubling given the
emerging evidence that pseudologues have a tendency to falsify stories of
victimisation. On the other hand, it is anticipated that the incidence of childhood
abuse in this dataset is underrepresented and doesn’t reflect true epidemiology, as
has been the case in a variety of other studies (e.g., Cicchetti & Carlson, 1989;
Fallon et al., 2010; MacMillan, Jamieson & Walsh, 2003). Abuse of the child
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pseudologue is a theme that has transcended generations, with abuse being
documented in the earliest and most recent publications. The case singled out here
is from Langer’s (2010) report. Langer’s description highlights the multifaceted
nature of childhood abuse and neglect, but it should be noted that there is
disagreement amongst the patient’s family as to whether the claims of sexual abuse
were legitimate:
Langer (2010): Childhood history was significant for a report
of sexual abuse by his maternal uncle at 9 or 10, as well as
alcohol abuse and neglectful behaviour by both parents…
(p.3).

Langer (2010) came to the conclusion that his patient attempted to deny the horrible
reality of his molestation by fabricating an exaggerated and distorted account of the
true to life molestation.

When considering a child who is being abused, especially abuse that violates the
child’s physical and emotional integrity, it is understood that that child will engage
in a variety of behaviours and cognitive strategies to deal with and survive that
abuse. Many of these strategies, like mental dissociation, can serve a protective
function, in that they defend the young person from having to contemporaneously
process and/or remember the abuse (e.g., Mollon, 2003; Walker, 2009). It is widely
acknowledged, however, that these strategies can become less adaptive and can even
become maladaptive when continued into adulthood (e.g., Feinauer, Mitchell,
Harper & Dane, 1996; Steel, Sanna, Hammond, Whipple & Cross, 2004). For some
victims of childhood abuse, pseudologia fantastica may be used as a dissociative
daydream that mentally takes them away from the world they live in and provides
them with a temporary oasis.

The child can make their pseudological world

whatever they want it to be and when the abuse starts up again they can take
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themselves away to this world. To share the pseudology with others makes the
fantasy more real and gives strength to their wished-for existence. The act of lying
may also function to keep outsiders from ever getting close or ever knowing them
with a tacit assumption that being close and being known is dangerous.

2.4.3.2.5 Parental substance misuse
The current study’s figures for parental substance misuse were comparable to King
and Ford’s 1988 figures, with 14% (versus 10% from King & Ford, 1988), of the
current dataset having a parent with reported substance abuse issues. Alcoholism
was identified as the most common form (seven cases), followed by benzodiazepine
abuse (one case) and narcotic abuse (one case). Again, given issues surrounding
retrospective self-report it is conceivable that this number could be a lot higher and
it could also be lower. Weston and Dalby’s (1991) case was one of the nine
pseudologues identified for this theme:
Weston and Dalby (1991): He talked of his early childhood
and his alcoholic father who used to beat him, and stated
that he was afraid of the world (p. 613).

From cases like Weston and Dalby (1991) researchers can begin to piece together a
picture of what it would have been like to grow up with an alcoholic parent and how
pathological lying could conceivably develop as an adaptive survival strategy. For
instance, if home life is volatile and unpredictable the perception that life is volatile
and unpredictable may generalise out to the whole world, and as can be seen for
Weston and Dalby’s (1991) case, the whole world can begin to feel unsafe. In such
a world, prevarications and lies may artificially foster a sense of predictability in the
child’s life. Again, as is the case with other forms of abuse and/or neglect, a child
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may find themselves self-soothing through tellings and re-tellings of stories that
paint the picture of an idyllic family life.

Summary of attachment disruption
Less significantly, there were two cases found to come from uncharacteristically
large families where it is suspected that it would have been difficult for the child to
secure adequate attention and attachment. And finally, two cases were identified as
having parents with histories of mental illness, which the literature indicates is a risk
factor for developing adverse outcomes including attachment rupture (Martins &
Gaffan, 2000; Murray & Cooper, 2003; van IJzendoorn, 1995). Altogether when the
themes were collapsed to represent an overall “trauma/attachment disruption”
picture, 37 cases were identified. This represents 57% of the cases analysed. These
figures support the hypothesis that trauma and disruptions to attachment play a
potential and perhaps significant role in the development and/or exacerbation of
pseudologia fantastica, and that trauma and attachment disruption need to be
considered as reasonable correlates and/or risk factors for developing or advancing
the condition.

One hypothesis worth considering is that pathological lying is

traumatogenic and develops as an externally expressed defence strategy in response
to ongoing trauma and/or attachment disruption. Such a defence system could,
hypothetically, protect the individual from acknowledging and/or processing
traumatic memories from their past and create emotional distance interpersonally.
This hypothesis could explain why 20 cases were flagged from the current dataset as
using pathological lying as a psychological defence. Importantly, however, trauma
is not identified across the board; therefore it cannot be held as a necessary or
sufficient risk factor.
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Interestingly, research into attachment has revealed that individuals who experience
attachment ruptures are at risk of developing difficulties with physiological,
emotional, cognitive and behavioural regulation, interpersonal relationships, impulse
control, delayed gratification, causal thinking, personality development, and identity
formation (Hughes, 1997; Kagan, 2004; Perry, 1994, 2001), all of which have been
identified as salient to pathological liars in the case study research. When reviewing
the research on attachment trauma and the sequelae of psychological markers of
dysfunction it is difficult to ignore the potentially powerful link between attachment
trauma and pseudologia fantastica. Hughes (1997), for instance, compiled a list of
behavioural symptoms of children with significant attachment difficulties based on
research and clinical experience and found children with attachment disturbances
frequently engage in intense lying even when caught in the act. Hypothetically one
can imagine a child who has never experienced security in relationships developing
a belief that it is not safe to connect to adults in an authentic way because they will
eventually abandon or mistreat you. That child may learn that if they lie or at least
pretend to be someone else, their true self becomes protected from rejection and
their pseudo-self may accelerate the formation of new attachments.

2.4.3.3 Financially impoverished childhood
Ten case studies were identified in the data as coming from financially impoverished
childhoods. This figure is potentially skewed by the types of cases that make it to
publication, with persons from lower socio economic backgrounds being less likely
to access mental health services, especially private facilities. This critique seems
relevant given a number of the case studies have been reported by private
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practitioners. When considering poverty as a risk factor for pseudologia fantastica it
makes intuitive sense that poor children will lie to hide their family’s financial
shortcomings and to secure social acceptance despite their lack of affluence. A child
from a poor family may learn that with poverty comes disadvantage and that they
are more likely to succeed interpersonally if they project a favourable self-image.

2.4.3.4 Peer relationship difficulties
Sixteen cases studies were identified as having poor peer relations. Often these
cases studies were described as having few friends, and that they lied in an attempt
to gain some form of peer acceptance or peer exchange, as seen in Mitchell and
Francis’ (2003) case study:
Mitchell and Francis (2003): He was an individual with low
intellectual functioning…interpersonal problems, and few
friendships or romantic relationships…(he) admitted that his
fabrications were fantasies that he had repeated to peers in
order to earn their respect and thereby become more compatible
with others.

Some authors felt that the pseudologia fantastica was triggered by peer isolation, in
that it helped the person feel like they can be accepted, but the reverse can also be
held true, that the pseudologia fantastica sabotaged the person’s ability to secure
lasting and respecting friendships, especially if the fabrications were transparent.
Poor peer relationships, would potentially reinforce to the pseudologue that their
true authentic self is not acceptable to others, making it understandable that they
may feel compelled to pretend they are someone different.
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2.4.4 Dominant symptom markers
While there is significant symptom heterogeneity across case studies there is also
enough homogeneity to support the stance that pathological lying represents a
unique condition that can be defined by several key behavioural and cognitive
markers. The symptomatological markers seen in 50% or more of cases include:
Lying chronically and at a high frequency; creating stories about
events that are humanly possible, even if implausible;
disseminating falsehoods that are self-aggrandising; depicting
oneself erroneously as either the victim and/or hero; lying in a
manner that denotes poor awareness, which can sometimes result
in self-deception; deceiving others without distinct purpose or
motivation to gain materially; creating fabrications that are
intricate, elaborate and complex and; showing a capacity to
acknowledge mendacities when challenged.

The symptom markers seen in 20% to 49% of cases include:
Represents a psychological defence; can be underpinned by
disturbances in the person’s reality testing capabilities;
pseudologues can temporarily believe in their own falsifications
and/or lack awareness that they are lying when disseminating
falsehoods; they can show an initial failure to acknowledge their
falsehoods when confronted through a myriad of diversionary
techniques such as denial, meta-fabrication or strong emotional
outbursts; they have a propensity to tell secondary lies in order to
cover up primary lies; they can continue to engage in false
statements despite the consequences of such acts being selfinjurious; kernels of truth are embedded in the overall lie matrix;
while falsehoods are presented as believable and consistent over
time they are also easily detectable as pseudologues fail to
safeguard their lies from detection.
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Symptom markers with an endorsement rate of 20% or higher were taken from
Study 1, Part 2 and cross-matched with definitional features identified in 20% or
more of publications in Study 1, Part 1. Nine of the stronger themes from both
studies were held to have similar or complementary meanings. These themes are
shown in Table 2.

Table 2
Descriptors with 20% or higher endorsement that held similar or complementary qualities across
.
Study 1, Part’s 1 and 2
Themes from Study 1, Part 1 (32 definitions)
with an endorsement rate of 20% or higher
Habitual, extensive and repeated production of
falsifications.

Themes from Study 2, Part 2 (64 case
studies) with an endorsement rate of 20%
or higher
Lying chronically and at a high frequency.

May partially convince him or herself that their
fabrications have some basis in fact.

Lying in manner that denotes poor awareness,
which can sometimes result in self-deception;
pseudologues can temporarily believe in their
own falsifications and/or lack awareness that
they are lying when disseminating falsehoods.

Entirely disproportionate to any discernible end
in view; such lying is not determined by
situational or external factors.

Deceiving others without distinct purpose.

The pseudologues’ falsehoods are not told for
personal procurement or profit or material
reward.

Deceiving others without motivation to gain
materially.

Often of a complicated nature.

Creating fabrications
elaborate and complex.

Unconscious
predominate.

internalised

motivations

that

are

intricate,

Represents a psychological defence.

Demonstrates an impaired ability to distinguish
between fiction and reality.

Disturbances in the person’s reality testing
capabilities.

The possibility that the untruth may at any
moment be demolished does nothing to abash
the liar.

They can continue to engage in false
statements despite the consequences of such
acts being self-injurious.

Easily verified as untrue.

Easily detectable as pseudologues fail to
safeguard their lies from detection.
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Six of the top themes from Study 1, Part 1 (published definitions) did not correspond
with any of the top themes outlined in Study 1, Part 2 (64 case studies). These
themes were:
Often of a fantastic nature; social advantage does not govern the
pseudologue’s motivation to lie; when an external reason for
lying is suspected the nature of the lies told are often far in
excess of the parameters of that reason; the pseudologue can be
held hostage to their lies and cease to be master over them; the
lying behaviours manifest over a period of years or even a
lifetime and the onset can be traced back at least to adolescence
or early adulthood; the pseudologue cannot be declared insane,
feebleminded or epileptic and the lying cannot be accounted for
by an intellectual defect, illness, organic memory impairment or
delusion.

Eight of the top themes from Study 1, Part 2 (case studies) did not correspond with
any of the top themes outlined in Study 1, Part 1 (definitions). These themes were:
Creating stories about events that are humanly possible, even if
implausible; disseminating falsehoods that are self-aggrandising;
depicting oneself erroneously as either the victim and/or hero;
showing a capacity to acknowledge mendacities when challenged;
kernels of truth are embedded in the overall lie matrix; falsehoods
are presented as believable and consistent over time; they can show
an initial failure to acknowledge their falsehoods when confronted
through a myriad of diversionary techniques such as denial, metafabrication or strong emotional outbursts; they have a propensity to
tell secondary lies in order to cover up primary lies.

The majority of these ‘non-corresponding’ themes did, however, match up with less
frequently endorsed themes.

For example, self-aggrandisement was a theme

identified in 20% or more of case studies in Study 1, Part 2, but was only endorsed
in three out of 32 (9.37%) definitions in Study 1, Part 1, thus making it appear as if
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the two studies had different perspectives on self-aggrandisement, when in actuality
the only difference pertained to endorsement frequency; this was true for the
majority of themes. It is evident that between Study 1, Part 1 and Study 1, Part 2
there are areas of thematic divergence, however, over 50% of the stronger themes
from both sources overlapped, which again supports the presence of a delineable
construct.

It is interesting to note that greater theme consistency was observed across the case
studies than published definitions.

For instance, the highest endorsement rate

recorded for definitional themes was 37.5%, with three themes attracting this score.
In contrast, across the case studies there was one theme which attracted an
endorsement rate of 98.4%, another two which scored 79.6% and an additional four
that achieved an endorsement rate of 40% or higher. There were more themes
counted across the 32 definitions, than there were across the 64 case studies,
indicating that the spread of opinion was wider for definitions than what is actually
observed in real life cases.

The discrepancy in theme consistency potentially

highlights that descriptions of cases are a more reliable way to elucidate a
construct’s essence than postulations of non-case specific definitions.

With regards to risk factors, the case study material was explored for patterns and
trends to see if there were any aetiological correlates of significance. At this stage,
there is need for greater clarity, but traumatogenic factors seem to be the most
prevalent over and above physiological indicators. Whether or not the prevalence of
trauma exceeds rates of trauma in the general population remains to be seen and
requires further investigation (e.g., Brooker, Cawson, Kelly & Wattam, 2001).
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Similarly, there may be greater evidence of neurobiological determinants to come,
especially if future research incorporates neuro-imaging technologies.

Limitations of case study material
The figures presented in this study cannot be held as accurate representations of
real-life prevalence, because the marriage between what happens in a pseudologue’s
life and what gets reported in a case report is not going to be 100% congruent.
Therefore, symptom markers and epidemiological factors may be under or over
represented in the current data. One of the other more notable limitations of using
case study material for research is the inability to control for extraneous variables,
which makes it impossible to draw unqualified conclusions about the interplay
between a subject’s behaviour, motivation, cognitions and autobiographical history.
Single-case study designs also lend themselves to greater researcher bias (Goodwin,
2002; Wampold, 2006); with authors more likely to present information that fits
with their agenda, therapeutic preferences and general worldview.

As a

consequence it has always been held that researchers cannot discern cause and effect
conclusions when using case studies, nor can they generalise findings to a wider
population (Goodwin, 2002; Wampold, 2006).

In Summary Study 1, Part 2 has achieved its aim of combining information from 64
case studies to form a profile of pathological lying. The information from Study 1,
Part 2 predominantly corresponds with the more common definitional features
identified in the previous study. At the conclusion of Study 1, Parts 1 and 2, there is
stronger confidence in the stance that pathological lying represents a distinguishable
condition. The next two chapters describe Study 2, Parts 1 and 2; these studies share
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the same aim as Study 1 - to stabilise the identity of pathological lying through
qualitative, conceptual analysis methods, so that future researchers can confidently
identify pseudologues for research. Study 2, will strive to broaden and build on the
understandings taken from Study 1 by interviewing mental health professionals
about their conceptualisations of the construct, thereby providing a current
practitioners’ viewpoint on pathological lying.
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CHAPTER THREE
Developing the interview protocol - Study 2, Part 1
“Lies are a little fortress; inside them you can feel safe and powerful. Through your
little fortress of lies you try to run your life and manipulate others. But the fortress
needs walls, so you build some. These are the justifications for your lies. You know,
like you are doing this to protect someone you love, to keep them from feeling pain.
Whatever works, just so you feel okay about the lies.”

- Paul Young, The Shack
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The purpose of the third and fourth chapters of this dissertation is to provide a
contemporaneous investigation into pathological lying.

Because there are no

reliable or valid methods for identifying and recruiting pseudologues for scientific
study it was decided that the next best thing would be to interview mental health
professionals about their experiences with the construct and relevant clients. In Part
1 of this second study, a semi-structured interview protocol was developed to
standardise the proposed interview process. The interview protocol was formed by
a dynamic focus group discussion led by the researcher and her supervisor, and
attended by a small sample of experienced researchers and clinicians in the
psychology field. Members of the focus group were asked to consider the aims of
the second part of the study, namely the interviews with clinicians, and to
recommend questions that would elucidate the intricacies of pathological lying and
address the research questions. A focus group was chosen, rather than researcherdeveloped interview questions, to neutralise inherent researcher biases and ensure
that the questions most relevant to practising clinicians were included.

3.1 Aims
1. Develop a set of interview questions, which can be used in the next phase of
this study, where industry experts will be interviewed about their experiences
with and/or their opinion on the construct of pathological lying.
2. Minimise researcher allegiance effects by having interview questions
developed by an independent panel of psychology experts.
3. Design and test interview questions to meet scientific standards of
objectivity, ensuring questions do not lead the responses.
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3.2 Research Questions
1. What interview questions can be asked of clinicians, which will return the
greatest clarity of understanding the symptomological profile of pathological
lying?
2. What interview questions can elicit useful information regarding aetiological
correlates associated with pathological lying?
3. Which order should questions be presented in the interview to enhance
participant disclosure and minimise researcher bias effects?

3.3 Participants
Five psychology professionals, two females and three males, agreed to participate in
the focus group. The split between clinical and research professionals was 2:3
respectively. Participants’ level of experience in psychology ranged from five to 25
years.

3.4 Method
All discussions and briefings were held as a unitary focus group. Participants were
instructed at the beginning of the process that the purpose of the focus group was to
develop a set of interview questions that could be used in a qualitatively-based
interview of psychologists and psychiatrists regarding their clinical experience
and/or vicarious assessment of pathological lying. The focus group was briefed
about the proposed strategy for data collection. After this initial debrief members of
the focus group were encouraged to raise any comments, issues of methodological
weakness and suggest ideas for experimental design improvement.
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A brainstorming method was used to structure the focus group’s initial discussions,
with all suggestions written on a large white board and recorded by the researcher.
Once initial suggestions were made, similar questions were grouped together into
categories.

Once categories were established, the focus group voted on which

question categories should remain in the study and which should be excluded on
account of their irrelevance to the research aims. Once categories were agreed upon,
the final wording of each question was decided upon. The questions that were
generated from this focus group were then compiled and drafted before being sent
out via email to each focus group member for final analysis and critique. Once all
focus group members approved of the final compilation of questions they were
standardised into the interview protocol.

3.5 Results
The unanimous decision of the focus group was that a semi-structured interview was
the best fit for achieving the research aims as it offered some degree of scientific
standardisation, without losing the flexibility and responsiveness provided by the
semi-structured format. The guidance given from the focus group was that each
participant should be asked the standardised questions, but where necessary the
researcher could use prompt questions for elaboration.

The focus group suggested certain questions should be ordered at the beginning of
the interview to reduce the influence of later-placed questions on the participants’
responses. For instance, participants were asked to define pathological lying at the
beginning of the interview to ensure their response was a true reflection of their

127

clinical experience and/or opinion rather than a product of their interaction with the
researcher. Careful consideration was given to the construction of the interview
questions. For instance, open-ended questions were to be used as the benchmark
standard in an effort to reduce interviewer pressure and minimise respondent
acquiescence bias. Closed or dichotomous-response questions were to be placed at
the end of the interview, thereby ensuring these questions could not contaminate
earlier free-association responses. Answers to closed and open questions would be
compared to earlier answers to check for internal response consistency. The final
questions created by the focus group are shown in Table 3.
.
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Table 3
List of interview questions created by the focus group in Study 2, Part 1
Question
number

Content and structure of question

1

Are you familiar with the term pathological lying or compulsive lying? Are there any alternative
terms that you would use or feel more comfortable using?
If you had a definition of pathological lying, what would it be? What would you regard to be the
main symptoms of pathological lying?
In your opinion and experience, do you believe pathological lying is a distinct disorder that is not
the result of an underlying psychiatric condition? In other words, do you believe pathological
lying exists as a disorder in its own right? Alternatively, do you believe pathological lying is a
behavioural manifestation belonging to a formally recognised psychiatric condition?
a) Why do you hold this opinion?

2
3

4

Have you ever had a client/s whom you believed to be a pathological liar? If not, have you ever
met or known someone in a non-professional capacity who you would consider to be a
pathological liar?
a. Would you tell me about that?
b. What makes you believe that the person you assessed or treated was a
pathological liar?
c. What was your personal response or attitude towards these clients/people? (E.g.,
irritation, anger, disgust, sympathy?)
d. Was it immediately obvious that this person had problems with pathological
lying?
e. What was the reason for referral?
f. Who referred them? (E.g., their doctor, their spouse, a parent, etcetera. Please
note that this question is not asking for you to name the referrer, rather the
question is asking you to indicate the relationship between the referrer and the
client.)
g. Did the person believe they had a problem?
h. How did the person conceptualise or describe their problem?
i. How did the referrer conceptualise or describe the client’s presenting problem?
j. Could the person’s symptoms be accounted for by psychosis or delusion?
k. What do you believe the function was of the person’s lying? Could you provide
a brief formulation regarding how the person’s lying habits developed?
l. Can you provide a general overview of the person’s childhood and
developmental history? How do you think this history has contributed to the
person’s pathological lying habits?
m. Can you give me some demograhics i.e., gender, age, relationship status, age of
onset etcetera if they have not already been mentioned. [No identifiers.]
n. Can you give me any other examples of clients or persons who you believe
were/are pathological liars?
If you have never met someone who you would classify as a pathological liar, how would you
establish whether a person was a pathological liar?

5

In your opinion how are the following DSM-IV-TR psychiatric conditions different to or the same
as pathological lying? In other words, how would you distinguish pathological lying from lying
that presents in the following conditions or conversely, on what basis would you argue that they
are the same condition:
a. Anti-Social Personality Disorder
b. Narcissistic Personality Disorder
c. Factitious Disorder
d. Borderline Personality Disorder
e. Confabulation
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f.

And how would you distinguish pathological lying from
Malingering
(DSM-IV-TR criteria for the DSM conditions and a medical definition of Confabulation were
presented to the participants to enhance accurate comparison of the highlighted psychiatric
conditions with their conceptualisations of pathological lying.)
Would you ascribe any of the aforementioned diagnoses to your case study or any other
recognised psychiatric condition?
6

In your opinion, what makes pathological lying the same or different to other forms of lying; what
are its unique characteristics, if any (i.e., what makes it different to or the same as, white lies,
malingering, confabulation, anti-social lies, self-protection lies to avoid punishment etc)?

7

Can you describe the client’s childhood briefly?
What do you believe could underlie or influence the phenomenon of pathological lying? (Risk
factors, aetiological factors, motivations behind the lies, personality issues etc.)

8

Can you describe some of the personality characteristics that seem to present with such
clients/people?

9

In your experience or opinion, do pathological liars have control over their lies?

10

In your experience or opinion, are pathological liars aware of their lying and that they lie beyond
what is considered normal?

11

In your experience or opinion, do pathological liars believe in their falsifications?

12

Did you ever confront the person about their lies? Why or why not? What was their reaction to
being confronted?

13

If/when you have treated someone who you believed to be a pathological liar, what treatment
course did you pursue?
a. How effective did you find treatment to be? In what way was it effective or ineffective?
b. If you haven’t treated someone with pathological lying issues, what sort of approach do
you think you might take?

14

What was your personal response towards this person?

15

Returning to our earlier question regarding the definition, if you had a definition of pathological
lying, what would it be? What would you regard to be the main symptoms of pathological lying?

16

Again, in your opinion and experience, do you believe that pathological lying is a distinct disorder
that is not the result of an underlying psychiatric condition? In other words, do you believe
pathological lying exists as a disorder in its own right? Alternatively, do you believe pathological
lying is a behavioural manifestation belonging to a formally recognised psychiatric condition?
a) Why do you hold this opinion?

Example
prompt
questions

Can you tell me more about that?
What makes you believe that was evidence of (insert participant’s answer)?
How did you come to understand that behaviour and its function?
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At the conclusion of this process there was good confidence that the interview
protocol, as endorsed by the focus group, would provide a sound investigation tool
for the next and final phase of this research.

131

CHAPTER FOUR
Clinicians’ experiences of pathological lying - Study 2,
Part 2

“We tell lies when we are afraid... afraid of what we don't know, afraid of what
others will think, afraid of what will be found out about us. But every time we tell a
lie, the thing that we fear grows stronger.”
- Tad Williams
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At present no empirical methods have been used to formulate and validate a
definition of pathological lying, nor have such methods been used to establish
criteria for this phenomenon. Therefore the empirical arm of this project employs
quasi-scientific methods to provide a clinical perspective on what constitutes
pathological lying and the context in which it might manifest. To achieve this,
clinicians from psychology and psychiatry were invited to share their experiential
understanding of pathological lying and the criteria used to identify this population.

4.1 Aims
1. Evaluate the degree to which the term “pathological lying” is recognised and
endorsed by mental health professionals.
2. Note the prevalence of pathological lying within client populations known to
participants.
3. Examine thematic convergence within cases and identify areas of thematic
divergence.
4. Synthesise idiographic descriptions into a nomothetic symptom profile.
5. Identify childhood factors common to case studies.
6. Differentiate pathological lying from other DSM-IV-TR psychiatric
conditions (presented in Chapter Five).

4.2 Research questions
1. Is pathological lying, along with its various derivatives, a term that is
recognised and endorsed by mental health professionals?
2. Is pathological lying identifiable as a distinct construct and what are its
defining characteristics?
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3. How can these characteristics be differentiated from other psychiatric
conditions? (Answered in Chapter Five.)

4.3 Participants
Eighteen clinicians (four psychiatrists and 14 clinically trained psychologists) drawn
from a convenient sample of practising researchers and clinicians were approached
to participate in this study. Of the 18, 14 agreed to participate. Contact was made
via email, using email addresses readily available on the internet. Within the email,
prospective participants were informed that I was completing a Doctoral thesis in
Clinical Psychology, the aim of which was to develop an understanding of the
construct of pathological lying. The email outlined that I was intending to interview
experienced psychologists and psychiatrists about their experience and/or opinion on
the topic and that prior exposure to and/or belief in the phenomenon was not
necessary for participation.

There were four participants who questioned their

suitability for the study owing to their lack of experience with pathological liars;
each of these participants was given the option to not participate if so desired but
they were also encouraged to participate because their stance of “inexperience” was
in itself interesting, all four of these participants agreed to participate. Participants
were recruited from four geographically distinct institutions in New South Wales,
Australia: The University of Wollongong; Macquarie University; the South Eastern
Area Health Service Cluster; and the Western Sydney Area Health Service Cluster.
Across the participant group there was a wide and diverse range of therapeutic and
theoretical leanings including: Gestalt Theory; Bowen Systems Theory; Attachment
Theory; Cognitive Behavioural Therapy; Object Relations/Psychodynamic Therapy;
Dialectical Behaviour Therapy; Schema Therapy and Behaviour Therapy.
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The participant pool is categorised as convenient as three of the 14 participants had
provided academic teaching to the primary researcher, another five had provided
supervision, four were members of the psychology faculty at the University of
Wollongong where the primary researcher had trained, and one participant was a
work colleague and manager.

Eight of the participants shared a professional

relationship with the primary supervisor of this study.

While the pre-existing

relationship between researcher and participant may have moderated the type and
amount of information shared, it is unlikely that any of these participants felt swayed
to answer in an acquiescent style owing to their historic position of authority over
the researcher. Participant characteristics are outlined in Table 4 below.

Table 4
Participant information for Study 2, Part 2
Designation

Pseudonym

Years of experience Number of
(range)
pathological lying
case studies
discussed

Clinical Psychologist
Clinical Psychologist
Psychologist
Clinical Psychologist
Clinical Psychologist
Psychiatrist
Clinical Psychologist
Clinical Psychologist
Clinical Psychologist
Clinical Psychologist
Clinical Psychologist
Clinical Psychologist
Clinical Psychologist

Paul
Mary
Dagan
Ben
Sonja
Jessica
Phil
Matthew
Marie
Daniel
Gary
Laura
Ann

20 + years
0-5 years
5-10 years
20 + years
20 + years
5-10 years
20 + years
20 + years
5-10 years
5-10 years
5-10 years
20 + years
0-5 years

Clinical Psychologist

Felicity

5-10 years

One non clinical case
One non clinical case
Two clinical cases*
Two clinical cases
Two clinical cases*
One clinical case*
Three clinical cases
One clinical case*
None
Two clinical cases
Two clinical cases*
One clinical cases
Two non-clinical
cases
One clinical case*

* Participant reported knowing more cases than those described during the interview
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4.4 Materials
Standardised interview questions from the focus group study were used (see Table 3
in previous chapter).

A semi-structured interview approach was chosen as it

provided an opportunity to address research questions with theoretical interest, while
remaining flexible and responsive to the unique answers of each interviewee.

4.5 Procedure
A mutually convenient time and location was arranged to conduct the interview.
Participants were given an information sheet and consent form. They were told the
interview would last about 60 minutes and would be a collaborative exploration of
pathological lying.

Each subject was asked to outline their qualifications, and

provide an overview of their clinical experience including the different populations
of clients they have worked with and the number of years they had worked in a
therapeutic or ancillary capacity.

Each participant was then asked a series of

standard questions that were based on the questions created by the focus group in the
preceding study. Participants were invited to elaborate upon their responses through
a system of ad hoc questions. The ad hoc questions were generally open-ended and
put forward at the discretion of the interviewer. The interviewer was mindful that
any deviation from the standardised questions would reduce the objectivity of the
study and so all supplementary questions were formed according to three rules: 1)
where possible ad hoc questions were open-ended; 2) in any instance where a
closed-ended question was unavoidable, an attempt was made to pose the question
in double-barrel form so that both the affirmative and negative view were presented;
3) the interviewer was mindful of their own viewpoints and made attempts to not let
those biases be obvious in the presentation of ad hoc questions. All three rules were
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implemented in an effort to minimise interviewer influence on participant thinking.
Examples of ad hoc questions were, “can you give me an example of that type of
lie?” and “how do you make sense of this idea that it didn’t seem to serve a purpose?
What do you make of it?” If any response discrepancy was detected during the
course of the interview the participant was invited to reflect upon this discrepancy
and provide an explanation as to why they had provided discrepant answers.

4.6 Methodological issues
One of the methodological dilemmas facing this study was whether participants
should be given a definition of pathological lying to orientate their thinking, or
whether participants themselves should define the construct. Through the first phase
of this dissertation it became apparent that no scientifically formulated definition of
pathological lying existed, nor was there a consensus definition used throughout the
literature. As a result of this finding, one of the primary aims of this current study
was to systematically define the parameters of pathological lying.

With this

research aim in mind it seemed contraindicated to provide a definition when the
purpose was to elicit one.

However, an equally valid concern was whether

clinicians can be interviewed about a construct without first defining it for them? If
no orientating definition is provided there is the risk that participants would be
talking about disparate constructs. On the other hand, if participants are presented
with a non-scientifically formulated definition to guide their thinking, there is a risk
that the construct validity of the study’s outcomes will be jeopardised. The other
major danger of providing participants with an anchoring definition is that
participants could potentially mould their answers to fit with this definition in
accordance with confirmation bias principles, for instance, participants could report
traits and symptoms that conform to the provided definition and dismiss or overlook
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important elements that were not prompted in the supplied definition. Ultimately,
the decision was made to not provide a definition of pathological lying. Instead, one
of the first interview processes involved asking participants to define what he or she
understood the term to mean.

Another methodological limitation worth noting is that the findings of this study
only represent the number of times a theme was reported, it does not represent the
number of times a theme presented in real life. Symptom and aetiological markers
will be under represented, for example, if a participant fails to identify or report it,
which is a real possibility given participants were mostly asked open-ended
questions.

4.7 Data analysis
Each interview was audio-recorded and transcribed orthographically by an
independent third party who was not related to the research. Before analysis each
transcript was reviewed against the audio records by the primary researcher to
correct any typing errors or omissions; this process was repeated twice to enhance
accuracy, while also providing the primary researcher with the opportunity to review
the data, including the participants’ tone and expression. All participants were deidentified in accordance with ethical guidelines and any names or institutions
referred to in the transcript were removed to protect anonymity. Audio recording
and transcribing the entire interview preserved the original context of the
participants’ responses.

The coding process was structured according to both theoretical and inductive
thematic analysis principles. This combined framework was borrowed from Braun
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and Clarke (2006), who outlined the implementation of both inductive and
theoretical thematic processes in psychological research. According to their review,
a theoretical approach to thematic analysis is guided by a set of pre-determined
questions. Those questions are typically conceptualised after an extensive review of
the available literature. Under this approach the analyst systematically examines the
qualitative data for answers to their preconceived question(s). For instance, within a
theoretical framework, a question such as, “do pathological liars have any conscious
awareness of their lying behaviours?” may be set. The process would then commit
the analyst to search the textual data for answers to this question. Such an approach
inevitably means the analyst ignores a multitude of other, potentially invaluable
data, but has the strength of orientating the analyst towards a more detailed
examination of a specific area within the data. In contrast, an inductive approach to
thematic analysis is considered to be more curious and liberal. Questions are formed
after reading and analysing the data, rendering the questions “data-driven”. As such,
themes found within the data may not relate back to any pre-determined questions,
including questions posed to the participants in the interview.

An inductive

framework provides the analyst with greater freedom to explore a poorly understood
construct, without forcing the data to conform to a pre-existing coding system.
Essentially it was decided that both approaches used conjunctively would enhance
understanding of the construct.

In accordance with theoretical and inductive processes the transcripts were manually
coded using a colour classification system.

Eleven coding categories naturally

emerged from the data and can be viewed in Table 5. The coding categories
overlapped strongly with the standardised prompt questions developed for the semi-
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structured interview. Each coding category was assigned a corresponding colour;
orange for instance, represented the category of “alternative terms used”. Each
transcript was read and colour coded according to the 11 categories. Staying with
the current example, whenever a participant used an alternative term to discuss
pathological lying, the word or phrase was highlighted in orange to signify its
category. This process was repeated for every subsequent alternative term used and
then repeated for the remaining 10 categories. The colour highlighting process was
uniformly applied to each transcript, ensuring every line was either colour coded and
assigned to a particular category or entirely excluded.

Content was only excluded from the categorisation process for one of three reasons:
if the content pertained to interview small talk, which was not relevant to the topic;
if the content was case/client sensitive and there was a risk to client confidentiality
and anonymity, or if it was deemed indecipherable.

Only a small percentage of

textual data was excluded from the coding process and only an occasional word
proved indecipherable. To assess overall exclusion trends in the coding process, a
transcript was randomly selected for analysis. The transcript selected belonged to
participant “Ben”; in this particular transcript 85.02% of the respondent’s content
was coded and included in the analysis process. An examination of the remaining
transcripts confirmed that the coding trends observed in “Ben’s” transcript were
representative of the remaining 13 transcripts. This means, on average only 15% of
the textual data was omitted from analysis, satisfying attempts to take an inductive
approach to coding.
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Textual data that did not naturally fit with the predetermined coding categories was
placed in a miscellaneous category for later analysis, thus ensuring no important
themes were overlooked. In keeping with Braun and Clarke’s (2006) guide for
thematic analysis, the pre-determined categories represented the theoretical arm of
the analysis, while the miscellaneous category made up the inductive element of the
thematic analysis process.

Thematic analysis was used to build a hierarchical index of themes. According to
Braun and Clarke (2006), thematic analysis “is a method for identifying, analyzing
and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organizes and describes
your dataset in (rich) detail” (Braun & Clarke, 2006 p. 79). A master analysis
matrix was created in the form of a tabulated document illustrating each of the
extracted themes with relevant data.

The matrix was organised according to the

categories identified in Table 5 and was divided into three columns; the first column
held the theme name, the second contained all the quotes that illustrated the theme
and the third column kept track of how many participants mentioned that particular
theme in their recorded responses. The matrix was created using a set procedure,
which can be viewed in Appendix Three. As per the thematic analysis guidelines
laid out in Braun and Clarke (2006), the goal was to afford equal attention to each
data item during the coding process and to avoid generating themes from just a few
vivid examples. All relevant extracts from within and between transcripts were
assembled into the unified matrix document and identified themes were checked
against each other and back to the original dataset.

The coding process was

thorough, inclusive and comprehensive in an effort to increase the internal
coherence, consistency and distinctiveness of the final composition of themes.
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4.8 Inter-rater coding
Two of the 14 transcripts were randomly selected for analysis by the researcher and
an independent coder. The coder was a Clinical Neuropsychologist who was paid an
hourly rate to analyse both transcripts in accordance with the 11 coding categories
generated from the focus group study and outlined in Table 5. The co-coder was not
informed of the aims of the research but was provided with a template of categories.
The results from the coder’s analysis were used to measure inter-rater reliability and
ensure coding of the remaining 12 transcripts was reliable and valid.

Two

transcripts only were co-rated as the coding categories had already been established
and the purpose of co-coding was to identify and avoid any bias by the researcher.
Initial agreement rates between coders was lower than desired, with only a 53% and
60% agreement rate respectively across both transcripts. Both coders then went
through their results together and discussed the rationale for including data under the
various headings. Both coders then independently re-coded the transcripts under the
11 headings and the second round agreement rate was then much higher, with a 93%
agreement rate for the first transcript and a 95% agreement rate for the second. The
remaining transcripts were coded by the researcher using the agreed types of
participant responses that related to each category.

4.9 Results and discussion
Table 5 provides an example of how the data was organised. It has been divided
into 11 categories and shows how example quotes from the data were assigned to
each category. A coding document identical to the one shown in Table 5 was used
for all transcripts.
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Table 5
Coding categories as appropriated from the focus group questions with example responses
Coding Category

Example from the data

Alternative terms used.

“Problematic lying”

Definitions of pathological lying.

“I suppose pathological lying is when you’re lying
even when it’s not in your own interests to do so
any longer… and you can’t really quite help
yourself…”

Symptoms/characteristics of pathological lying.

“Repetition of lying in similar circumstances”

Characteristics/symptoms of pathological lying
specific to individual cases.

“She had come to believe the lie herself whenever
she was with me.”

Function/Purpose of the case study’s lies.

“She has to protect herself from being overwhelmed
by a situation.”

Influences or factors that underlie the phenomenon
of pathological lying.

“There is another form of pathological lying that
belies the sadness of somebody who cannot accept
themselves…”

Treatment recommendations.

“I believe it would be a choice of both schema type
therapy mixed with a cognitive behavioural
approach.”

Distinguishing features of pathological lying from
other DSM-IV-TR disorders.

“Even if it isn’t DSM-IV oriented I think it will still
fall into that category of disordered behaviour…”

Differences between pathological lying and other
forms of lying.

“Once again I think it’s just how broad it is. So I
think that there might be lies associated with that
(antisocial lies), but there’s lies also in other
domains of that person’s life.”

Significant childhood experiences of the case study.

“Grew up in an abusive household. Her father was
convicted of sexually molesting young boys. When
this girl was very young her mother left the family
and took the girl’s brother with her…”

The clinician’s reactions to the identified
pathological liar.

“I hated to see her coming in the end. I found it
very hard towards the end to support her, even
before the knowledge that something she was
saying was wrong…”

Miscellaneous themes and references.

“She had something to fear from this man (her
partner)… He had beaten her up in front of the
children… All of which she did not act upon in
terms of getting help.”
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4.9.1 Recognisability of the term pathological lying
One of the key research questions guiding analysis was whether or not the term,
“pathological lying”, along with its various derivatives, is recognised and endorsed
by mental health professionals. Across the participant group there was a 100%
recognition rate, with every participant reporting some familiarity with the term and
its subsidiaries (e.g., pathological liar and pathological lies). While all participants
recognised the term, not everyone favoured its use. Two participants said they felt
uncomfortable using the term because it was pejorative.

Overall, however, a

remaining majority of 12 said they were comfortable using the term. During the
interview process each participant was given the opportunity to put forward an
alternative term to use instead of pathological lying, and from this three alternative
terms were suggested by four different participants including: problematic lying,
which was suggested by two participants, chronic lying and compulsive lying.

4.9.2 Prevalence of pathological lying within this sample of
clinical, sub-clinical and non-clinical populations
At the outset of this chapter it was identified that one of the aims of Study 2, Part 2
was to note the prevalence of pathological lying by examining the frequency in
which participating mental health professionals come into contact with and identify
pathological liars. While 13 out of 14 participants interviewed could identify at least
one pathological liar, the proportion of clients attracting this classification is still
relatively low compared to other diagnostic groups.

“Ben”, for instance, a

participant with over 20 years experience as a clinical psychologist, was only able to
identify two clients about whom he felt confident applying this label.
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Four of the 14 participants had indicated prior to the interview that they had not had
enough experience with pathological lying to be any sort of authority on the topic.
These participants were still encouraged to participate on the basis that their
reflection of “inexperience” was in itself significant and because excluding them on
this basis would inflate prevalence figures. Interestingly, at the conclusion of data
collection, 13 out of the 14 participants were able to identify at least one case study
on which to draw their clinical impressions.

Twenty-one case studies were

discussed, 17 of which came from a clinical setting. Six participants reported that
they knew more pathological liars than what was discussed in their interview.
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4.9.3 Defining characteristics of pathological lying
Table 7 below lists the various themes that emerged from the cross-transcript data
analysis and shows the number of participants who provided evidence or support for
each theme. The colour coding system illustrates the relative strength of the themes.
In line with research question two, this profile provides a synthesised, nomothetic
insight into the defining characteristics of pathological lying. Following Table 7 is
a discussion of each theme, starting with the themes that attracted a strong
endorsement rating with some exceptions; themes considered relevant to the
construct of psychopathy are discussed under their own subheading in Chapter Five.
Table 6 immediately below, is an accompanying guide that explains how qualitative
endorsement strength ratings were determined.

Table 6
A guide to represent the qualitative strength of each theme according to the number of
.

participant endorsements
Strong

10-14 participant endorsements

Moderate

5-9 participant endorsements

Weak

4 or less endorsements

146

Table 7
.

Tabulated profile of pathological lying as it presented in Study 2, Part 2
Themes with a Very Strong endorsement strength (10-14 endorsements)
Chronicity
Excessive frequency
Pervasiveness
Diminished control/unintentional lying
Impulsivity, reactivity and automaticity in lying
Dyscontrol
Maladaptive and self-injurious behaviour
Significant impairment and/or injury to functioning
Impaired insight and awareness combined with self-deception
Psychological strategy
Psychological defence
Interpersonal defence/distrust of others
Identity disturbance
Psychopathic features (overall)*
Themes with a Moderate endorsement strength (5-9 endorsements)
Impulsive lies
Impulsive generally (not just in the context of lying)
Reactive lies
Automatic response
Compulsion to lie
Pathological lies are detectable
Illogical and odd behaviour
Small trivial lies
Awareness of lying
Awareness of lying combined with insight and no self-deception
Poor insight and poor awareness combined
Diminished awareness of lying in the moment
Variable awareness of lying in the moment
Poor insight into problematic nature of lying
Self-deception
Bolstering self-esteem
Self-aggrandisement
Failure to take ownership or responsibility for lying
Denial when confronted
Holding onto lies when confronted
Outbursts of anger when confronted
Meta-fabrication and loss of control over lies
Takes ownership of lies after therapeutic intervention
Diminished or absent empathy*
Empathic capacity*
Remorse/regret*
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Participant
endorsements
12
13
14
14
13
10
12
11
10
14
13
10
10
11
Participant
endorsements
9
7
6
5
8
9
8
5
5
7
7
6
6
7
5
8
8
9
8
7
6
7
5
7
6
5

Non-exploitative*
Experiences distress*
Failure to take ownership and responsibility for self
Not designed to cause harm to others*
Themes with a Weak endorsement strength (2-4 endorsements)

6
8
6
7
Participant
endorsements
3
4
3
2-4
4
4
4

Crying or sulking when confronted
Needs for attention
Fabricates in a confident and convincing manner
Manipulative*
Non-manipulative*
Exploitative*
Malevolency or harm to other*
*Themes with an asterisk are discussed in Chapter Five under the heading
“Differential diagnosis considerations: Psychopathic features of pathological
lying” .

4.9.3.1 Strongly endorsed themes
The following section is a detailed discussion of the themes referenced by 10 or
more participants. The thematic convergence observed here reflects the centrality of
these themes to the construct of pathological lying. The depth of discussion shown
also signals the considerable richness of the data.

4.9.3.1.1 Chronicity
In this study a distinction is drawn between chronicity and high frequency. The
Macquarie Dictionary defines chronic as “continuing a long time” or “having long
had a disease habit, or the like” (p. 395).

In contrast, frequent is defined as

“constant, habitual, or regular” (p. 848). Presumably someone could begin lying at a
high frequency at any given time, but it would not qualify as being chronic until it
had continued for a prolonged period. Similarly, someone could have a habit that
has persisted since early childhood, making the habit chronic, but if it only flares up
on rare occasions it would not be considered a frequent behaviour.
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Healy and Healy (1915) accommodate the element of chronicity within the limits of
their definition when they say “it manifests itself most frequently by far over a
period of years, or even a lifetime”, and so too does Dike, Baranoski and Griffith
(2005) with their assertion that pathological lying, “may manifest over a period of
years or even a lifetime” and that “the lies are often repeated over a period of years”.
In the previous study, 34.37% of the definitions and 79.6% of the case studies
included a reference to chronicity, making this one of the stronger themes to emerge
from Study 1.

In the present study four participants expressly mentioned chronicity or used a
derivative of the word. For instance, Paul stated that it is the chronic nature in
which pseudologues lie that makes the behaviour pathological:
Paul: It happens in a chronic fashion. That’s what makes it
pathological.

Everybody potentially does that in certain

circumstances but the thing that makes it pathological is that
this becomes a pattern and a chronic pattern of responding to
people in the world.

Marie similarly pointed to “the pervasive, chronic, ongoing nature of it” as an
indicator of a “much deeper and more profound need that’s being fulfilled.”

Ann

and Daniel also used the word chronic, with Daniel stating that he felt more
comfortable using the term “chronic lying” over “pathological lying” and that in his
experience the lying behaviours observed amongst pseudologues “eventually take on
a sense of chronicity”. Eleven participants inferred chronicity by identifying longstanding patterns of problematic lying within their case observations. Seven of the 21
cases discussed were identified as problematic liars as children while an additional
five cases were described as having pathological lying tendencies during adolescence
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and beyond.

Altogether, 12 participants, referring to 15 separate case studies,

provided evidence that pathological lying is a chronic condition that starts early in
one’s development. None of the participants interviewed provided any evidence that
contradicted this observation.

It is interesting to note the potential correspondence of this theme with DSM-IV-TR
guidelines for defining and diagnosing personality disorders. The current DSM
outlines that before a personality disorder can be diagnosed, one must first establish
that “the pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at
least to adolescence or early adulthood” (p. 689).

4.9.3.1.2 Excessive Frequency
Thirteen participants mentioned high frequency, or used a term synonymous with it,
such as, “lots of lies”, “habitual”, “repetition”, “lying about everything” and
“consistent”. Three participants made reference to “lots of lying”, including Gary,
who said he would define pathological lying in part by “people that lie a lot”. When
Gary was asked to confirm his definition for the second time at the end of the
interview, he again mentioned frequency as a defining characteristic by saying:
Gary: it’s when someone lies a lot. I don’t know how you
measure a lot, but someone who lies a lot.

Likewise, when participant Jessica described her case study, she made reference to
“lots and lots of lies and stories”. When Jessica was asked why she felt her case
study’s mendacities met pathological thresholds she stated:
Jessica: I think the intensity and the frequency and the
persistence

despite

repeated

attempts

at

behavioural

management strategies for it, having virtually 24-hour a day
reminders in place and it was still ongoing.
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Similarly, participant Felicity outlined her understanding that pathological liars are
people who lie “a lot in day-to-day situations”. When Felicity was asked to define
pathological lying, she provided the following response:
Felicity: define pathological lying as a repeated pattern of lying
or not representing situations or events in a factual manner…
looking for repeated patterns that are not just a one off but a
repeated pattern of doing it despite aversive consequences.”

Matthew also referenced the high frequency nature of lying amongst pathological
subtypes, as seen in this quote about one of his clients:
Matthew: he’d be just making up things and the more he
made it up the more he would have to keep making it up and
so he was definitely doing lots of lying.

Another synonymous term extracted from the data was ‘habitual’.

Three

participants mentioned that the prevaricating behaviours of pathological liars are
habitual (Paul, Felicity and Sonja); with Sonja stating that a pathological liar is
“somebody who habitually lies or uses lying to get out of situations of their own.”

According to Paul, the frequency of lying amongst pseudologues is so intense that
almost all verbal output has questionable veracity:
Paul: …it’s like it’s their modus operandi. Even to the point
that everything that comes out of their mouth you wonder
whether it’s just a lie, whether they are just making stuff up.

The results of this study are in keeping with the findings of Study 1, Parts 1 and 2,
where 25% of definitions and 79.6% of case studies defined or described
pathological lying as an act of fabricating to an excessive degree. As was the case in
Study 1, Parts 1 and 2, this was one of the stronger themes, with no caveats within
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the data to dilute or unhinge this finding. The strong endorsement of this theme
gives credence to the definition coined by Healy and Healy (1915), which states
pathological lying “rarely, if ever, centres about a single event” and that pathological
lying “manifests itself most frequently.” The results presented here, however, would
support a stronger commitment to frequency than Healy and Healy (1915), whose
definition also allows for rare instances of one-off lying or lying pertaining to a
specific event.

4.9.3.1.3 Pervasiveness
Healy and Healy’s (1915) definition of pathological lying states that the lying
behaviours “rarely centre around a single event” and that it “represents a trait rather
than an episode”. This definition indicates a perception that pathological lying is a
pervasive syndrome that manifests across a range of contexts, audiences and time
periods, a position reflected in 12.5% of published definitions. In the current study
all 14 participants mentioned “pervasiveness” explicitly or inferred pervasiveness as
a defining quality, general symptom or a symptom specific to a case study For the
purposes of this discussion, pervasiveness has been interpreted to mean that the lies
told by pathological liars emerge across and within a variety of different contexts,
audience types and across different behavioural domains.

Of the nine participants who spoke directly about pervasiveness, four spontaneously
used the word “pervasive” or a derivative of it.

Paul, for instance, defined

pathological lying by saying “it pervades all components of their lives.” Likewise,
Dagan stated in her definition that it’s “a tendency to lie across various situations
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and dimensions, so pervasive maybe would be a good word.” When discussing one
of her cases Dagan affirmed:
Dagan: there were a lot of lies that were going on in all walks
of this person’s life, so not just in the therapeutic situation, but
right across the board.

Consequently, Dagan felt that the lying “was so severe that nothing that the client
said you could actually take at face value.” Both participants Gary and Marie
similarly used the word pervasive, with Gary stating a couple of times that the lying
behaviours are pervasive and that “the lies are around lots of different things” and
“it’s over multiple domains of their life.” Given all 14 participants provided either
direct opinion or evidence that pathological liars engage in pervasive deceptions, it
is considered appropriate to reference pervasiveness when defining the structural
parameters of this construct.

4.9.3.1.4 Diminished control/unintentional lying
The wider literature indicates that there is uncertainty about whether pathological
liars can control their lying. In Study 1, Part 1 there was some contradiction in
definitions but the majority opinion, as held by 25% of authors, was that
pathological liars cease to be masters over their lies. In Study 1, Part 2, the stance
on control and intent was again mixed, but once more the majority opinion was that
non-volitional forces drive pathological liars to lie. Related to the concept of intent
are questions pertaining to whether pathological lying is an impulsive or compulsive
act, whether pathological liars have a diminished capacity to control their lying,
whether pathological liars intend and plan out their lies and whether or not
pathological liars are generally more impulsive than the general population. The
interview protocol used for this study specifically asked participants whether they
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believed or observed pathological liars to have control over their lies; the following
subheadings outline the various responses given to these questions.

Impulsivity, reactivity and automaticity
Nine participants spoke about how the lies told by their case studies or pathological
liars in general are done in an impulsive manner, with two of these participants,
Matthew and Marie, saying that there was potential for two types of pathological
liars, ones who are impulsive and ones who are more thoughtful in their dishonesty.
Seven participants spoke about how their case studies were generally impulsive, not
just in the context of lying. While Dagan felt both of her cases lied impulsively, she
felt her first case study was not a generally impulsive person across other areas of
his life. In total, with all opinions combined, 13 participants provided preliminary
support for the hypothesis that pathological liars have difficulties with impulsivity,
with nine of these participants directly linking impulsivity to the pseudologue’s
lying habits. An excerpt taken from Matthew’s transcript represents the types of
commentaries made regarding this theme. As can be deduced from this quote, there
is concern that an impulsive temperament will predispose certain individuals
towards chronic lying:
Matthew:

the

impulsivity

I

think

is

another

temperamental factor that places him at more risk of
doing that and not thinking through the consequences. So
is it the impulsivity that’s the problem? He may if he
wasn’t so impulsive, he would think through things and
he wouldn’t do this. So it’s maybe an impulsivity
disorder.
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Six participants spoke about how the lies told by their case studies were often
reactive “blurts” rather than well-orchestrated and planned deceptions; Gary, for
instance, determined that for one of his case studies, lying was an immediate
reaction to what was happening in the moment:
Gary: When we kind of explored why he did say it in the
first place, it seemed like it was more like an immediate
reaction just kind of came out and once it was out there
he had to follow it through.

When Gary was asked whether he believed this adolescent’s lies were reactive or
intentional he responded by saying, “look I think it was more reactive lies, but I’m
sure that there were other intentional lies.” Complementing Gary’s observations is
Mary’s description of her case study, who reportedly made her lies up on the run as
a way of getting herself out of undesirable situations. When Mary was asked if she
felt her case study could control her lying she responded by saying:
Mary: I don’t think she could control it at all. I mean she
probably would have sat down and thought about it, but I
really got the sense that a lot of it was made on the run, it
was very reactive.

Five participants described pathological lying as an “automatic” reaction with
limited cognisance.

Phil, for instance, made reference to the automaticity of

pathological lying when exploring concepts of control:
Phil: I think it’s probably so automatic that (it)… seems
like they’ve got no control, but I don’t think it’s totally
out of their control.

Dagan conceptualised that her case study’s lying behaviours became automatic
because of her preoccupation with securing her needs:
Dagan: Well I guess at the time I always felt that she realised,
but it’s in hindsight that I look back and think “was it just so
automatic because her attentional resources were focused on her
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needs rather than what she was actually doing?” So was she
even at a conscious level ever thinking about it and my response
would be to that “probably not”.

When the themes impulsivity, reactivity and automaticity were combined they
yielded a support rating of 13 out of 14, making this one of the stronger and more
reliable themes of the study.

Dyscontrol
Ten participants spoke about how they believe pathological liars either cannot
control their lying or that their capacity to control their lying is greatly diminished.
Paul in particular felt that the urge to lie was so strong and so entrenched amongst
pseudologues that the only way they could avoid lying would be to ban themselves
from talking:
Paul: “I get the sense, and it’s just a sense that almost the
only way they can avoid doing it is just by keeping their
mouths shut.”

Four of the 14 clinicians interviewed believed the picture regarding control was
mixed. Laura felt some pathological liars would have a heightened sense of control,
while others would potentially have a diminished capacity to control their lying;
Laura’s position was summarised in this quote:
Laura: I’m guessing here. I would say that some people
would (have a diminished capacity to control lying), that
things bypass their frontal lobes and their ability to
process consequences.

Dagan explained her position, by distinguishing between pathological lying and
serious pathological lying.

In her opinion, she felt serious pathological liars

probably lacked the capacity to control their lying unless they underwent intensive
therapy:
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Interviewer: Do you think that people with pathological
lying tendencies can control their lying?
Dagan: I think that sometimes some people may be able
to and others not, but lets just say if we take it as the
worse case and call it serious pathological lying I would
say no, not without intensive work and not without a hell
of a lot of assistance to become motivated to do that
because the reward contingencies are a problem.

Jessica’s opinion appears split between two schools of thought. When describing
her case study she stated several times that she felt the person did not necessarily
have control over their lying. She stated that there was a “degree of impulsivity and
blurting and lack of control of his verbal output” and Jessica questioned whether her
client had the super ego capacity to regulate his impulse to lie. However, in the
final part of the interview, when Jessica was asked whether she believed
pathological liars in general have a heightened sense of control or a diminished
sense of control and whether the lying is done intentionally or impulsively, her
response indicated that there is probably some degree of control involved:
Jessica: I think probably pathological lying would, the term
would suggest that there is a degree of control over it, so there is,
I think there is insight into it into the lie.

The conclusions drawn from Jessica’s transcript is that she believes pathological
liars have the potential to control their lying, but that this control was not observed
in her client whom she ascribed the pathological liar label.

While Ann appeared to be of the opinion that there would be some control and
awareness around lying, she also felt that there would be an element of compulsion,
where, “you can’t really quite help yourself.” Ann went on to postulate that while
she believes there are indications that the pathological liar can strategise and
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therefore control their lying, she believes the pathological liar potentially does not
know how to deal with situations in a truthful and authentic manner and that the
only coping strategy available to them is to lie. Ann gave the following response
when asked whether she believed pathological liars have control over their lies:
Ann: Well I think there are elements of strategy and …some
kind of selective reliance on coping mechanisms of which lying
might be one. So you’d think there would be some control or
some awareness of the use of it, but it’s more like they might
have forgotten what else one could do… It’s more like all the
other things that the rest of us would do rather than lying, might
have atrophied

So while Ann alludes to there being an element of control present when a person
fabricates pathologically, she also argues that the level of control is moderated
significantly by the pathological liar’s underlying impulsivity and lack of internal
resources to manage situations adaptively.

Representing the non-ambiguous views held by the remaining participants is Paul’s
comment that pathological liars have a diminished capacity to regulate their lying
behaviours:
Paul: for me pathological lying indicates a level – a form
of lying that goes beyond the kind of lies that people
typically engage in, to the point that there’s almost a
sense of a lack of control by the person. Like, that’s one
of the characteristics that would for me make it a bit
more at the pathological end.
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On eight occasions Ben alluded to the theme of dyscontrol. He was so convinced of
his case study’s inability to control his lying that he questioned the person’s
neurophysiological make up:
Ben: not necessarily organic but the brain seems to be
wired like that from an early age and there’s not too
much they can do about it.

Felicity and Phil held a different perspective to the 10 participants who supported
this “dysregulation” theme. Felicity, for example, alluded to the functionality of the
behaviour as an indication of it serving a purpose rather than denoting an impulsive,
dysfunctional act:
Felicity: I believe in many instances it’s probably not impulsive,
out of control blurt, just comes out, and I say that because … I
think it’s part of quite a clever strategy of surviving in the world,
but that doesn’t necessarily mean that they have full insight or
it’s premeditated but I think it fits very well with a strategy
within the world – yeah.

Later in the interview, Felicity clarified that the lack of insight shown by pathological
liars could be indicative of inadequate behavioural control, but that despite poor
insight, pathological liars are quite often able to control their environment through
their lies.

Phil also conceptualised that while pseudologues possess a diminished capacity to
regulate their lying it is not entirely outside of their control, as illustrated by this
quote:
Phil: I don’t think it’s something they just don’t have a
choice over, I think it’s been a decision made, probably
subconsciously at some level as a way of surviving and
fitting in and getting on with life, but I think if the reality
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keeps coming back to them then they would … they
would sort of be able to re-decide.

In summary, only one of the participants, Laura, went so far as to say that
pathological liars have an above normal or heightened sense of control when it
comes to lying, but she also argued that there would be a mixed picture, with some
pathological liars having the opposite problem. Two participants hypothesised that
pathological liars possess some degree of control when it comes to lying but not
inordinate amounts, while 10 participants were of the opinion that pathological liars
are not well equipped to suppress their lying tendencies.

Compulsion to lie
Eight of the 14 participants interviewed alluded to there being a compulsive
component to observed patterns of pathological lying.

Matthew, for instance,

outright said one could “look at it as a compulsive behaviour.” Matthew continues
with this excerpt:
Matthew: Compulsive also describes it a bit more, like what it is
that person is compelled to lie, for that because they just don’t
stop to think about doing something other than lying so it is like
a compulsion.

In his clinical judgement, Matthew believed that it was easier for his client to lie
than to express the truth:
Matthew: in real time it’s so automatic that it is slightly
compulsive, but it’s as easy for him to not tell the truth than it is
to tell the truth.

Paul specifically pinpointed compulsivity as a defining element of pathological
lying:
Paul: there’s almost a compulsive component to it and that’s to
me what makes it a bit more at the pathological end.
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In summary, given the thematic similarities between “reactivity”, “impulsivity”,
“diminished control”, “automaticity” and “compulsivity” and their inherent links to
concepts of intention, the decision was made to collapse all five themes and
subsume them under an “unintentionality” banner. Synthesising the data in this
fashion resulted in a 100% endorsement rate from the participants, which means all
14 participants at some point made reference to pathological liars suffering from
some form of self-regulatory impairment. This complements the overall picture
taken from Study 1, Parts 1 and 2. However, as with other themes discussed, there
was some contradiction found within the data. Nine participants, for instance,
mentioned that “pathological liars tell a mixture of intentional and unintentional
lies” and that there could be cause for a categorisation of two different types of
pathological liars, one which engages in intentional and planned out lying and the
second, which is dysregulated and impulsive.

4.9.3.1.5 Maladaptive and self-injurious behaviour
The data revealed a cluster of themes that pointed to pathological lying being a
maladaptive and self-injurious pattern of behaviour. Within this cluster of themes
were four repeated observations; the first was that pathological lying causes
significant impairment to functioning, the second was that the lies are detectable,
leaving the pseudologue vulnerable to self ruination, the third was that the lies told
are often odd and illogical, and the fourth was that the mendacities often seem trivial
and not worth the predictable fallout.
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Significant impairment and/or harm to functioning
Eleven of the 14 participants mentioned that pathological lying habits are
maladaptive in that they cause a significant degree of harm psychologically,
socially, and/or interpersonally to the individual.

All 11 participants agreed

pathological lying interferes with or impairs the pseudologue’s ability to maintain
healthy and adaptive relationships personally and professionally.

This was

consistent with the analysis of case studies in Study 1, Part 2, where it was observed
that 28.12% of pseudologues lie despite self-injurious repercussions. It also aligns
conceptually with the data from Study 1, Part 1, which showed 15.6% of definitions
outlined that pathological lying is mostly unhelpful and/or harmful to the liar. The
only difference is that the data from Study 2, Part 2 supports stronger endorsement
of this theme.

The DSM-IV-TR mandates that impaired functioning is a requisite feature of any
psychiatric disorder, and so it was particularly interesting to see this theme so
strongly endorsed by the data. Take for instance, Dagan, who clearly alludes to
DSM-IV-TR recommendations for mental illness when differentiating pathological
lying from other forms of lying:
Dagan: well again it’s a matter of degree, and how much is it
impacting on a person’s life or those around them, how much
distress, or disturbance is it causing and at what point, like all
other disorders, do we go from telling a few lies to
pathological. I would just have to say if it’s interfering with
the person’s life and those of others then it’s a problem.

When Felicity spoke about how pathological lying differs from other forms of lying,
such as white lies, she provided strong support for the hypothesis that pathological
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lying is a disorder that significantly impairs functioning across important areas of
life:
Felicity: I think the behaviour would be sufficient as to cause
some problem in interpersonal relationships or work
functioning or school behaviour slash performance.

Felicity also used a case to illustrate how pathological liars hold onto lying as a
psychological strategy even when it proves aversive and redundant:
Felicity: it was almost like she needed this strategy so much that
she believed in it despite the evidence that it was not working.

At the beginning of the interview when participant Ann was asked to give her
opinion about the meaning of pathological lying she responded by saying:
Ann: I suppose pathological lying is when you’re lying even
when it’s not in your own interests to do so any longer and
it’s no longer discretionary that you do so but you can’t
really quite help yourself.

Towards the end of the interview Ann was asked if she would add anything to her
earlier definition of pathological lying to which she said, “it has an enormous
interpersonal cost, it’s readily discovered as a falsehood.”

At the end of the

interview Ann reflected on the process of thinking about pathological lying for the
first time and said:
Ann: I suppose what shocked me about the interview was the
realisation that I had valorised the harm done to others to
such an extent that I hadn’t really focussed on how
devastating it would be to have really weighed anchor on
having any kind of real connection to reality or being a
trusted source of authority by others. What are the kind of
consequences of that for a person, even though they are only
harming themselves?
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Ann’s contemplation of harm done to others and to self highlights the ease in which
professionals can overlook the self-injurious nature of pathological lying. Paul and
Gary similarly raised the point that pathological lying damages the pseudologue’s
reputation to such a degree that they forfeit the privilege of being a trusted source of
information and in time forfeit the experience of being interpersonally connected.
The following quote from Paul highlights the enormous interpersonal cost of lying
at a pathological level:
Paul: Everybody around them knows that this is either a
gross exaggeration or an outright fabrication and yet they
continue to behave this way towards people even when
confronted,

even

when

they’ve

lost

friendships

or

relationships with people.

Possibly the pathology of this phenomenon can be best understood as a lapse in
executive functioning, which impedes the pseudologue’s ability to foresee the
irreparable damage that accompanies pathological patterns of lying. Participant,
Paul, explains that unlike pathological liars, non-pathological liars can easily weigh
up the deleterious impact of lying and abstain from temptations to lie:
Paul: they could be very trivial things from our perspective
which would make the lie entirely nonsensical, we’d look at
it and say “well gee for us as individuals the loss of things
like integrity and trustworthiness and those kinds of things
it’s just ridiculous, it’s far too high to tell such a stupid lie”.

While there was clear endorsement of this “impairment to functioning” theme, there
was one caveat found within the data. Despite Felicity’s earlier claim that she
would define pathological lying as a repeated pattern of lying that would create
problems in the person’s life and persist despite adverse consequences, she did also
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say, with reference to her first case study, that the lying represented a functional
action:
Felicity: it wasn’t impulsive out of control that actually it
was a very functional behaviour that fit very well with an
overall way of being in the world. I think it’s an effective
strategy that’s not just random chaos. … when you look at
the behaviour in the context of the overall way functioning in
the world I think it fits beautifully and I think it’s part of
quite a clever strategy of surviving in the world

It is not held that the concepts of “effective strategy” and “impairment to
functioning” are mutually exclusive. It can quite often be the case that a behaviour
represents a functional strategy on one level and still generate a clinically significant
amount of harm on another. Take for instance cigarette smoking; on one level the
smoking is seen by the user as an effective way to reduce internal experiences of
stress, but the long-term health consequences undermine and counteract those
benefits. Pathological lying can be seen from a similar angle, where in the short
term it represents an effective coping strategy that can be used to help the person
avoid uncomfortable situations or artificially inflate their social standing, but when
used in excess it can generate a sequelae of harmful effects for the user, including
reputational damage, loss of employment, disintegration of relationships and social
ostracism.

Pathological lies detectable
In Study 1, Parts 1 and 2 one of the stronger themes to emerge was that pathological
liars fabricate untruths in a way that is easily verifiable and detectable, with 25% of
definitions capturing this theme and 37.5% of case studies demonstrating it.
Detectability has been included under the broader heading of “maladaptive” because
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it is the discoverable nature of pathological lies that leaves the pseudologue
vulnerable to ridicule, societal disengagement, interpersonal rejection, and
vocational discharge, thus rendering the behaviour maladaptive.

Nine participants made reference to the idea that the lies told by pathological liars
are verifiable. Seven of those nine made specific mention that the lies are easily
discoverable and/or blatantly obvious. Five participants who claimed pathological
lies are easily detectable also gave opinion or case illustration to show pathological
liars fabricate despite knowing there is a high chance of discovery. Two themecontradictory case illustrations provided evidence that at least some pathological
liars can successfully dupe those around them; Ben, for instance, provided two
disparate case exemplars one of whom would tell people “right in your face lies”,
which could be easily detected and the other who successfully maintained an
elaborate fabrication about having a fatal medical condition during five months of
psychotherapy. When this latter client revealed to Ben that he had been lying about
this medical condition, Ben reported feeling “dumbfounded” and “at a loss for
words”.

From the data there were many excerpts that supported this theme. For example,
Paul provided an insight into how pathological lying behaviour looks from an
outsider’s perspective and how despite the obviousness of their lies, pseudologue’s
steadfastly hold onto their lying habits:
Paul: everybody around them knows that this is either a gross
exaggeration or an outright fabrication and yet they continue
to behave this way towards people even when confronted.
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Felicity commented on how blatant her client’s lies were:
Felicity: there were many examples where she twisted the
truth slightly when you’d see clearly that was not an accurate
representation of what had happened or what her life was
about – it was odd.

One interesting observation taken from the data was that some pathological liars are
inept prevaricators. For example, in answer to the question “how did you know he
was lying?” Ann responded by saying, “probably because he wasn’t very good at
them.” Ann’s reflection that her case study was clumsy at lying despite being a
habitual liar may explain why so many of the interviewed clinicians felt pathological
liars are easily exposed as deceivers. Ann’s reflection could form the basis of an
important research question: are pathological liars ineffective at lying and if so,
why? This data-driven observation is somewhat counter-intuitive given the often
adopted dictum that “practice makes perfect” and the expectation that the
pseudologue’s proclivity for lying would provide them with ample opportunity to
fine tune their lying skills.

One of the more intriguing observations made by five participants was that
pathological liars lie despite knowing that there is a high likelihood they will be
found out. For instance Dagan spoke about how one of her clients told his new
partner that he had been previously married even though he could reconcile that
such a deception would be eventually uncovered:
Dagan: knowing that that truth was going to come out at
some point but at the time that lie was stated, seeing that
there was no problem with it.
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In a similar vein, Gary spoke about how one of the key dilemmas facing his client
was that his lies were always detected:
Gary: (his) biggest problem was people always found out his
lies, like they were stuff that was just always going to come
out but he’d still lie about it which was kind of strange.

What is interesting about Gary’s observation is that despite his client’s repeated
failure to convince others of his falsifications, he continued to lie. Knowing they
will be caught adds another dimension to the easy detectability theme.

While it would be tempting to summarise the nuances of the data by saying
pathological lies are for the most part discoverable this would fail to take into
account one very important possibility, that pathological liars who are successful at
deceiving others would not be readily classified as pathological liars.

Illogical and/or odd behaviour
One of the themes that emerged with moderate strength was that pathological lying
behaviours are illogical, odd and difficult to understand.

This theme corresponds

with Healy and Healy’s (1915) conceptualisation that the lying is “entirely
disproportionate to any discernable end in view” (p.3) and also with Dike, Baranoski
and Griffith’s (2005) more recent reframe, “material reward or social advantage
does not appear to be the primary motivating force but the lying is an end in itself;
an inner dynamic rather than an external reason drives the lies…” (p. 343). It also
corresponds with the findings of Study 1, Part 2, where 47% of cases were identified
as lying without discernible or rational purpose.
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Altogether eight participants in this study agreed that pathological lying represents
illogical and nonsensical behaviour. Of the expressions used to illustrate this theme
seven participants used phraseology such as, “defies logic”, “no rhyme or reason”,
“irrational”, “unnecessary”, “not sensible”, “dumb”, “illogical”, “lying for no good
reason”, “not goal oriented or directed”, “poor means end thinking”, “no apparent
purpose”, “nonsensical”, “stupid” “they’re not good decisions in real time” and
“difficult to gauge purpose”.

Six participants made references to the lying

behaviours being “odd”, “bizarre” “puzzling”, “strange” or “not making sense.”

In his theorisations of the construct, participant Paul spoke about the puzzling and
confusing nature of pathological lying:
Paul: in many cases there’s almost no rhyme or reason to
the lying and I mean it’s pathological in that sense.

Later in Paul’s interview he elaborated on this point by saying:
Paul: one of the characteristics (of pathological lying) seems to
be it defies logic. It defies other people’s views of objectivity.

Complementing Paul’s viewpoint is the observation made by Sonja about one of her
clients. Sonja explained, among other things, that the lying was illogical:
Sonja: It wasn’t logical, it wasn’t rational and it wasn’t sensible
but she did it anyway.

In the context of differentiating pathological lies from other forms of lies Dagan
spoke about how it is difficult to discern any reasonable motive or goal that drives
pathological lying:
Dagan: I think pathological lies are different because…,
they’re not so goal directed… whereas if a person tells a lie
to avoid a punishment or even if an antisocial person tells a
lie to get something that they want, we can sort of see it as a
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goal directed behaviour but often with pathological lies that
come out of people’s mouths you wonder what the goal is.

The oddity and irrationality that potentially underpins this phenomenon gives weight
to the hypothesis that pathological lying could justifiably be conceptualised as a
mental illness.

Small trivial lies
In Study 1, Part 2 a small number of case studies (6.25%) were identified as persons
who told lies of a trivial and/or mundane nature. This theme again appeared in the
current study, but with stronger support.

Five participants reported instances of

trivial lying, which was found to be perplexing, as it didn’t make sense that
individuals would risk being detected as dishonest for the sake of telling frivolous
lies. Ben spoke about how there was no discernible or necessary purpose underlying
the lie’s composition:
Ben: the general paradox is often he used to lie about where
he went or what he did, so it wasn’t necessary lying –like it’s
interesting because when you start to think about it, to me the
sense is that for both of these men is that they’re sort of lying
about their activities for no good reason.

Ben went further to outline that the pathological liar is undiscriminating in his or her
decision to lie about the smallest, most trivial things:
Ben: he had to lie about everything. He had to lie about what
he read in the newspaper. He had to lie about where he was
going, people asked him where he was he would lie about it.

Dagan spoke about the confusion she experienced as a therapist when her client lied
about minor issues:
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Dagan: you would just shake your head and go ‘why on earth
would a person ever tell a lie about that’ because it might have
been something just so minor.

In a similar vein to the previous participants, Gary also spoke about how one of his
clients would lie about things that just weren’t important:
Gary: they weren’t just around important things. They were
around just pretty trivial things.

In summary, when the themes ‘impairment to functioning’, ‘illogical’, ‘trivial’ and
‘detectable’ were combined into one maladaptive/self-injurious theme there was 12
participant endorsements, rendering this one of the stronger themes in the dataset.

4.9.3.1.6 Impaired insight and awareness and self-deception
One question that sparks a lot of interest and debate in the wider literature is whether
pathological liars have a contemporaneous awareness of their lying and whether
they possess insight into the problematic nature of their lying habits. These are
understandably difficult questions to answer as participants need to rely on clinical
perceptions of non-observable cognitive functions. The following section details the
different opinions expressed by the participants on this topic.

Diminished awareness of lying
One of the central questions asked and answered by the dataset pertained to whether
pathological liars are cognisant of their false representations at the moment of
dissemination. Study 1, Part 2 indicated that more often than not, pathological liars
struggle to maintain a sense of awareness around their lying. In the current study
there was divergence across opinions, but the majority opinion supported Study 1,
Part 2’s perspective.
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Five participants were under the impression that pathological liars possess some
level of awareness or insight into their lying behaviours, although one of these
participants, Ben, also purported that the awareness did not necessarily extend to the
moment when the words exit their mouth. Jessica was one of the five participants in
the study to put forward a position that pathological liars have awareness of their
mendacities; Jessica no less than three times referenced her client’s self-awareness
as evidence of this supposition:
Jessica: When the client was lying, they had insight into the
fact that they were actually lying at the time.

Ben also felt pathological liars’ possess partial awareness into their lies:
Ben: They have some sense of what the truth is and they
choose to distort it or they feel that they have to distort it…
so clearly there’s some awareness going on there.

Ben was able to relate this awareness-hypothesis back to one of his case studies by
reflecting on how his client would become cognisant of his falsehoods once the lie
had been expressed:
Ben: it was like his awareness was more clear once he said it
then you know he made it clear that it was a lie.

In contrast to the observations made by Jessica and Ben, there were six participants,
including Ben, who espoused pathological liars have no or very little insight into
their lying habits. Paul for instance held this belief:
Paul: Their primary response is to lie without thinking and
my guess is the level of awareness of their lying is not
necessarily high.

Paul’s general opinion fits nicely with Matthew’s formulation for his client, whose
instinctive response was to fabricate without consideration:
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Matthew: he’ll say it as though it’s the truth and he may not
stop long enough to ponder whether it was or wasn’t the truth
to worry about it? Like say he might say whatever he says
“oh I did this yesterday and I did that blah, blah, blah” …he’s
not stopping to think about the lies, he’s moved onto the next
thing that happens.

Six participants held that there was a combination of low and high awareness or that
the level of awareness varied across time and/or person. Paul’s clinical impressions
best illustrates this variegated viewpoint:
Paul: my feeling is that they will have varying levels of
awareness…There’s no reflection on the truth, just the words
come out. So I think it can happen that way or I think they
can reflect on it and actually think “well I kind of know this
isn’t a hundred percent true but I’m going to say it anyway,
and I’m going to say it like it’s the truth”

To make it clear, only two participants were of the sole opinion that pathological
liars have little to no awareness about their lying and only two participants held the
sole view that pathological liars have an awareness of their lying, all other
participants (six) either held the belief that there was a combination of high and low
awareness or that the awareness varied either within or between subjects.

Poor insight
Four participants stated that at least one of their case studies had some form of
awareness that their lying habits were problematic. Jessica for instance clearly
stated that her client possessed insight into the problematic nature of her lying
habits:
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Jessica: The client had insight into the fact that they had
problems with lying.”

In contrast, Ben’s clinical experience was that some pathological liars perceive their
lying to be problematic, while others do not. Ben, for instance, reported that while
his first client (the electrician) did not think his lying was problematic, his second
client did:
Interviewer: Do you think that they both believed they had a
problem?
Ben: the gay man clearly realised…when he actually sat down
and told me, he had some distress around it…. The electrician –
yes knew he had a problem, but the problem was his wife was
unhappy as opposed to you know, like I don’t think it was a
problem for him.

Gary, similarly observed different levels of awareness across his two case studies,
with his first case study reportedly exhibiting signs of awareness and his second case
study showing signs of awareness when prompted by someone else:
Interviewer: Would he see it as a problem?
Gary: when he gets caught out yes but when he doesn’t get
caught out no. The other kid, the first one we were talking
about yes he could say “look this is a problem that I need to
stop doing it” whereas not the current one I would say no.

In more general terms, Gary conceptualised that pathological liars can recognise
their problematic relationship with lying:
Gary: People that I think fit into that pathological lying they
do have some insight that it’s a problem when they do it so
much…they can usually say “look I lie, it happens and I
don’t want to do it like I keep doing it”

In contrast, seven participants held the contrasting view that pathological liars either
do not know they have a lying problem or have minimal awareness of this. Ann for
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instance provided this response when asked if her case study knew they had
problems with lying:
Ann: No. I think they would have been aware that they had
problems but I don’t think there would have been an
awareness of problems of lying at all.

There is moderate evidence from the data that pathological liars struggle to see the
pathology of their lying and weak evidence supporting the converse perspective that
pathological liars actually do possess adequate insight into their problems with lying.
Ben and Gary saw both ends of the spectrum with their case examples, and provided
evidence that perhaps the concept of awareness is not ubiquitous across the profile of
pathological lying. The disparity of opinion observed in the data could be explained
by Daniel’s intellection that self-awareness varies depending on the type of
pathological liar. According to Daniel, antisocial and narcissistic subtypes might
have very little awareness that they have a lying problem, whereas person’s utilising
the lies for the purposes of defence may have some potential for developing insight.

Self-deception
As part of the semi-structured interview format each participant was asked to
consider whether pathological liars believe in their falsifications. The outcome of
Study 1, Part 2, indicated that approximately 22% of case studies temporarily
believe their own falsifications. In the current study five participants indicated that
there was some observable evidence of self-deception with some caveats; for
instance, Dagan postulated that her first client believed in his lies, but that her
second client did not. In contrast two participants, Phil and Gary, were unsure
either way, and two participants, Ann and Matthew, felt that their clients maintained
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a sufficient grasp on reality to preclude self-deception. Felicity was one of the
participants to hypothesise that her client believed in her own lies.

Felicity

theorised that the reliance on the lie was so great that her client needed to believe its
validity:
Felicity: It was almost like she needed this strategy so much
that she believed in it despite the kind of evidence that it was
not working or despite evidence that she’d lied, like she
almost she believed the lie. She …she had to believe it to
keep the defence intact I suspect.

Daniel painted a detailed picture of a woman who he felt came to believe that she
was the parent she described in her fabrications, and the sheer act of confronting her
about the accuracy of her stories would send her into an intense rage, as illustrated
by this quote:
Daniel: I certainly saw it as a form of lying that she actually
believed in and that every time somebody tried to challenge
her she would become quite violent about it even in the face
of factual material. Even in the face of signed material she
would deny it….I believe she actually got to the stage where
she believed fully that she was the parent that she
described…. She was living two lives.

When Daniel was asked why he thought this woman believed in her stories, he
spoke of her convincing expression of distress when he confronted her:
Interviewer: what makes you say that she came to believe the
lie?
Daniel: Because if the emotion that she was turning on was
just a play act then she should have been in Hollywood
somewhere.

Ann and Matthew held the opposite view that their clients knew they were lying and
therefore did not succumb to their own propaganda. Matthew drew on theories of
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cognitive dissonance to illustrate that his client’s distress was indicative of someone
who did not whole-heartedly believe in his lies:

Matthew: Well the fact that he gets so grumpy suggests not…
Because it suggests some cognitive dissonance going on
there. Interviewer: So if he truly believed he was employed
he would be happy?
Matthew: Yeah he wouldn’t feel bad about it.

Phil admitted that he could not be sure as to whether his client believed his lies, but
did feel his client desired to believe in them:
Phil: I don’t know if he fully believed it. I think there’s
probably a desire to believe it, to the point where he maybe
convinced himself of the truth of it, but I don’t know.

The data indicates that some pathological liars are able to exhibit what seems like
genuine signs of distress, which confuses some observers into believing that the
person believes in the falsities they propagate. Gary’s observation, that there is
probably a desire to believe in the lie, but not necessarily a steadfast belief in the lie
highlights the dilemma of examining and interpreting psychological constructs
through qualitative methods, as the concept of self-deception is one that cannot be
directly measured and must be circuitously inferred from observable behaviours,
verbal admissions and clinician intuition.

Of those participants to provide insights into self-deception five believed
pathological liars succumb to believing their own falsehoods while two argued selfdeception is not typical to the overall presentation.
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In summary, the concepts of awareness and insight are not uniformly endorsed.
When the themes diminished awareness, poor insight and self-deception are
combined there is strong evidence (10 endorsements) that pathological liars are
poorly equipped to monitor and recognise their lying in the moment and reflect on
its deleterious effects.

However, a sub-majority of seven participants provide

evidence that pseudologues possess some awareness and some capacity for insight.
Six participants explicitly outlined that the nature of awareness at the time of
fabricating is not homogeneous and can fluctuate both within and between
pseudologues.

When the data from all three sub-themes are combined eight

participants provide evidence of both poor self-awareness/self-deception and
lucidity. The divergence in opinion outlined here further substantiates that there are
real and inhibiting difficulties encountered when assessing and measuring cognitive
process.

4.9.3.1.7 Pathological lying represents a psychological strategy
In 2005, Dike, Baranoski and Griffith postulated that, “an inner dynamic rather than
an external reason drives the lies” of pathological liars (p. 343).

While no

elaboration was given as to what an “inner dynamic” would look like, Dike,
Baranoski and Griffith’s (2005) hypothesis was taken to mean that pathological liars
are not primarily driven to lie in order to procure financial or material reward or to
escape military or vocational duties, but instead, to meet a deeper intrapsychic need.
In Study 1, Part 1, 37.5% of definitions identified some specific inner dynamic as
driving pathological lies, making this one of the stronger themes to emerge from that
study. Given the centrality of this theme to a number of definitions there was a
natural curiosity around whether this theme would be supported or refuted by Study
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2, Part 2’s data. Interestingly, the data revealed very strong support for this theme,
with every participant interviewed identifying some form of intrapsychic motivation
within the fabric of pathological lying.

There were seven “inner dynamics” identified within the data; the first and strongest
variant of this theme was psychological defence, the second inner dynamic
identified closely relates to the first and pertains to the repeated observation that
pseudologues operate fictitiously as a way of protecting themselves from
interpersonally-driven discomfort and/or distrust. The third inner dynamic identified
was a need to augment a fragile ego state.

The fourth was identified as an

unconscious attempt by the pseudologue to protect, disguise and artificially stabilise
a poorly developed self-concept.

The fifth inner dynamic relates to the

pseudologue’s effort to bolster problematically low self-esteem through repeated
and protracted distortions of the truth. The sixth dynamic complements the previous
two themes, in that it explores the function of self-aggrandisement within
pathological lying. Finally, there was weak evidence suggesting pathological lying
comes from a desire and/or need to garner attention from others. Each of these
themes are discussed below.

Psychological defence
In 1988 King, Ford and Hollender postulated that pathological lying acts as a form
of repression or denial that disguises internalised and unaccommodated conflicts.
This theory has been raised by several other authors, including Healy and Healy
(1915), and is supported by 13 of the 14 participants of this study who framed
pathological lying as a psychological defence strategy. This endorsement rate was
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significantly stronger than the one observed in Study 1, Part 2, where only 31% of
cases were conceptualised in this way. For the purposes of this research, “defence
mechanisms” are defined as, unconscious psychological strategies used by persons
to cope with the anxiety, shame or distress that is related to reality and serves to
protect and/or maintain one’s self-image (McWilliams, 1994). Referred to more
correctly, as an ego defence mechanism, these defence strategies can become
pathological when their chronic use leads to maladaptive behaviour that adversely
impacts on the person’s functioning (McWilliams, 1994).

McWilliams (1994)

describes archaic or primitive defences, as the “psychological avoidance or radical
distortion of disturbing facts of life”; while mature defences are described as
unconscious processes where the person learns to accommodate reality regardless of
the intense negative emotions this may generate.

Four of the 13 participants explicitly used the word “defence” in their descriptions
of pathological lying. The remaining nine participants were included as it was
judged that they provided enough detail to reliably describe the functional elements
of a psychological defence as per the definition provided by McWilliams (1994)
previously.

Participants conceptualised the lying behaviour being discussed as a behavioural
mechanism that conceals or compensates for a poorly defined and/or poorly
developed sense of self and ego, with one participant hypothesising that the lies help
stabilise the person’s internal experience. Another observation was that pathological
lies operate as an evolving “mask” that allows the person to hide their true and
unacceptable self. Pathological lies were also conceptualised by various participants
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as a strategy for protecting the person from connecting with internal emotions and
experiences that if experienced would potentially overwhelm them. Falsehoods at a
pathological degree were also seen by some participants as a way of avoiding reality
especially realities that are perceived to be painful and distressing.

Marie described pathological lying as a psychological strategy that facilitates
avoidance of reality and helps stabilise the person’s disorganised internal
experience. One of these excerpts is presented here:
Marie: It’s necessary for them to do that (lie) in order to
stabilise something internally because it’s almost like they
can’t tolerate reality as it stands so they manufacture stuff….
it’s almost like it’s a way of trying to create a reality, create
sort of a solidness or substance in the world and when the
internal world is so chaotic maybe they want to distort reality
to sort of fit with something that they can sort of hold and
feel and know and convince themselves of rather than them
having to operate in the world or on the world in a way that
that might sort of confuse them further.

Many of the commentaries extracted from the transcripts painted a picture of
pathological lying being a stratagem designed to protect the pathological liar from
experiencing the fear and discomfort that comes from being real and authentic with
themselves and with others. A proportion of the participants interviewed imparted
their belief that some pathological liars struggle to exist in the world “unmasked”
and so construct a defensive barrier around their true selves that takes the form of
fantastical stories. Ann perceived that her case study’s greatest fear was, if I am
real, and if I allow people to connect with me, then I will risk being hurt, judged and
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rejected in some catastrophic and unbearable way.

Ann provides a rich

conceptualisation to illustrate this theory:
Ann: they didn’t want to be surprised by anything, they didn’t
want to let the world in or didn’t want to let things touch them in
someway. … they’ve got this fear that if they were ever to
reveal true authentic motivation that they’d be judged and
rejected but they never take the risk of doing it. They’re always
so disguised and so kind of like, yucky in their disguises…. So
they’ve kind of created a hostile world that fits with their view
that the world is hostile and so of course you’d lie, of course
you’d keep yourself hidden and secret in such a world

Ann goes further to symbolically liken the pathological liar to a “hermit crab” who:
Ann: wants to just retreat in some way and hide and they do so
by making merry with the truth about reality or people or
whatever.

From the 13 participants flagged for this theme, three hypothesised that some form
of ego disturbance inherent in the pseudologue necessitated the development of a
psychological defence. In the context of describing someone she knew personally,
Mary spoke candidly about the seemingly fragile nature of her case study’s ego and
how she was unconsciously propelled to augment and protect it:
Mary: there’s this very small fragile ego that just needed to be
protected and bolstered and projected into something it wasn’t.

Given 13 out of the 14 participants provided theorisations and case illustrations to
support the supposition that pathological lying forms part of an overall
psychological defence strategy, it is considered appropriate to regard this theme as
core to the construct of pathological lying. With reference to Nancy McWilliams’
(1994) theoretical examination of defence structures, it appears as if the defences
alluded to in the current data would most reasonably fit under the banner of
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“primitive”.

This determination is made on the basis that pathological lying

resembles the psychological act of denial, a key component of primitive defence
organisations. With reference to the data there is a persistent pattern of self-denial
playing out, whereby the pseudologue develops fabrications that repudiate their core
nature while simultaneously protecting their identity from ever being examined by
the outside world.

The next four sub-headings are associated with the theme of psychological defence
in that they represent psychological processes and/or vulnerabilities that predispose
persons to developing defence strategies such as pathological lying. The first of
these themes is avoidance of interpersonal rejection, the second is distrust of others,
and the third is identity fragility.

Interpersonal defence/distrust of others
This next theme pertains to the idea that pathological lies are told, among other
reasons, as a way of avoiding interpersonal rejection or disapproval and as a strategy
for enhancing acceptance from others. Ten participants spoke to this theme, with
three of these also emphasising that the pseudologue’s default stance is one of
distrust. Daniel saw underneath the pathological lying behaviours the sadness of
someone who cannot accept themselves and fears the evaluation of others. In the
following quote Daniel provides an insight into the complex beginnings of
pathological lying and how it can develop into a maladaptive interpersonal defence
strategy, as conceptualised for one of his clients:
Daniel: If people don’t like her, people are going to reject
her. Where is she going to find herself? Way back where she
was when she was four years of age. No home, no parent,

183

nowhere to go, no one to love her. That is too overwhelming
in terms of memory, therefore I will do anything I can to
ensure that nobody ever, ever thinks that I’m not a nice kid.

Daniel’s conceptualisation highlights the fragility that can underscore the
pseudologue’s interpersonal style. In this particular case study it is evident that the
trauma of being rejected as a child conjures up such intense emotional pain that it is
easier for her to lie than to risk being rejected again.

Sonja was another participant to support this theme. In her case formulation she saw
lying, as it presented for her case, as a protective reflex triggered by anticipation of
rejection or ridicule. Sonja understood this person’s lying habits as a strategy for
enhancing their chances of acceptance, which done repeatedly develops into a pattern
that resembles definitions of pathological lying:
Sonja: I think they give, in a problem situation when they think
they’re not going to be accepted, they often give an answer that
is most likely to be accepted which other people may look at as
pathological lying.

Matthew similarly saw his client struggle with trusting that his genuine self would be
enough for his friends and family. According to Matthew, his client often engaged in
mendacities designed to elicit positive regard from those around him, an effect he did
not believe would happen without creating a veneer of lies.

Mary had a slightly different take on the motivation behind her case study’s
falsehoods, where the underlying anxiety was more around others taking advantage
of her rather than a fear of being rejected or disapproved of:
Mary: that desire to never let anybody get the better of you,
then I can see that as a motivation for her lying, but
also…there’s this very small fragile ego that just needed to
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be protected and bolstered and projected into something it
wasn’t, so that yeah.

The data from the research paints an ironic picture whereby the very lies that are
intended to protect the pseudologue, paradoxically exposes them to greater
interpersonal rejection, disapproval and harm.

Identity disturbance
Identity disturbance was conceptually linked to pathological lying by 10 of the 14
participants making it one of the strongest variants of the “inner dynamic” theme.
The link made by all 10 participants was that pathological lying develops as a strategy
for protecting, disguising, and artificially stabilising a poorly developed and often
disturbed self-concept. Due to the interchangeable nature of the terms “sense of self”
and “identity” (McWilliams, 1994) they have been collapsed into one theme.
Admittedly there is variance in the degree of disturbance described, with some
participants saying things like, “not really a clear sense of self” (Phil) and others being
stronger in their theorisations, such as Marie and Daniel who respectively said,
“disturbed sense of self” and “serious discomfort with the self”.

Two more

participants, Jessica and Gary, provided insights that were in keeping with this
conceptualisation, but their comments were excluded because they were in the context
of describing mid-aged adolescent clients, and it is commonly acknowledged that
identity disturbance is a normative developmental trait amongst this age group
(Arnett, 2000; Erikson, 1968; Kroger, 1997; Marcia, Waterman, Matteson, Archer &
Orlofsky, 1993; Meeus, 2011; Meilman, 1979; Waterman, 1982; Waterman, 1992).
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Much of what was extracted from the data suggested that falsehoods may provide
pseudologues with some kind of surrogate compass to which they orient their lives
and organise their internal experiences.

Marie provides a detailed hypothetical

formulation as to how chronic fabrications of a pathological liar can help provide the
person with “some sort of scaffolding around a really shaky sense of self.” When
Marie was asked to elaborate on this statement she stated:
Marie: I mean I suppose if someone has got a shaky sense of
self then or an unstable sense of self or an identity
disturbance then they’re kind of seeking, ways of externally
supporting that absence and so by creating untruths and a
false reality it’s a way of almost trying to create some sort of
story and that sort of gives a sense of stability ironically.

In her explorations of potential childhood experiences that would predispose
someone to develop pathological lying traits, Marie spoke about the child’s early
attachment experiences with their primary care giver using an object relations lens.
This has been included here because the rich conceptualisation brings to life one
potential theory as to why pathological lying behaviours develop and the function it
would serve for someone with a poorly developed sense of self:
Marie: they’re at sea really and they haven’t got any sort of
bearing on what’s going on internally and the sense of self as
a result can’t sort of form because you know there’s no sort
of reflective capacity that can start to develop and …and
they’re left sort of always, having transient internal
experiences where there is no cohesion about them. …if the
constancy is never developed then there’s no kind of
coherence that’s there and if the coherence isn’t there then
obviously you know the person’s self is very fragmented and
there’s no solidness about it.

This next paragraph synthesises some of the other statements made by the remaining
nine participants as a way of demonstrating the consistency in which this theme was
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endorsed. Daniel, for example, felt pathological liars are driven to lie by a serious
discomfort with the self-concept:
Daniel: Somebody who is lying because it reflects a deep sense
of not being comfortable with the self; driven by a serious
discomfort with the self.

Ann framed it by saying there “isn’t a unified sense of self…isn’t an integrated sense
of self” and stated that there’s “no overarching, reflective sense of self.” Mary
reflected that her case study “didn’t have a very good sense of self” and that she had
a “limited sense of self that needs to be bolstered.” When discussing treatment
options, Ben commented how therapy for one of his clients focused on helping the
client develop a sense of self and helping the client be happy with who he was in the
room and allowing the client to take that out into the world. Felicity described her
client as having a “very fragile sense of self” and an “underdeveloped sense of self.”
There was one caveat found within the data and that pertained to Ben’s transcript,
where he formulated that only one of his two case studies appeared to possess a poor
self-concept.

As has been previously highlighted, there has been much debate over whether
pathological lying represents a psychiatric disorder in its own right, and more
specifically whether it conforms to standards used to describe disorders of the
personality. The concurrence between identity disturbance and pathological lying is
viewed with great interest, as identity disturbance has historically been a hallmark
feature of Axis II personality disorders. At the time of writing this dissertation, the
working party for the DSM-V had publicised new proposed criteria for personality
disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2010), which drew great attention to
identity formation. The DSM-V was proposing to collapse previous diagnostic
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models for all personality disorders into two domains: identity disturbance and
impairments in interpersonal functioning.

This DSM-V proposal appeared in

keeping with broader understandings found in the literature that someone with a
personality disorder typically has issues relating to self-formation. Given the strong
endorsement by this study’s data that identity disturbances are pronounced amongst
pathological liars it is reasonable to speculate that pathological lying is a
phenomenon that could sit comfortably alongside established personality disorders.

4.9.3.2 Moderately endorsed themes
The following themes attracted moderate endorsement from participants (between
five and nine endorsements).

With moderate endorsement these themes are

considered linked to pathological lying in a meaningful way but cannot, as yet, be
considered reliable and valid attributes of the examined construct.

4.9.3.2.1 Psychological strategies continued
Bolstering self-esteem
Eight participants reflected that persons with pathological lying tendencies had
either poorly developed self-esteem and/or their fictitious admissions were in aide of
bolstering inefficient self-esteem reserves. This was consistent with the data from
Study 1, Part 2, where 28.1% of cases were identified as persons with impoverished
self-esteem. Self-esteem is a concept that shapes a person’s belief about whether
they are worthy and lovable (Harter, 1999) and so has a huge and potentially
deleterious impact on a person’s cognitive and emotional health.
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Some of the quotes considered to best represent the dataset come from Dagan and
Laura. Dagan’s suggestion that pathological liars are searching for ways to enhance
self-esteem came early on in the interview process when she was asked to define
pathological lying:
Dagan: the lies that they tend to tell would be possibly in
relation to enhancing self-esteem or some sort of defensive
protective mechanism.

Dagan again alluded to low self-esteem being a key factor when exploring the
functional determinants of pathological lying:
Dagan: I determined that it was to enhance self-esteem that
he had extremely low self-esteem and also this tendency to
ruminate…I think it was serving the function of preserving
his self-esteem.

Laura similarly felt that the lies of one of her clients served the purpose of elevating
his self-esteem:
Laura: I think it would be for a couple of reasons, one would be
social approval, my social approval. I also think it would be to
boost his own self-esteem.

When asked to explain how she felt the lies helped bolster his self-esteem, Laura
provided an aetiological explanation that stemmed from the client’s childhood
insecurities:
Laura: it comes from basic insecurity, and feeling not good
enough and so you present, children anyway, present the way
that you would like to be seen rather than what actually is
with a view to stay out of trouble or gaining something that
you would like, so I think it’s probably the same for adults
just a bit more maladaptive.

189

Self-aggrandisement
In Study 1, Part 2, one of the stronger themes to emerge was that pathological liars
engage in acts of self-aggrandisement, with just over half of the case studies
demonstrating this theme. In the current study, just over half of the participants
(eight), hypothesised that the lies told by pathological liars were done in an effort to
project a more favourable self image. Analysis of nine case studies revealed five
different self-aggrandising scenarios: 1) general boasting, 2) exaggerating one’s
achievements, 3) lying about educational attainment and qualifications, 4) inflating
one’s earning capacity or 5) pretending to know or have associations with famous
people. While an explicit link between self-aggrandisement and self-esteem was not
made within the data, the two themes complement each other in that selfaggrandisement is a potential avenue for artificially enhancing self-esteem.

In Paul’s attempts to define pathological lying he said “it is often the kind of lying
that is promoting them as a person.” Paul further stated that pathological liars “are
going to tell a lie which for the most part places them in a positive light.” Matthew
too described one of his clients as putting “himself forward in a good light by
making up various things.” When Felicity was asked to define the construct of
pathological lying she emphasised that pseudologues fabricate in an effort to
enhance their social desirability:
Felicity: is often done to portray oneself in a more socially
desirable manner; to present themselves in a slightly better
light.

Paul also described pathological lying as a state of “boastfulness gone wild”, which
converged nicely with Gary’s observation that pathological lying serves a
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“bragging” and “boasting” purpose, seemingly to cover areas of perceived
inadequacy:
Gary: he would just brag or boast about things that were
clearly not true…. he would be talking about how well he did
on a certain test when he clearly didn’t do well on that test.

One of the themes that emerged weakly across the dataset was that pathological liars
have a tendency to fabricate associations with famous people.

This theme is

affiliated with self-aggrandisement, as referential lies function to elevate the
pseudologue’s public image and place them in a positive light. Three participants
made reference to four cases who lied about knowing famous people or constructed
lies that gave the illusion of fame. Mary spoke about someone she knew personally
who would lie about “this huge salary and lifestyle and connections with famous
people and stuff.” One of Phil’s case studies lied about being “connected with all
these quite famous people”, while another client lied about being closely associated
with a famous entertainment group. Dagan spoke about how one of her clients
would speak about knowing and socialising with a famous sporting team, which
according to Ford (1996) is one of the more common fabrications told amongst male
liars. While as a standalone theme, ‘references to fame’ is only weakly supported by
the data; it becomes more clearly associated with pathological lying when viewed as
a specific form of self-aggrandisement.

It was not a surprise to find self-aggrandising lies among the repertoire of falsehoods
told by pathological liars, as this was a theme strongly supported by the data
collected in Study 1, Part 2.

But the findings do engender further research

questions, such as do self-inflatatory lies uniquely relate to pathological lying or is it
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characteristic of normal everyday lying also? Or, alternatively, what is
compositionally different between the self-inflating lies of pathological liars and the
self-inflating lies of non-pathological liars? To provisionally answer this question
one can borrow thought from DePaulo, Ansfield, Kirkendol and Boden (2004) who
classified ‘serious lies’ as falsehoods, which among other things, generate
relationship problems and endanger people’s reputations.

The combination of

themes that have emerged from this study appear supportive of DePaulo et al.’s
(2004) theory, that it is perhaps the combination of self-enhancement lies together
with reputation endangerment that renders this form of deception pathological.
Given the moderately strong support of this theme, it is reasonable to include it as a
recurrent feature of pathological lying, however, definitional constructions should
emphasise that while self-aggrandising lies are common amongst pseudologues they
are neither necessary nor sufficient to establish the existence of this syndrome.

“Look at me! Look at me!” The pseudologues’ need for attention
Four participants hypothesised that a certain proportion of lies told by pathological
liars serve an attentional purpose. Phil, for instance, spoke about how his third case
study would consistently fabricate stories in a bid to gain centrality in everyone’s
focus:
Phil: He was certainly attracting that attention and wanting to
be the centre of attention and, making up stories to do that.

Dagan saw a similar pattern with two of her clients, one of whom engaged in overt
attention-grabbing behaviour within a therapy group setting. Dagan theorised that her
client feared she would cease to exist if people weren’t focused on her at all times:
Dagan: Whatever happened she would tell a lie in order to
get the focus of the attention… back onto her, and she
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wouldn’t only lie she would do other behaviours such as you
know faking her own illness in the toilet and various other
things like that, so it was really important to her to have that
focus.

While Mary also made reference to attention-seeking, the functional flavour was
different in that her case study manoeuvred attention onto herself as a way of
avoiding uncomfortable topics of conversation; mostly topics that would reveal
areas of personal weakness or incompetence. While this theme is classified as a
weakly endorsed view, it is included here as it reflects a psychological strategy.

In summary, the results of this study support the findings in Study 1 and add weight
to the view that pathological lying is driven from an inner dynamic. Nuanced
analysis has revealed several different “inner dynamics”, which may underpin the
emergence of pathological lying. The strongest of these is psychological defence,
followed by interpersonal defence, identity disturbance, self-esteem enhancement
and self-aggrandisement. This theme could be presented in the following way:
pathological lying is driven by an intrapsychic need, experience or sensation, which
often stems from an underlying fear that their true self is intolerably flawed in some
fundamental way. Such needs may include defending oneself from unbearable
intrapsychic and/or interpersonal experiences; it may also represent a strategy for
bolstering or shoring up a fragile sense of self and/or compensating for
impoverished self-esteem.

4.9.3.2.2 Failure to take ownership or responsibility for lying
In Study 1, Part 2, 33% of case studies were observed to engage in deflection
strategies presumably designed to protect their falsehoods from external challenges;
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these included denial, anger, outrage and the creation of further deceptions to cover
the original lie. In the current study these deflection strategies were again observed
throughout the interview data including denial, additional lying, holding onto the lie,
prevarication, anger, aggression, crying, dramatic overtures, admitting to the lie and
laughing it off. The next sections deal specifically with each of these response
styles and how they were represented by the data.

Denial when confronted
Eight participants reported that when they or someone else confronted pathological
liars the pathological liar responded dismissively or somehow managed to deny or
avoid taking responsibility for their lying. This finding was consistent with Study 1,
Part 2, although denial featured more dominantly in the current study. Ann said that
when she confronted her first case study her questions were met with “gales of
laughter” as the “very idea was considered preposterous.” Gary similarly described
how one of his clients steadfastly held his position despite repeated attempts by his
parents to get him to confess:
Gary: There was stuff around stealing money and it would
clearly be him and there would be no doubt in relation to him
or his parents of who had stolen the money, but he would still
say no he didn’t and he would really stick to that and kind of
make a big performance about how it wasn’t him.

As with Gary’s case study, Felicity also observed her client’s unwavering
commitment to deny and/or minimise any instances of lying when confronted, as
demonstrated by this quote:
Felicity: she didn’t respond much at all, it was quite flat
affect and either a complete denial of “no, no, no that’s not
the case I never said that” or there was real minimisation of
it, it’s like “oh no, no, no I don’t think I really said that.” So
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even where there was a slight admission of the truth being
twisted it was minimised.

Whether denial of lying is a pathological trait or a trait common amongst nonpathological liars is an important question. The denials observed in pseudologues
may be qualitatively different to the denials see in normal populations on the
grounds that the pseudologue maintains their denial in the face of ardent and
compelling evidence, and they do so with gusto, which is incommensurate with the
lie itself.

Holding onto lies when confronted
One trend observed in the present dataset was that pathological liars will continue to
cling onto their lies even after those lies have been revealed or evidentially
disproven. This theme was supported by seven participants, including Paul, who
stated that his client continued to prevaricate in the face of confrontation:
Paul: Everybody around them knows that this is either a
gross exaggeration or an outright fabrication and yet they
continue to behave this way towards people even when
confronted.

Dagan, also provided an illustrative example of this theme during her attempts to
define the construct of pathological lying:
Dagan: To continue lying in the face of being uncovered, the
deception being uncovered.

Outbursts of anger when confronted
Six of the 14 participants interviewed saw anger and/or aggression as a hallmark
stance to confrontation.

Daniel’s case study, for instance, became intensely

outraged when her story was doubted, as illustrated by this quote:
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Daniel: When I confronted her (about lies) she became
violent, abusive, screaming, calling me for everything and
threatening me because I wouldn’t believe her… every time
somebody tried to challenge her she would become quite
violent about it even in the face of factual material. Even in
the face of signed material she would deny it.

In Daniel’s dealings with this particular client he observed several emotional
reactions, normally consecutively, to any act of confrontation or challenge. In
Daniel’s opinion, this client’s reactivity was indicative of someone who needed to
desperately hold onto and protect the defences she had created for herself. In this
next quote, Daniel’s experience is illustrated and it shows how his client was
hypervigilant to having her façade ruptured:
Daniel: We went from severe emotion to crying and so on to
anger and accusatory comments and … and attack even
before I opened my mouth and so it was as if she needed to
defend this stance in case it’s façade was pulled down.

Meta-fabrication and loss of control over lies
Half of the interviewed participants provided commentary on how pseudologues
become caught in a cycle of meta-fabrication.

This cycle suggests that

pseudologues try desperately to contain the impending fallout from their mendacities
by spinning more and more lies. Matthew likened the meta-fabrication effect to a
“rolling snowball”, and a “runaway train”, while Mary described it as a “whole
network, interlace of lies”. Matthew’s metaphorical depiction of pathological lying
as a “runaway train” symbolised the double-edgedness of meta-fabrication.
According to Matthew, the pseudologue sits at the front of the runaway train trying
their best to steer and stay on the tracks. Matthew explains that the only way the
pseudologue knows how to control the train is to manufacture more lies, which can
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give the impression of helping the train stay on the tracks but paradoxically these
lies, like pieces of coal in an engine fire, fuel the train to go faster and faster and
more and more out of control. From Matthew’s descriptions it appears as if the
pathological liar does not know what else they could do to correct the hurtling train
and so they get drawn into a cycle that makes life feel in control one moment and
out of control the next. As the feeling of chaos intensifies, the pseudologue falls
back onto their instinctive coping strategy of lying in the hope that just one more lie
will fix everything, thus maintaining the meta-fabricating cycle. Matthew summed
up these impressions in the following quote:
Matthew: I’m viewing it as like a sort of a rolling snowball
thing. It just grows and grows and grows until it becomes
more and more habitual and starts to spread wider and wider
and wider as well.

Seven participants made reference to this meta-fabricating cycle, including Dagan,
who hypothesised that one of her case studies’ inability to rectify his past
mendacities led him into this cycle. According to Dagan, her client would tell more
and more lies in an attempt to absolve himself of his previous lies because he did not
know what else he could do:
Dagan: I think there was quite an impulsive aspect to it and
also he didn’t have the skills needed to, even if he did on
occasion realise he’d done the wrong thing, be able to go
back and undo it, so would then try and get out of it through
more deception and more lies rather than taking the path of
owning up or trying to rectify what he’d said.

Gary similarly discussed how one of his clients would reactively tell a little white lie
that on its own would not be that significant, but through a gradual process of metafabrication the initial lie would grow and grow and get out of hand. According to
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Gary his client would feel enormous strain from carrying his mendacious snowball
and would express great relief when the lie was finally uncovered:
Gary: It was like just being sort of stuck in that moment
making a decision to kind of tell a little white lie and more
often than not they would just get out of control. So he would
tell this one little bit and he would just have to keep adding
on it and adding on it and it was often a huge relief for him
when the truth actually came out.

Gary’s observations of this particular case study shows one way that the
pseudologue can exit the meta-fabricating cycle is to admit to their lies, but as
Dagan and Ann explain, this may be a near impossible feat for a pathological liar.
Ann was able to highlight the motivational pull that perpetuates meta-fabrication,
namely, the anxious desire to protect their back catalogue of created falsehoods:
Ann: Lies beget lies. Like sometimes there are too many that
you’ve told and that to start telling the truth now would mean
you might have got caught for one, but if you actually tell the
truth about that one it might reveal that you’ve been telling
some whoppers for an awful long time.

In summary, the themes denial, anger/aggression, crying/sulking and metafabricating can theoretically be subsumed under the one category of “failure to take
ownership of lying behaviours”. When all of these categories are combined nine
participant endorsements are observed. The next section speaks to the opposite end
of the behavioural spectrum, those pathological liars who demonstrate a capacity to
acknowledge their falsehoods.

Crying or sulking
Only three case studies, presented by three participants, were described as
responding to confrontation by crying. Dagan saw the crying response displayed by
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her client as a strategy for “avoiding responsibility for it” and for resuming the
victim role in the face of being challenged. Gary stated that his client would “sulk”
when his parents confronted him about lying. Gary believed, however, that the
sulking was not so much an attempt to disguise his lying, but was a reaction to
feeling disbelieved:
Gary: Yeah I’m not sure about the crying but just kind of sort of
down and going to his room and I think it was more the people
didn’t believe him. I think that’s what he was sulking about.

4.9.3.2.3 Takes ownership of lies after therapeutic intervention
Five participants presented eight case studies that went against the trend of the
previously cited data, in that they showed some potential to take responsibility for
their lying habits. This theme held slightly weaker relevance here than it did in
Study 1, Part 2, where 56% of pseudologues demonstrated a capacity to recognise
their falsehoods when presented with strong and irrefutable evidence. In the current
study, six of the eight identified cases required intensive or long-term
psychotherapeutic intervention before being capable of acknowledging their lies.
Jessica, for instance, spoke about how her patient was eventually able to own her
falsehoods, but that this was in response to 24/7 behavioural interventions applied in
sub-acute in-patient setting:
Jessica: He actually responds really well to being confronted, it
varies sometimes he will sort of persist and try to hold to the lie
but I think towards the end of the program, with repeated
intervention he usually stops and owns it and actually makes a
good effort.

Gary and Ben had two clients, one of whom was able to acknowledge his lies to his
family and therapist without first receiving psychological treatment, but their other
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case study did require psychotherapeutic intervention before being able to
acknowledge his falsehoods:
Gary: In the counselling room he could look back on those
situations and recognise that he was lying, he would be really
quite honest about it but couldn’t be at that time, just kind of
felt like he was stuck.

Phil believed that both of his case studies required long term psychotherapy before
they could be honest about their lying habits.

4.9.3.3 Weakly endorsed themes
Each of the following themes received between two and four participant
endorsements. While providing some interesting perspectives, and keeping in mind
the small sample size here, without further exploration, these themes can be
considered as transient, uncommon features of pathological lying.

4.9.3.3.1 Fabricates in a confident and convincing manner
Three participants made reference to their case studies confidently propagating their
falsehoods. One such reference came from Phil, who described his first case study
as a very convincing liar commensurate with a professional spruiker:
Phil: There definitely was conviction there…. yeah, very
convincing. I mean it’s sort of like…those old…snake oil,
sort of sales people… he could spruik…and quite…engaging
and… believable… (he’d) probably have a bright career in
marketing or something, he was quite … able to sort of spin a
yarn.

Despite Phil describing this client as being convincing, at no point did he indicate
that he was personally fooled by this person’s mendacities. Mary on the other hand,
did find herself duped by her case study’s lies for a number of years. When Mary
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investigated this person’s history she discovered that she had become more
proficient at lying with age, making it increasingly difficult for people to discern
what was fact and what was fiction:
Mary: this is what they started out like, they were just huge
and utter whoppers, which at that time they (her family)
didn’t believe because they had experience with her… as she
matured… they just became more believable, they weren’t
these huge outlandish, amazing lies.

Daniel was the other participant to weigh in on this theme; he described his case
study as someone who lied with the conviction of a Hollywood actress. Just like
Phil, however, Daniel did not buy into the act, so while Daniel describes his case
study’s conviction, he did not find her lying believable.
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4.9.4 Childhood background factors
Participants were asked to describe their case study’s developmental history and in
response to this question, 17 cases, presented by 11 participants, were discussed.
Cross comparisons were made in an effort to extricate key developmental factors
that may play a significant role in the development and/or exacerbation of
pathological lying. While the findings do not support causal conclusions, they can
be used to establish testable hypotheses for future research.

Inductive analysis revealed strong links between attachment trauma and pathological
lying. Attachment trauma has been defined as one of four events: an unanticipated
and/or prolonged separation between child and primary carer with little
communication and no shared plan for union; physical and sexual abuse of a child
by an attachment figure; loss of an attachment figure; the abandonment by an
attachment figure in a situation of urgent need (Kobak, Cassidy, & Zir, 2004).

The types of childhood disruptions considered relevant to attachment included:
parent-child relationship difficulties (nine cases); rejecting parent and/or
psychological needs unmet by caregiver (seven cases); permanent or extended loss
of a parent (five cases); parental depression (two cases); trauma and abuse (two
cases); leaving home as a teenager (two cases); multiple geographical moves (two
cases); foster care and adoption (one case) and death of a parent in
childhood/adolescence (one case).

There were six other significant life factors

identified in the data that may or may not be linked to attachment, these included:
poor peer relationships (nine cases); parental divorce or separation (seven cases);
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family discord (three cases); adolescent pregnancy (one case); financial
disadvantage (one case) and large family of origin (one case).

A number of the childhoods described in this study were littered with adversity; one
example of this was a cold, critical, neglectful or fractured child-parent relationship.
This type of childhood dynamic was observed in nine of the 17 cases. This included
Ann’s case who reportedly grew up with a cold and rejecting mother. According to
Ann, the relationship difficulties were exacerbated by his perception that his siblings
were significantly more talented than he was. Ann formulated that the dynamic
between this man and his mother was underwritten by criticism and that this man
grew to be very distrusting:
Ann: The relationship to the mother was such that it had
obviously not been safe to be transparent with her because
she had a very dim view of this boy and by the time I knew
him you could see why she might have, but I don’t know if
her dim view pre-existed his trust issues or arose from the
fact that he was an untrusting person that she hadn’t been
able to come to know.

Daniel’s first case was also described as having a fragmented relationship with her
parents. According to Daniel, the patient’s father was unable to reach his daughter
personally and the relationship appeared poor from childhood. When Daniel was
asked to provide a brief formulation as to how the client’s lying habits developed, he
identified this fractured parent-child relationship as pivotal to aetiology:
Daniel: from the age of about five years of age… had significant,
fragmented relationship experiences with her father in particular,
and with her mother, that in order to develop some sort of
relationship she would put together stories in her mind…that
described her father who cared about her, loved her and was part
of her life and so forth, when in fact the father was quite tough –
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not quite abusive but quite tough and hard on her, that as she got
older and found that she…could tell lies in order to escape her
father’s wrath, and also to get outside the family home.

Jessica also identified marked systemic issues in her client’s family, which, when
combined with a family culture of face saving, created a ripe atmosphere for lying:
Jessica: the theme of the family was face saving so I think
perhaps she has grown up in a world full of secrets and pretence
and she had to try and save face and maintain face at all costs so
she may have learnt very early that often dishonesty was the
norm for the family.

Five case studies were identified as experiencing extended or permanent separations
from a parent during their formative years. Dagan for instance, reported that her
second case had a difficult upbringing, with her mother leaving her and her siblings
when they were very young, leaving them to be raised by their father. According to
Dagan the children’s level of care barely surpassed minimum standards, with only
basic needs being met.

More severely, Daniel’s second client had a striking

background marked by abuse, abandonment and exposure to an unsafe and
preoccupied caregiver:
Daniel:

Her father was convicted of sexually molesting

young boys. When this girl was very young her mother left
the family and took this girl’s brother with her. This girl was
then left alone to live with her father. This girl never had
contact with her mother or brother again. The girl often
remembered being kept out of the picture and being ignored
by her father, obviously because he was molesting young
boys.

These two exemplars represent cases where permanent separation from a parent
occurred.

Two other cases experienced permanent separation, one, which was

presented by Dagan, involved the death of both parents in childhood/adolescence
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(Dagan’s first case study), and the other, which was presented by Phil, was taken into
foster care and never knew his natural parents. According to Phil this man had a
really troubled childhood, where he was “bantered around” in foster homes before
finally settling into a stable foster placement. The fifth case to experience separation
from a caregiver was presented by Felicity and represents the only example of
impermanent separation.

Felicity’s case study experienced multiple, extended but

temporary separations from her mother because of her mother’s intractable
depression and needs for hospitalisation. In addition to physical separation, Felicity
noted that her client’s mother was emotionally unavailable, which led to the
postulation that her client suffered from “a major attachment disorder”.

Parental depression was again noted in Phil’s third case study. Phil reported that the
depression was intergenerational and meant that “a lot of needs for contact were not
being met”. He hypothesised that this was probably because the parents were "off in
their own world to try and deal with their own depression.”

Seven of the cases reportedly experienced the separation/divorce of their parents
during childhood or adolescence. This is considered both a significant life event
marked by stress, but also a period of separation from one or both parents. Mary,
for example, explains that her case study’s parents split up when she was 13 or 14,
shortly afterwards, she left school and home, an event which in itself is striking and
disruptive for a 15-16 year old. Both of Gary’s cases had parents who divorced;
interestingly the first of these cases started lying in this context of his parents’
separation.
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Peer difficulties were identified in nine cases. While lying may not relate to peer
relationships in any way, it is also conceivable that individuals may initiate lying as
a strategy for coping with or augmenting poor relationships or conversely, lying may
predispose someone to experiencing relationship ruptures and peer isolation. In at
least two of the cases, reported by Felicity and Ann, the lying habits appeared to
cause peer difficulties in adulthood, with no mention of childhood effects. Matthew
agreed with the question that pathological liars struggle to form relationships and
that they use lying as a means of aiding relationship development, but again, this
was in the context of discussing adult relationship patterns. The remaining six cases
were identified as showing evidence of peer relationship difficulties in childhood.
Jessica, for example, reported that her client experienced difficulties with being
bullied and teased at school. Gary identified that both of his cases lacked good
friendships and that the absence of a solid friendship group would predispose
individuals to lying:
Gary: my general theory would be, people that don’t have such
great peer groups or that aren’t accepted by people are the ones
that lie to feel better about themselves and make them – that’s
my sense of kids that I used to go to school with who used to lie
lots and I think both of the kids I’m talking about now fit into
that category.

Phil identified peer disconnection as an important background factor, with his first
client lying in order to gain power, respect, and friends. This client reportedly
moved around a lot throughout his childhood and was consistently on the road; as a
result he had to become adaptable to fit in quickly with others:
Phil: having to be that adaptable to fit in with other people, you
never really make long term friends because you’re sort of
being uprooted and moved on and you almost need to be a
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chameleon, needed to develop these different ways of fitting in
fairly quickly. I think that it’s exactly how he was presenting in
the rehab - you know coming in, doesn’t know anyone, how am
I going to fit in, creates a story, off we go.

Phil hypothesised that his client was captured by an existential fear of not fitting into
the world because he did not have much going for him. Phil postulated that this
client reinvented himself constantly in an attempt to connect to others:
Phil: I just really got the sense that this character really just
doesn’t connect with people generally. So he needs to reinvent
himself to the point where, you know, someone may actually
start to like him.

Two cases were identified as leaving school and home at around age 15 or 16 (Mary
and Daniel’s cases). Daniel’s first case, for instance, left home to live with a 20 year
old man and was pregnant with her first child at the age of 16.

Not only does

moving away from parents at a young age generate a form of attachment disruption,
it can also be an indicator of a pre-existing attachment problem.

Only four cases were reported to have “unremarkable” childhoods, although, two of
these cases were also described as having “a deprived childhood to some degree but
not a significant one” (Ben who discussed two cases).

The other two

“unremarkable” cases also had parents who separated during their childhood (Ann
and Gary), with Gary reporting that there were problems in the client’s relationship
with his step parent and step siblings and Ann reporting that her case study left
home and school at the age of 15 or 16, an event which seems developmentally
significant and indicative of an unhealthy attachment system.
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No one reported a serious illness or injury that may have adversely impacted on
brain development, although this question was not specifically put to participants.
Matthew did, however, hypothesise that pathological lying is an impulse control
disorder, and Ben stated that the brain might be hard-wired to produce abnormal
lying:
Ben: I mean not necessarily organic but the brain seems to be
wired like that from an early age and there’s not too much they
can do about it.

Three participants did not provide case-specific background information, but two of
these, Marie and Matthew, hypothesised that some type of attachment difficulty
could foster pathological lying. Matthew for instance, pinpointed carer rejection as
a key vulnerability for projecting a false-positive image:
Matthew: life would be better if you made out this reality rather
than the reality that is…. I would suggest some attachment
difficulties and that for whatever reason it is really important for
that child/infant to portray a particular persona that wasn’t their
own and if right from early on that they hadn’t really got a real
sense of who they were as a person because that was rejected by
their carers, then I think it would be even easier for them to
develop a false persona of something else.

Two other participants and four in total theorised that pathological lying relates to
attachment difficulties. Laura, for instance, formulated that neglect together with
insecure attachment deprives a child from the opportunity to practice telling the truth
in a safe context:
Laura: possibly neglect, having to fend for yourself and try and
cope yourself from an early age and then insecure attachments so
that you can’t, in a safe environment experiment with or practice
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telling the truth and experiencing the consequences of being
intolerant there, those sorts of things.

Overall, most of the cases discussed had significant life events or relationship
dynamics that coincided with pathological lying symptomatology. There were a
total of 11 cases presented by seven participants who experienced life events during
childhood or adolescence that are considered deleterious to healthy attachment
development, with many of these cases experiencing more than one significant life
event. Only two of the 17 cases discussed had no significant life events identified,
although they were said to have a deprived childhood to some degree.

As

mentioned earlier it is impossible to make causal links between the life events
identified by our participants and pathological lying, as the methods used here
cannot control for extraneous environmental, temperamental and social factors. It is
also important to note that there is considerable variation in the type of life event
reported and the severity of each event, which means ‘like for like’ comparisons
were not made. While no one life event was identified as common to each case, the
underlying psychological outcome may well be, for instance, unstable attachment
formation may result from a variety of different life factors. It is also important to
highlight that the majority of cases experienced multiple significant life events,
which makes it difficult to discern which factors, if any, hold aetiological relevance
in individual cases. What’s more, most participants failed to specify whether or not
the identified life events occurred pre or post-morbidly, which makes it difficult to
delineate whether these factors created a vulnerability towards lying, or whether the
lying habits created a vulnerability towards adverse life events and poor attachment.
It is also important to acknowledge the finding that some children, who are exposed
to childhood adversity, including abuse and neglect, can have positive or non-
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clinical outcomes in adulthood (e.g., Finkelhor, 1990; McGee, Garavan, de Barra,
Byrne & Conroy, 2002; Miller-Perrin & Perrin, 2007). This means, significant life
events alone cannot be held responsible for pathological lying development as
positive, protective or exacerbating factors can mitigate, moderate and mediate the
effects of those events.

In summary, this chapter has taken observations and conceptualisations from 14
clinically trained therapists and produced a data-driven, nomothetic outline of what
behaviours, cognitive states and psychological processes constitute and correspond
with pathological lying. The findings from this dataset were compared with the data
obtained from the past literature, which when combined creates a stronger
theoretical and empirical base for establishing diagnostic criteria for the construct.
Childhood factors considered relevant to pathological lying development were also
identified and discussed. The next chapter will combine this chapter’s finings with
the findings of Chapter’s 1 and 2 to create an operational understanding of
pathological lying in the form of provisional diagnostic criteria. These criteria will
then form a basis for distinguishing pathological lying from other psychiatric
conditions.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Establishing an operational understanding of
pathological lying as a diagnosable condition with
distinguishable criteria.

“What a man had rather were true he more readily believes.”
- Francis Bacon
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The task of providing clear diagnostic criteria for a distinct clinical disorder carries
with it the necessity of clarifying characteristics of the disorder, distinguishing these
from characteristics of other, established disorders and determining that the
characteristics can be classed as pathological. So far, this thesis has explored the
characteristics of pathological lying as revealed by previous research, published case
studies and clinicians’ experiences. Putting these together, this research now turns
to establishing this form of lying as a pathology with diagnostic criteria and
comparing it to other established disorders and constructs.

5.1 Lying as a pathology
In Study 2, Part 2, one of the participants questioned the appropriateness of creating
‘yet another’ diagnostic category to recognise and accommodate pathological lying.
His comments drew important attention to the question, what makes a ubiquitous
behaviour, such as lying, pathological. According to the DSM one of three factors
must be present to establish pathology: 1) the behaviours need to deviate markedly
from socially accepted norms; 2) the behaviours need to cause significant
impairment to important areas of social, vocational or educational functioning;
and/or 3) the behaviours must lead to clinically significant distress. Using these
DSM criteria as a guide and drawing on data from Study 1 and 2, it is possible to
discern 11 features of pathological lying, which appear indicative of pathology.
These features are discussed below.

One of the key indications that pathological lying is a form of pathology is its
maladaptiveness, in that it is a counterproductive and ineffective method for meeting
one’s needs. This is most clearly seen by how the negative consequences associated
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with pathological lying usually outweigh the benefits and in how the outcome that is
desired is frequently thwarted by the very mechanism chosen to procure it. An
example is when pseudologues self-aggrandise in order to secure approval or respect
from others. Positive regard from others is the need, lying is the method used to
meet this need, and negative regard is often the outcome. Most non-pseudologues
would accept that the process of establishing respect and trust takes time, patience
and importantly, the delivery of genuine and real accomplishments.

The

pseudologue however, shortcuts this process and in their haste for approval,
generates stories that give a false impression of achievement. Ironically of course,
once their mendacities are revealed, the positive regard is undone, replaced by scorn,
disapproval or, at best, puzzlement and distancing. The pseudologue now finds
himself or herself sitting further away from their original goal, clueless as to how to
undo the damage.

Such instances of lying in isolation could be regarded as

momentary lapses in judgement but when repeated over a period of years it becomes
self-hindering, deleterious and gives the appearance of pathology.

Not only,

therefore, does pathological lying fail as a strategy, it also reflects a significant
disparity between normative and pseudological thinking.

Pathological lying is more than just an ineffective strategy; it is one that causes
destruction and impairment to the pseudologue.

By fabricating in a repeated,

uncontained and transparent fashion, they become easily discovered as
prevaricators, which inevitably causes recurrent injury to their reputations,
vocational pursuits and relationships.

It is little wonder then that they find

themselves adrift, moving from one job to another and losing partners, friends and
family. These injuries are not enough, however, to stop them from lying, which
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points to either an executive function deficit and/or a self-destructive tendency; both
of which seem non-indicative of normal functioning. When the ineffectiveness and
self-destructiveness of this syndrome is considered, all three above criteria for
pathology are met – deviation from societal norms, impaired social and occupational
functioning and levels of clinical distress.

In support of the argument that pseudological behaviour deviates markedly from
social norms, is the observation that their lies are often peculiar and atypical of
common lies. It is somewhat accepted that ordinary people will, on occasion,
choose to lie when they perceive the truth will land them in hot water. Almost
everyone will recall telling ‘white lies’ such as: “Do I look good in this? Yes”; “Did
you complete your homework? Yes mum”; “Did you read the brief? Yes boss”. But
pseudologues do not restrict themselves to these kinds of lies; they go one step
further, spinning fantastic tales without any discernible trigger or provocation; such
as sidling up to a person in a bar and falsely claiming they played in an elite football
team, or walking into a parade and masquerading as an ex-serviceman, or falsely
accusing a college professor of sexual impropriety. These situationally unprovoked
lies are the types of lies that attract extraordinary attention and puzzlement. They
are also the types of lies that rarely, if ever, exit the mouths of non-disordered
individuals.

The pseudologue is also inclined to tell trivial lies that provide no refuge and no
clear gain; this type of lying is considered peculiar to a pathological degree because
it carries high risk with very little discernible gain. It is also counter-intuitive
because the truth often represents an easier and more straightforward option. The

214

habitual creation of senseless lies strengthens the hypothesis that pseudologues
possess profound executive functioning deficits indicative of a regressed and/or
poorly formed frontal lobe, similar to what is observed in persons with impulse
control disorders and/or personality disturbances.

Excessive frequency and pervasiveness are two additional key markers of pathology.
Not only are pseudologues observed to fabricate to a degree, which is beyond social
norms, they are also observed to lie in a way that pervades every corner of their
lived experience. The observation that this is an enduring, pervasive and excessive
pattern of behaviour, gives credence to an overall picture that this is a trait-based
pathology underscored by a serious dysfunction in the decision making and impulse
control regions of the brain.

The final pathological marker is the slippery and vacillating hold pseudologues have
on reality. This addresses the criteria of significant deviation from societal norms
and impairment of social, vocational and educational functioning. Pathological liars
appear to float between lucidity and self-deception, in a way that is vastly discrepant
to ordinary individuals. It is as if they drift into a cavernous daydream where they
suspend disbelief for their own pleasure and self-soothing. While not meeting
psychotic thresholds as a rule, their degree of reality suspension differs markedly
from normal cognitive processes.

When all 11 features are combined they provide a sound basis and rationale for
categorising this phenomenon as a pathological disorder.
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5.2 Developing provisional diagnostic criteria
The format to establish provisional diagnostic criteria used here is adopted from the
DSM-IV-TR and follows the structure used for defining personality disorders and
pathological gambling. Three diagnostic prototypes were constructed, the first is
based on the thematic analysis conducted in Study 1 Part 2, where 64 case studies
were formally analysed; the second is based on the thematic analyses conducted in
Study 2 Part 2, which involved analysis of interview transcripts from 14 clinically
trained participants; the third is a combined diagnostic profile that is based on the
analyses of both studies. The third diagnostic profile is presented below, forming
the basis for comparison with established DSM-1V-TR disorders. Profiles one and
two are able to be seen in Appendix Four. Each prototype dictates how many
criteria a person must display before a diagnosis of pathological lying disorder can
be applied. For instance, in prototype one, a person must meet six of the ten “A”
category criteria and five of the eight “B” category criteria before a diagnosis can be
assigned.

A simple mathematical algorithm was used to determine how many

criteria, at minimum, must be present before a positive diagnosis can be made. The
algorithm was:
(Number of Criterion / 2) + 1
The algorithm was modelled on DSM-IV-TR decision guides, which for the
majority of its diagnoses specifies that persons must exhibit 50% or more of the
outlined criteria before attracting a formal diagnosis. It is estimated that the DSMIV-TR utilised epidemiological statistics to determine absolute criterion thresholds,
but unfortunately comparable statistical analyses were beyond the scope of this
dissertation, so instead, this dissertation has based its algorithmic equation on
general patterns observed in the DSM-IV-TR and not on any specific statistics
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related to the phenomenon of pathological lying. All three diagnostic profiles
specify that this is a Cluster B personality disorder.

The decision to group

pathological liars into this category was based on the observed similarities between
pathological lying and Cluster B personality disorders.

5.2.1 Diagnostic prototypes one and two
Prototypes one and two can be viewed in Appendix Four. The first diagnostic
prototype is based on the thematic analysis conducted in Study 1, Part 2. Placed
next to each diagnostic criterion is a percentage figure, which indicates the number
of case studies that supported that particular criterion. Criteria were included if 20%
or more of cases demonstrated its existence. The second diagnostic prototype is
based on the analysis conducted in Study 2 Part 2. After each criterion there is a raw
figure followed by a percentage score. The raw and percentage figures indicate how
many of the 14 participants endorsed those particular criteria. To be included as
criteria the theme had to have five or more participant endorsements or 36%, which
was slightly higher than the inclusion requirements for the first diagnostic prototype.

5.2.2 Diagnostic prototype three
The third and final diagnostic prototype combines the findings from Study 1 and
Study 2 into an amalgamated set of criteria. The third diagnostic prototype clearly
illustrates areas of divergence and convergence across both studies and uses a colour
coding system to highlight this. Green indicates overlapping criteria, blue indicates
criteria relevant to Study 1, Part 2 (case studies) only, and pink indicates criteria
relevant to Study 2, Part 2 (interviewed clinicians) only.
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Table 8
Proposed diagnostic criteria for pathological lying disorder based on data from Study 1,
Part 2 combined with Study 2, Part 2. Green represents criteria common to both studies,
blue represents criteria unique to Study 1, and pink represents criteria unique to Study 2

Cluster B Personality Disorders
301.3 Pathological Lying Disorder
A. An enduring and pervasive maladaptive pattern of creating and propagating
falsehoods to others, that is intra-psychically motivated by poor self-esteem or
identity disturbance, that is not engaged in for purposes of hurting, exploiting or
maligning others, beginning (at least) by early adulthood or adolescence and
present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by eight (or more) of the following:
1. Stability in lying behaviours across time, with lying occurring at an
abnormally high frequency when compared to societal standards.
2. Falsehoods are communicated as a psychological strategy or as a means of
meeting an inner psychological need; they are not designed by motivation
to gain material objects or financial advancement.
3. Fails to take ownership of lying behaviours when confronted by denying
their lies, telling more lies or becoming angry and aggressive, but can
admit to lies when convincingly confronted with evidence of their
falsehoods or following on from therapeutic intervention.
4. Falsehoods are self-aggrandising and portray the pseudologue in a positive
light.
5. Falsehoods are told with impaired awareness and self-deception may
occur.
6. Falsehoods are easily detectable by others.
7. Falsehoods resemble stories that could be feasible and/or possible, and are
not the product of delusion, hallucination or confabulation.
8. Falsehoods centre on stories of heroism and/or victimisation.
9. Falsehoods are intricate, complex, and elaborate and can be believable.
10. Lies may be based on elements of truth.
11. Impaired capacity to regulate, control or inhibit urges to lie, as indicated by
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a sense that the lying is impulsive, compulsive, reactive, automatic and that
the lies can build up on top of each other and get out of control.
12. Falsehoods appear odd and illogical to outside observers, with some lies
being trivial and small.
13. Experiences negative affect, as indicated by displays of remorse, guilt,
shame and/or distress after lying.

B. Eight (or more) of the following must also be present to make this diagnosis:
1. Disregard for personal and interpersonal wellbeing, i.e., they continue to
lie despite the risks of harm to their reputation and relationships. Has
jeopardised or lost a significant relationship, job, educational or career
opportunity because of lying behaviours.
2. Impaired self-esteem: feelings of low self-worth and unlovability. Lies
function to bolster low self-esteem.
3. General impulsivity across a variety of domains.
4. Hypersensitive and hypervigilant to being criticised, disliked or rejected,
which often results in unhelpful attempts to secure admiration or positive
regard through lying.
5. Identity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self-image or
sense of self.
6. Diminished capacity for empathy, but empathic responding is possible: can
show regard for other people’s feelings, needs and suffering.
7. Repeatedly fails to take responsibility for mistakes, shortcomings or
wrongdoings, often resorting to deception instead.
8. Poor insight into the problematic nature of their lying habits.
9. Engages in petty, non-serious acts of crime.
10. Has difficulties maintaining stable employment, i.e., frequent job changes
and/or multiple sackings.
11. Intermittent suicidal ideation and para-suicidal gestures.
12. Poor relationship skills and lack of close or long-term friends.
13. Impaired ability to apply reality testing to their falsehoods.

C. The enduring pattern of lying is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of

219

personal and social situations.
D. The enduring pattern is maladaptive and leads to clinically significant distress or
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
E. The pattern is chronic, stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back
at least to adolescence or early adulthood.
F. While the disorder may originate in childhood the diagnosis should not be made
until the person reaches 18 years of age, unless the lying is causing the child
clinically significant distress or impairment in social and/or academic functioning.
G. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or consequence
of another mental disorder, i.e., the falsehoods should not represent delusions,
hallucinations, confabulation or any psychotic illness.
H. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance or
general medical condition.
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5.3 Differential diagnosis considerations
This next section gives due consideration to how and if pathological lying can be
distinguished from other psychiatric constructs using data from Study 2. This section
starts with an overview of how pathological lying overlaps with psychopathy, which
is then followed by a discussion of how participants from Study 2, Part 2,
conceptually compared and contrasted pathological lying from a collection of
established conditions and concludes with a systematic overview of how the
provisional diagnostic criteria for pathological lying compares and contrasts with a
range of DSM conditions. The theoretical challenge to demarcate pathological lying
was considered so important it was embedded into the research aims and research
questions outlined at the beginning of Study 2, Part 2. Aim number six for example,
spoke of the ambition to draw out the delineable characteristics and features of
pathological lying, while research question two asked whether pathological lying is
identifiable as a unique construct and finally, research question three asked how the
defining characteristics of pathological lying could be differentiated from other
psychiatric conditions.

5.3.1 Psychopathic features of pathological lying
One of the major obstacles to studying the phenomenon of pathological lying was
the theoretical overlap between pathological lying and psychopathy. Indeed, when
the search term “pathological lying” was entered into the ‘PsychArticles’ database,
only one article was returned that was considered relevant to pathological lying,
while another 40 articles were retrieved that dealt specifically with psychopathy.
Across the literature there has been a general assumption made that pathological
lying is not a discrete phenomenon, but rather, a symptom of psychopathy

221

(DeMatteo & Edens, 2006; Guy & Douglas, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2006; Neumann,
Kosson, Forth & Hare, 2006) and this assumption is seemingly supported by a large
body of research and theory that indicates persons with psychopathy engage in
repeated acts of lying (e.g., Cleckley, 1988; Hare, 1991, 2003; Seto, et al., 1997).
With this phenomenonological overlap in mind, one of the challenges facing this
dissertation was exploring how pathological lying would look similar to or different
to psychopathy.

The theoretical question of relevance was: what factors

appropriately delineate the two constructs, or conversely, prove their concurrency?
To answer this question two processes were followed, the first involved identifying
constructs strongly linked to psychopathy in the literature, the second involved
analysing Study 2, Part 2’s data for evidence of these constructs. Because the data
from Study 2, Part 2 was examined for evidence of particular themes it qualifies as a
bottom-down, theoretical approach to thematic analysis.

The interpersonal and affective traits that characterise psychopathy have been
theoretically and empirically elucidated by Cleckley (1941, 1988) and more recently
captured in the Hare Psychopathy Checklist – Revised (PCL-R, 2003). These traits
include: callousness/lack of empathy; glibness/superficial charm; lack of remorse or
guilt; shallow affect; failure to accept responsibility; grandiose sense of self-worth;
pathological lying; conning/manipulation of others; poor behavioural control;
impulsivity; criminal versatility; need for stimulation/boredom; parasitic lifestyle;
lack of long term goals; revocation of conditional release; juvenile delinquency;
early behaviour problems and irresponsibility (Hare, 2003). By tracing the presence
or absence of these themes in the transcripts, it is possible to highlight how
pathological lying and psychopathy might be distinguished or amalgamated.
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Callousness and empathy
Psychopaths are known to repeatedly commit social transgressions with significantly
muted signs of emotional distress and often in the absence of any empathy or
remorse (Cooke & Michie, 2001; Hare, 1991, 2003; Moran et al., 2009). For this
reason, it was considered essential to determine whether the sample of pathological
liars discussed in Study 2, Part 2, showed similar empathic deficiency. Seven
participants felt pathological liars lacked or had a greatly diminished capacity for
empathy, while six participants held the opposing view that pathological liars had
the capacity for empathic reflection. Dagan, Marie and Daniel were recorded as
holding both conflicting views. For instance, when Dagan was asked what elements
of Narcissistic Personality Disorder seemed to overlap with her conceptualisations
of pathological lying she responded by saying:
Dagan: Look there’s a few things. The lacking of empathy.
Really that unwillingness to recognise or identify with the
feelings and needs of others

Dagan’s comments in the preceding extract would indicate that she believes a
criterion for pathological lying is an absence of empathic responding. However,
when asked later if she felt pathological lying was different to antisocial lying,
Dagan reflected that unlike antisocial liars, pathological liars have some capacity for
empathy and remorse:
Dagan: I do think that the people that I’ve seen that I would
consider to be pathological liars… would have some degree
of empathy and remorse. So I think that’s a feature that that
makes it different.
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Similar to Dagan, Marie qualified that while she felt pathological liars lack empathy,
she believed that dimensionally, pathological liars would have more capacity for
empathic reasoning than persons on the antisocial end of the spectrum, as illustrated
by this quote:
Marie: if you’re going over to the antisocial realm you’re
really going into a realm where there is very little empathy or
capacity to hold another person in your own world and so the
lies would be really not taking anybody, anything into
account whereas maybe the pathological liar may not, I don’t
know but it may on a continuum may not be kind of as unempathic and may have more kind of somewhat more
capacity to hold someone else into, in their world.

There were six participants who indicated pathological liars do possess empathic
potential, even if that potential is somewhat encumbered relative to the general
population.

Matthew, Phil, Daniel and Jessica, for instance, felt the criteria

pertaining to “lacks empathy” for Narcissistic Personality Disorder did not
accurately reflect their clinical judgments of their clients, and thus did not fit with
their understandings of pathological lying.

Overall, a total of four participants believed that a non-empathic personality style
could underpin pathological lying, another three participants were divided in their
opinions providing commentary that both supported and repudiated the viewpoint,
and an additional three participants unequivocally supported the supposition that
pathological liars possess empathy. The divergence in opinions seen here may
reflect a difficulty inherent in measuring empathy, especially given it is an
emotional and cognitive experience that cannot be directly measured from
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observable behaviour. What is more, empathy is an experience that may be feigned,
which has been demonstrated amongst psychopathic individuals (Cleckley, 1988).
The data would suggest that pathological liars possess a limited capacity to
empathise with others, but this is not always the case nor is it typical. Given opinion
on empathy is divided it does not seem appropriate to use empathy as a
distinguishing or non-distinguishing feature, nor should it be considered a uniformly
expressed feature of pathological lying.

Remorse or Regret
Extensive examinations of psychopathy have revealed that psychopaths do not
experience remorse or guilt for their actions (Hare, 1991, 2003). In Study 1, Part 2 a
small number of cases (six out of 64) showed some degree of guilt, shame or ego
dystonia, while an almost equal number (five cases) showed a propensity to lie
without noticeable signs of distress. As a result, this theme was not given much
weight in the previous study. In the current dataset there was stronger endorsement
of this theme with five participants commenting that pathological liars experience
some level of remorse around their lying behaviours. The strength of these views
varied and were largely conservative, with none of these participants going as far as
to say pathological liars possess large amounts or even normal amounts of remorse.
For instance, Dagan stated, there is “some degree of empathy and remorse”, Ann
described her case study as having “pockets of remorse” and Gary said generally
speaking they have “some kind of regret or some remorse”. Marie hypothesised that
pathological liars would not experience remorse for low level antisocial behaviour,
such as mistreating others or stealing, but that they would potentially experience
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remorse when their actions resulted in someone else getting hurt. As can be seen
from these selected quotes, no participant is advocating that pathological liars exude
enormous amounts of remorse, but there does seem to be some consensus that there
is a degree of remorse present even if it’s only marginal. It should be noted,
however, that writers such as Cleckley (1941, 1988) have long held that psychopaths
can verbalise regret and appear to show impressive insight into the inappropriateness
of their behaviours, only to engage in these behaviours the moment a new
opportunity to do so presents. According to Cleckley (1941, 1988) the psychopath
can seem sincere but this sincerity is usually in service of dodging blame or negative
consequence. Therefore, when considering whether pseudologues express remorse
or regret, it is essential to delineate whether this is a sincere act or guile
manipulation. Unfortunately this determination cannot be made with the current
data. Overall, the findings of Study 2 provide preliminary support for remorse and
regret to be considered factors that distinguish pathological lying from psychopathy,
but such preliminary conjectures need further measurement.

Conning and manipulation
Research indicates psychopathic individuals are keenly motivated by a desire to
meet their own needs, often at the cost of manipulating or conning others (Hare,
2003). This is why, it was considered important to see whether manipulation was a
key characteristic of the pathological liars seen in this sample. Two participants
unequivocally stated that pathological liars prevaricate in a manipulative fashion,
with Jessica highlighting this as an integral component of her definition:
Jessica: I think for me the more manipulative and the more
malicious and the more entrenched the behaviours are, the
more likely I would be to give it a label of pathological lying.
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Both Jessica and Ann were clear with their clinical judgement that their case studies
operated in the world through guile manipulation. For instance, Jessica stated that
her client was “certainly a pathological liar so lots and lots of lies and stories and
manipulative.” While Ann spoke about how there were several victims who were
“psychologically bullied and manipulated by this person.”

Two more participants referenced manipulation with caution. Felicity, for instance,
felt her case study’s deceptions had “almost a more manipulative feel” but she also
qualified that she did not believe her client was deliberately trying to deceive or
harm others. Phil observed that “how they interact with the world requires some
kind of manipulation”, but he also stated that one of his case studies was nonexploitative. In contrast, four participants specifically mentioned that pathological
liars and their falsehoods are not intrinsically manipulative, Ben, for instance made
this following reflection:
Ben: they don’t appear to be manipulative, they don’t appear to
be designed in any sort of way to try and make somebody else do
something else.

Mary too believed her case study was not setting out to manipulate or hurt others:
Mary: I don’t think her lies were about manipulating and
hurting other people, I don’t think that, that wasn’t her. Her
lies were about presenting herself in the best possible light.
They were about, they were definitely about filling ego; they
weren’t about manipulating like the psychopath.

As can be seen by the preceding discussion, there is divergence when it comes to
understanding what role manipulation plays in pathological lying.

It seems

appropriate to categorise manipulation as a transient and uncommon feature of
pathological lying. With regards to psychopathy, it may be appropriate to consider
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manipulation as a differentiating marker, with pathological liars being less likely to
manipulate than psychopaths.

Parasitic and exploitative
The Hare Psychopathy Checklist outlines that psychopaths live a parasitic lifestyle
whereby they live off the efforts and achievements of others. Parasitic lifestyle did
not emerge as a theme per se in Study 2, Part 2, but exploitation did. Exploitation is
defined by the Macquarie Dictionary (1998) as “to use selfishly for one’s own
ends”, which seems similar in definition to parasitic lifestyle. Four participants
mentioned that pathological liars, either generally or in specific reference to their
case studies, had the potential to be exploitative. Ann was emphatic in her opinion
that pathological liars are interpersonally exploitative. However, at a later stage in
the interview process, as Ann was asked to clarify her opinion and whether she
believed antisocial traits were a requisite feature of pathological lying, she qualified
her previous statements by saying antisocial elements are neither necessary nor
sufficient. Marie spoke about how there are antisocial elements to the pathological
liar profile, which includes “a means to an end sort of feel to it”. When Marie was
asked if criteria six of Narcissistic Personality Disorder was relevant to pathological
liars, that they are interpersonally exploitative, she responded by saying “yes,
definitely.” However, at a later stage in the interview when exploring notions of
exploitation and how it relates to empathy, Marie did caution that exploitation does
not always go hand in hand with pathological lying presentations. In the context of
differentiating pathological lying from Antisocial Personality Disorder, Marie felt
pathological lying would potentially involve, “low level kind of exploitation as
opposed to actual real cruelty and harm to others.”
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Daniel believed there were two streams of pathological lying, both of which were
categorically different. The first was a self-protective form of pathological lying
which was born from a poor history and poor definition of self, while the second
was more antisocial in nature and was characterised by lying behaviours that were
intended to “gain an end that is destructive to the other person”. There is room for
conjecture here that pathological lying has an exploitative function, but there is also
room to suppose that this is not a requisite trait of all forms of pathological lying,
which is in keeping with Marie’s conceptualisation.

As with the previous theme, there were several strong arguments made by six
participants, which contradicted the postulation that pathological lying is a
deliberate act of exploitation or that pathological liars are intrinsically exploitative.
Matthew, for example, denied that his case study was interpersonally exploitive,
adding, “It’s more about dodging the bullet.”

Phil similarly rejected the sixth

diagnostic criteria for Narcissistic Personality Disorder, stating, “I don’t think there
was anything sort of exploitative or lacking in empathy.”

Ben distinguished

pathological lying from Antisocial Personality Disorder by saying:
Ben: there isn’t a sense of using lies for sadistic purposes, or
profit or gain, so that secondary gain is definitely not there.

Sonja drew a similar conclusion to Ben, stating that pathological lying was different
to lying in the context of Antisocial Personality Disorder because:
Sonja: it’s more driven by a fear or a feeling of inadequacy
where antisocial lies are to achieve an end and the person is
probably not feeling inadequate at all at the time.
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Sonja and Ben’s points were reiterated by Dagan, who felt pathological lying and
Antisocial Personality Disorder were separate constructs because the lies were not
solely around being able to get what the person wants.

Taking stock of all of the varying opinions across the dataset, there were four
participants who indicated pathological liars have the potential to be exploitative,
however, each of those four participants have, at a later point, either contradicted
this position, or at the very least acknowledged that exploitation is not a necessary
nor sufficient component of pathological lying. Conversely six participants claimed
that one of the differentiating aspects of pathological lying from antisocial
personality and/or narcissism, is the absence of exploitation. As was the case for the
manipulation theme, it is difficult to justify the position that exploitation is a central
characteristic of pathological lying. A more accurate overview of the data would
indicate that exploitation is not the overriding motivation behind pathological lies
nor is it necessary or sufficient for an exploitative lie to be classified as pathological,
although in some cases there may be elements of exploitation present. Examining
whether or not someone is exploitative and/or the degree to which they are
exploitative may prove useful when trying to distinguish pathological lying from
psychopathy, with the latter group demonstrating greater proclivity towards
exploitation.

Distress
In Cleckely’s (1988) enumeration of psychopathy’s features he outlines that they
possess a relative immunity from anxiety and worry and a general poverty in major
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affective reactions; this perspective is supported by other authors such as Blair,
Mitchell and Blair (2005) and Hare (2003). For this reason, there was a natural
curiosity around whether pathological liars experience affective blunting akin to the
emotional blunting seen in psychopaths. More specifically there was a deductive
interest in whether the participants of this study witnessed their cases feeling
distressed in the process and aftermath of prevaricating. In the present study two
participants relayed that they observed signs of distress in their clients in response to
their publicised falsehoods. Gary spoke about how he witnessed regret, guilt and
angst within his clients and Ben spoke about how one of his client’s displayed
significant signs of distress as he revealed he had been lying during the course of
therapy.

An additional six participants made mention of pathological liars

experiencing general distress and anxiety outside of the context of lying, which
supports Wiersma’s (1933) original postulation that pseudologue’s possess nervous
temperaments. In total, there were eight participants who provided evidence that
pseudologues experience distress which is antithetical to psychopaths. In contrast to
previous themes, no participants provided commentary that refuted the existence of
distress and anxiety within this population.

Failure to take ownership and responsibility for self
Research into psychopathy reveals that a key trait is an abdicating personality style,
whereby the individual fails or refuses to accept responsibility for their
inadequacies, errors and transgressions (Cleckley, 1988; Hare, 1991, 2003). In
Study 2, Part 2, six participants felt that the lies told by their case studies were done
in an effort to “exonerate themselves from any sort of responsibility for certain
behaviours” (Jessica). Felicity felt her client was someone who serially failed to
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own up to her mistakes and would utilise lying as a way of avoiding responsibility
for her actions, as illustrated by this quote:
Felicity: She wouldn’t take responsibility for things that
happened, so that was one example of where you’d see she
just twisted often to say “well no I didn’t do that or I”

Laura spoke about how her client lied in business transactions as a way of avoiding
financial obligations, and Ann was of the opinion that pathological liars potentially
lack the skills required to rectify follies and so they resort to deception as an
alternative solution:
Ann: It’s more like all the other things that the rest of us
would do rather than lying, might have atrophied.

The

thought of actually admitting that your not as good as you
are, or apologising or working hard to make good the damage
that you’ve done it might just be so alien to them that that’s
fallen out of their behavioural repertoire.

In the current data, there is moderate support for irresponsibility being a behavioural
feature of pathological lying, which is convergent with the psychopathic profile.

Harm to others
Due to a combination of traits the psychopath is considered unconcerned with others
and demonstrates difficulty understanding how they feel. According to authors such
as Lynam and Widiger (2007) such combinations mean that are not held in check by
a fear of hurting others. When this is combined with abnormal emotional profiles
and problems with self-regulation the result can be both reactive and instrumental
aggression and harm (Blair, 1995, 1997, 2008; Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Blair et al.,
1995; Kiehl, 2006; Kiehl et al., 2001; Raine & Yang, 2006). A wealth of research
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indicates psychopathic individuals malign or hurt others with little or no
compunction, which made it a relevant feature to explore in Study 2, Part 2’s data.
As with the previous themes of manipulation and exploitation, there was a high
degree of division both within and between subjects when it came to determining
whether malevolency is a feature of pathological lying. In review of all transcripts
only one participant was explicit in describing maliciousness as a consistent part of
pathological lying, and that was Jessica. Ann, Daniel and Marie, supported the idea
that malicious intent may form part of the diagnostic landscape, but fell short of
stating with absolute certainty that this was always the case.

As previously mentioned, Jessica was clear in her thinking that the more severe and
extreme the degree of maliciousness, the more confident she would be ascribing the
label of pathological lying to a person:
Jessica: it’s more of a spectrum and I think for me the more
manipulative and the more malicious and the more
entrenched the behaviours are, the more likely I would be to
give it a label of pathological lying.

At first glance, Ann’s observations seemed supportive of Jessica’s, especially when
she outlined that it is the act of hurting or damaging another person that makes the
lying pathological. However, Ann later reflected that the element of harm to other is
neither necessary nor sufficient to categorise behaviour as pathological lying.

Marie was similarly mindful to state that there could be harmful elements associated
with pathological lying but that malevolency is an unnecessary mind-state. In fact,
Marie, made the distinction that the more serious the harm caused by the lies, the
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more likely it is the result of an antisocial personality structure than pathological
lying, as illustrated in this reflection:
Marie: but it certainly may incorporate harm to others but the
level of harm I think would also be a differentiator.

Overall, only one participant unequivocally felt that ‘harm to other’ was a requisite
trait of pathological lying, with three participants stating there could be elements of
harm but that this was not necessary.

Across the data there were far more

participants endorsing the perspective that pathological lies are not told with
malicious intent, with seven participants speculating that the main differentiator
between pathological lying and antisocial lying and/or Anti Social Personality
Disorder was the degree of harm.

These seven participants stated that the

pathological lie was not designed to harm and if there was any harm caused, it was
not to the level expected of someone with antisocial personality traits.

Given the majority of participants lean towards the view that pathological lying is
designed to meet an internal need rather than a need to hurt other, it would be
considered inappropriate to have malicious intent stand alone as a defining criterion
for the construct of pathological lying. It would be considered more representative
of collective opinion to say that for the most part the intention behind pathological
lies is non-malevolent however, there are, on occasion, persons who will lie at a
pathological level and with an element of malice, although the degree of malice is
less extreme than what is expected with antisocial personality types or psychopaths.
As such, pathological lying can be differentiated from psychopathy on the basis of
harm caused to others.
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Psychopathic traits observed in Study 2, Part 2’s data
So far only one feature appears central to both pathological lying and psychopathy
and this is “failure to take responsibility for one’s actions”. Impoverished empathy
has also been flagged as a common feature but the support for this theme was not
uniform and therefore requires further investigation. In addition to these traits four
more, as outlined in the Hare Psychopathy Checklist – Revised, have a close
association with traits outlined in the data from Study 2, Part 2. These include
pathological lying, grandiosity, poor behavioural control and impulsivity.
Obviously pathological lying would be considered common to both psychopathy
and pathological lying, making this a key overlapping criterion. With regards to
grandiosity, Hare (2003) states that psychopaths have a grandiose sense of selfworth. On the surface it may appear as if this trait is also common to pathological
liars with eight participants citing evidence of self-aggrandisement, but closer
examination of the underlying mental state reveals pseudologues project a grandiose
image in order to compensate for or conceal low self-worth, which starkly contrasts
to the psychopath who genuinely holds a grandiose self-view.

Behaviourally,

however, grandiosity may serve as an overlapping marker. Poor behavioural control
and impulsivity were also observed strongly in Study 2’s data. Nine participants,
for instance, described pathological lying as an impulsive act, while seven identified
pathological liars as being generally impulsive across life.

Furthermore, 10

participants believed pathological liars are inept at controlling their lying
behaviours. Given the strength of endorsement in Study 2, it is reasonable to
conclude that impulsivity, poor behavioural control, failure to take responsibility
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and pathological lying are common factors to both psychopathy and the construct of
pathological lying.

Lack of empathy and grandiosity may be common factors, but

further investigation is needed.

Psychopathic traits not observed in Study 2, Part 2’s data
Despite there being several areas of construct overlap, there were behavioural
markers considered central to psychopathy that did not emerge in a meaningful and
reliable way in Study 2, Part 2’s data. These included: absence of remorse/regret;
manipulation; exploitation; absence of distress and intentionally causing harm to
others. While pathological liars appear less encumbered by remorse than the normal
population, their capacity for remorse is considered higher relative to psychopaths.
And while manipulation and exploitation may underlie pseudological behaviours
from time to time, manipulation and exploitation are not considered key or reliable
features of the construct. Unlike psychopaths, most pathological liars are considered
capable of experiencing distress and unlike psychopaths they do not appear, in the
main, to be characterised by a reckless disregard for others, nor are their lies
typically designed to cause harm. In addition to these themes there were several
other key features of psychopathy not shown to hold significance in Study 2, Part
2’s data, these included: glibness/superficial charm; criminal versatility; need for
stimulation/boredom; lack of long term goals; revocation of conditional release;
juvenile delinquency, and early behaviour problems. There was one caveat and that
pertained to one of Phil’s case studies, who he described as being a very convincing
liar who was very engaging and had a talent for marketing himself.

Phil’s

description, which follows, appears indicative of someone with superficial charm:
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Phil: those old sort of snake oil, sort of sales people that
was the kind of character he was, he could spruik you and
quite sort of engaging and believable…probably have a
bright career in marketing or something….

Overall, when the themes related to psychopathy were viewed as a whole, there was
a strong indication that pathological liars exhibit some psychopathic qualities. The
psychopathic themes with the strongest connection to pathological lying were
impoverished empathy, and failure to take responsibility for one’s actions; both of
these themes attracted a moderate endorsement rate (seven and six endorsements
respectively), although endorsement for empathy was not uniform. Altogether 11
participants endorsed at least one psychopathic characteristic. When the themes are
examined more closely, however, it becomes apparent that a number of
psychopathic traits are not common to pseudologues, and in fact can be used to
differentiate the two groups, such as absence of manipulation, exploitation and
intention to cause harm to others, and the presence of distress, expressions of
remorse and a greater capacity for empathy than psychopaths.

It is difficult,

however, to rely on the data from Study 2, Part 2 as proof of an absence or presence
of these traits, especially when it is noted by experts that psychopaths can “simulate
normal human emotion” (Cleckley, 1988, p. 245). It is conceivable, therefore, that
the participants in Study 2, Part 2, where unwittingly describing psychopaths, or
unwittingly describing feigned behaviours rather than actual behaviours. It is also
difficult to ascertain with absolute certainty that convergent features are in fact
constructurally similar, as two features may appear similar on the surface but can be
generated by distinctly different dispositional causes.

This is exemplified in

Karpman’s (1948) distinction between primary and secondary psychopaths.
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Karpman defined primary psychopaths as those whose antisocial behaviours are
motivated by a core set of dispositions associated with psychopathy such as shallow
affect, callousness, glibness, while secondary psychopaths display psychopathic
traits on a behavioural level, but are motivated instead by different dispositions, such
as neurotic conflict (for reviews, see Lykken, 1995; Mealey, 1995). The distinction
between primary and secondary presentations has relevance here because it may be
the case that both psychopaths and pseudologues share similar behaviours, like
failing to accept responsibility for their actions, but for psychopaths this may relate
to an entrenched belief that they are superior and above taking responsibility,
whereas the pseudologue’s abdication may be motivated by a fear their inner
vulnerable self will be discovered and rejected.

Exploring the antisocial or psychopathic elements of pathological lying has been an
interesting process, largely because of the division in opinion both within and
between participants. No other area across the data generated such division. There
are several hypotheses as to why this division exists. The first is that there are
potentially different subtypes of pathological liars, as suggested by Daniel, Marie,
Paul, Matthew and Ann. The second is that some of these psychopathic elements
such as manipulation, lack of empathy and maliciousness, are potential correlates to
pathological lying, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient traits. The third
hypothesis is that these features are dimensional and so the degree to which they
present within pathological liars varies person to person. The fourth possibility is
that each of these participants is describing a disparate phenomenon, with some
participants describing clients who are antisocial in their personality structure, and
other participants describing pathological liars without antisocial traits. However,
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this inconsistency in symptomatology is not unique to pathological lying. The
DSM-IV-TR is built on the premise that two people can receive the same diagnosis
and yet have almost completely different symptom profiles. Take for instance
Borderline Personality Disorder; to achieve a diagnosis a person must exhibit five of
a possible nine criteria. That means one person could meet the first five criteria and
receive a diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder. A second person could meet
criteria five through to nine and receive the same diagnosis, and yet the two people
will only have one criteria in common. To illustrate the point further one only needs
to look at the many diagnostic dialectics existent in Major Depressive Disorder.
Four of the nine DSM-IV-TR criteria for Major Depressive Disorder dictate that a
person can experience polar opposite states, such as weight gain or weight loss,
decreased or increased appetite, insomnia or hyperinsomnia, psychomotor agitation
or retardation. As can be seen from these illustrations, it has always been an
accepted convention that two people could bear the same diagnosis but look
significantly different from each other on a variety of behavioural, cognitive and
emotional dimensions.
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5.3.2

Distinguishing

pathological

lying

from

DSM-IV-TR

psychiatric conditions
To establish the existence of pathological lying as a delineable construct it was
considered important to rule out the very real possibility that pathological lying falls
under the jurisdiction of another disorder. With this aim in mind, participants in
Study 2, Part 2, were given DSM-IV-TR criteria for six psychiatric conditions and
asked how they would differentiate or assimilate those DSM conditions from or with
pathological lying. Participants were specifically asked the following questions:
“How are the following conditions different to or the same as
pathological lying? How would you distinguish pathological
lying from lying that presents in the following conditions or
conversely, on what basis would you argue that they are the
same condition?”

Comparable DSM diagnoses were chosen based on their association with
pathological lying in the wider literature. Confabulation was also chosen as a
differential construct, even though it is not represented by its own diagnostic
classification in the DSM. Participants were given a definition of confabulation
from The Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Psychology (Davey, 2005). Table 9 outlines
participant’s responses to this differential diagnosis exercise.
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Table 9
A tabulated representation of how many participants agreed with the idea that pathological lying forms part of another psychiatric
condition
The Disorder of
Comparison

Antisocial
Personality Disorder
Narcissistic
Personality Disorder
Borderline
Personality Disorder
Histrionic
Personality Disorder
Factitious Disorder
Malingering
Confabulation

No. of participants
saying P.L. results
from this
psychiatric
condition and their
case illustrations
support this

No. of participants
saying P.L. doesn’t
result from this
psychiatric
condition and their
case illustrations
support this

No. of participants
saying there’s a
non-necessary link
between both
constructs

No. of participants
saying there isn’t a
link between both
constructs but their
case illustration
meets DSM criteria
for the condition

No. of participants
saying there is a
link between both
constructs but their
case illustrations
don’t meet DSM
criteria

1

8

2

1*

2

3

5

3

-

3

1

10

3

-

-

-

1

7

-

-

-

12
11
13

2
2
1

-

-

Note * This participant believed the two constructs were not linked but their case illustration met criteria for ASPD
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The figures from Table 9 strongly support pathological lying being categorised separately
to the above-listed disorders, with some minority caveats. The DSM disorders noted to
be linked to pathological lying more than 20% of the time were Histrionic Personality
Disorder, Narcissistic Personality Disorder and Borderline Personality Disorder.
Histrionic Personality Disorder was most strongly linked, but this link is qualified by
participants stating that the link was neither necessary nor universal.

Before each participant was asked to compare and contrast pathological lying to the
disorders listed in the above table they were asked whether they believed pathological
lying exists as a distinct disorder that is not the result of an underlying psychiatric
condition or whether they believed pathological lying is a behavioural manifestation of a
formally recognised psychiatric condition. To these questions 12 participants speculated
that pathological lying cannot stand alone as a distinct disorder because it is underpinned
by some form of pathology. These responses seem to directly contradict the figures
presented in Table 9. Dagan, for instance, held that while pathological lying is structured
according to its own parameters, it is also characterised by other “issues”. Dagan gave
the following response when asked if she felt pathological lying can be construed as a
distinct disorder:
Dagan: Yes and no. Yes to the extent that it seems to have its
own kind of parameters, but no because I would expect that a
person that has this kind of problem would tend to have other
issues as well that are underlying that problem.

Overall the participants expressed a general view that pathological lying is underpinned
by a more generic pathological substrate. However, when participants were invited to
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systematically compare and contrast pathological lying to various DSM criteria the
majority of participants came to the position that pathological lying could not be
explained by these other disorders. The majority of participants, who initially assumed
their case study would meet diagnostic criteria for a DSM-IV-TR disorder, were often
surprised to find that this was not the case. In summary, the majority of participants
casually postulated that pathological lying is inextricably linked to some other condition,
however, when they were asked to formally distinguish the constructs there was far more
evidence to support delineation than subsumption of constructs. Furthermore, there was
no single disorder that consistently explained the multifarious features of pathological
lying as discussed by the participants. An overview of the participants’ responses is
given below.

What participants said about Anti Social Personality Disorder:
Eight of the 14 clinicians interviewed came to the conclusion that pathological lying was
not the result of an underlying antisocial personality structure.

An additional one

participant believed pathological lying was not the result of Antisocial Personality
Disorder, but was surprised to discover that their case study met diagnostic criteria for the
disorder. One participant stated that they believed pathological lying was the result of an
antisocial personality structure. Two more agreed that pathological lying was related to
antisocial personality disorder, but the cases they discussed did not meet DSM-IV criteria
for Antisocial Personality Disorder. Two participants felt there could be a relationship
between the two constructs but that the relationship was not necessary. One of the
participants who held the majority view was Dagan. Dagan believed the pervasive nature
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of pathological lying differentiated it from lying that would exist in Antisocial
Personality Disorder on the basis that the pathological liar does not deceive solely to
achieve their desired ends:
Dagan: I don’t think… that by having behaviours that involve
pathological lying that immediately translates to Antisocial
Personality Disorder because, … I think that there can be other
reasons for people engaging in pathological lying from my
experience and if the lies were solely around being able to get
what the person wants I’d be more inclined to think that, but
when we start to see other functions such as, maintaining self
esteem I find it very hard to reconcile that with Antisocial
Personality Disorder.

Mary was another participant to support the differentiation between pathological lying
and Antisocial Personality Disorder. Mary’s reasoning for this view was that the lies, as
told by her case study, were not done with the intention of manipulating or hurting other
people:
Mary: I think I can be clear on that, because I don’t think her lies
were about manipulating and hurting other people, I don’t think
that, that wasn’t her. Her lies were about presenting herself in the
best possible light. They were about, they were definitely about
filling ego; they weren’t about manipulating like the psychopath.

What participants said about Narcissistic Personality Disorder:
Five participants were of the opinion that pathological lying was not the result of an
underlying narcissistic personality structure. Three participants felt that there was a link
between the two constructs but their cases did not support a link. Three participants
believed there was a link between the two constructs but that it was not necessary to have
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Narcissistic Personality Disorder to be a pathological liar. Of the fourteen participants
interviewed three asserted clearly their belief that pathological lying was the result of an
underlying narcissistic personality structure and the cases they discussed supported this
claim. Participant Ann provides a detailed reflection of how pathological lying could
transverse various personality disorders, including Narcissistic Personality Disorder, but
that the type of underlying personality structure will influence the motivational pull that
drives the person to lie:
Ann: …it would go across Antisocial Personality Disorder and
Narcissistic Personality Disorder but the motivation for the lying
might differ and with the narcissistic one, it’s so much about
shoring up the grandiose sense of self which is an impossible
thing to shore up because it’s having no need, no sin you know
it’s like you’re not human. Like any human is going to fail at that
and so you’re going to have to lie, you’re going to have to hide
so yes I think you could definitely be a pathological liar and which I think is one of the difficulties of seeing it as a symptom
of a particular personality disorder because I think its like a
parameter that runs through a lot of personality disorders but it
fits into the personality disorders in different ways because it
serves different motivations because of the structure of those
different personalities and what it is that’s brought them to their
level of functioning or their way of functioning.

Gary, on the other hand, saw narcissism and pathological lying as diametrically opposed,
as illustrated by this quote:
Gary: narcissistic – no. I think it’s kind of opposite for these
kids. Like it’s not that they have this really great sense of you
know it’s the opposite that they feel kind of pretty crummy
inside and don’t feel like connected to other people and just want
to feel a little bit better.
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What participants said about Borderline Personality Disorder:
Ten of the fourteen participants felt pathological lying was not the result of an underlying
borderline personality structure. One participant speculated that the pathological lying
observed in one of his clients was driven by an underlying Borderline Personality
Disorder; however, this participant’s second case was not considered to have borderline
personality traits.

Three participants felt there was some non-necessary association

between the two constructs.

Paul, for example, was of the opinion that Borderline

Personality Disorder was one of the less associated disorders:
Paul: I would have to say probably less, less associated with the
borderline personality disorder in my view. I mean the only
context you may see lying that gets to the pathological lying
point would be trying to protect themselves from abandonment
so they do all that they can including lying perhaps in a
compulsive way to prevent that, but generally I don’t see it as
very related to what I’m thinking of.

What participants said about Histrionic Personality Disorder:
Histrionic Personality Disorder was not originally included as part of the question set, as
it was not flagged in initial research nor in the focus group. However, during the course
of the interviews, two participants, Jessica and Laura, made reference to Histrionic
Personality Disorder. When Jessica was asked what personality characteristics went
hand in hand with pathological lying she responded by saying it was hard to generalise
because she had not seen many pathological liars, but that the cluster B personality
disorders on the narcissistic-histrionic side were more typical of the clients she had seen
with pathological lying traits. When Laura was asked why she felt her case study may
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have had issues with pathological lying she commented on his presentation and style,
stating he was “very melodramatic, quite histrionic and told a good story….” No other
participants voluntarily made reference to Histrionic Personality Disorder nor did they
describe their case studies as having histrionic tendencies, however, for the sake of
clarity it was considered important to re-contact the participants in the study to explicitly
ask their opinion on the matter.

Participants were contacted via email and asked if they thought pathological lying was
the result of an underlying histrionic personality structure. The DSM-IV-TR criteria for
Histrionic Personality Disorder was attached for the participants’ viewing. They were
then given six response options and were encouraged to offer commentary if they felt this
was necessary. The response options were: (1) I think the two constructs are distinct and
that pathological lying is not the result of an underlying histrionic personality structure;
(2) I think pathological lying is the result of an underlying histrionic personality
structure; (3) I think that there is possibly some overlap/link between the two constructs
but that it is not necessary to have Histrionic Personality Disorder to have pathological
lying traits/behaviours; (4) I think there is some link between the two constructs; (5) I am
unsure; (6) provide your own answer. The participants were then asked to optionally
comment on whether they believed their case studies had histrionic traits or if they would
meet DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria for the personality disorder. Eleven participants out
of the original 14 responded to the email. Of the 11 participants who replied they all felt
that there was some link between the two constructs, but were not willing to go as far as
to say pathological lying was the result of a Histrionic Personality Structure.

247

What participants said about Factitious Disorder:
Twelve participants said they felt pathological lying was a construct distinct from
Factitious Disorder. Two believed there was some link or overlap between the two
constructs, but did not go as far as to say Factitious Disorder was the driving force behind
pathological lying. Most participants differentiated the two constructs on the basis that
the lying seen in pathological lying did not centre on or even include deceptions about
illness or assuming a sick role.
interview.

There was one caveat and that came from Ben’s

While one of Ben’s case studies lied about having a fatal illness, Ben

demarcated pathological lying from Factitious Disorder by drawing reference to his case
study’s proclivity for lying across a broad range of life domains and by the appearance
that he was not motivated to assume the sick role. Ben concluded that there was some
overlap or co-morbidity between the two constructs. A quote from Phil’s transcript was
representative of the majority view:
Phil: They weren’t playing the sick role at all. If anything the
opposite of that, it was like, projecting this sort of… “I’m
completely normal, in fact I’m better than normal” type of thing,
so….he….definitely wasn’t hiding behind that.

What participants said about malingering:
Eleven participants said that they believed malingering and pathological lying were
unrelated. Two felt the constructs were closely related, and one participant was unsure
and declined to give an answer. Dagan, for instance explained that the objectives behind
malingering were demarcatable from the objectives served in pathological lying:
Dagan: I think it’s different because I think for malingering
there’s usually an objective and the objective is usually quite
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obvious and it’s usually one type of objective you know and that
is to get out of something, or to get more of something. With
pathological lying I think that it can come from a lot of different
angles and serve different functions rather than just what
malingering tends to do.

Ben similarly held that malingering is defined by the person’s motivation to seek
secondary gains, such as financial imbursement or freedom. Ben reflected that
pathological lying pervades almost all areas of the person’s life and is not restricted to
instances of securing secondary gains:
Ben: No he definitely wasn’t malingering either. I think that the
difference with malingering again is, it’s conscious intentional
with a view to secondary gain and usually financial or some sort
of freedom or something like that as opposed to.

What participants said about confabulation:
Thirteen participants believed confabulation and pathological lying were disparate
constructs with little to no relationship. The two constructs were typically differentiated
on the basis that confabulation represents an organic brain impairment that is
compensated for by the person’s unconscious attempts to explain or fill gaps inherent in
their memory. Pathological lying on the other hand was seen as a form of deception that
originates from desires, such as self-aggrandisement, that were not explained by memory
impairment. Paul gave the following response when asked to consider whether there was
a relationship between confabulation and pathological lying:
Paul: Well confabulation in my mind is when somebody
basically doesn’t remember the facts and makes something up
that, for them is a reasonable explanation of the facts…Whereas
pathological lying is a response, they may remember the facts,
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they may misinterpret the facts, they may not remember all of
the facts, it doesn’t really matter they are going to tell a lie,
which I think for the most part places them in a … in a positive
light or gets them some other sort of a gain.

In the section that follows there will be a demonstration of criteria overlap between
pathological lying and a range of DSM-IV-TR disorders.

5.3.3 The process of examining construct independence
In order to illustrate the degree of construct convergence and divergence, I have listed out
the diagnostic criteria for pathological lying as per the third prototype, and six DSM-IVTR conditions: Anti-Social Personality Disorder; Narcissistic Personality Disorder;
Borderline Personality Disorder; Histrionic Personality Disorder; Factitious Disorder, and
Malingering. I have compared these with the third diagnostic profile of pathological
lying, which combined data from both studies. The six comparison diagnoses were
chosen because of their association with pathological lying in the literature. To achieve
the aforementioned aim I systematically examined each condition’s criteria, looking for
similarities and points of difference. The results of this exercise have been presented in a
table, which shows criteria considered unique to the comparison disorder and criteria
considered relevant to both disorders.
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Table 10
Differential diagnosis of Pathological Lying Disorder (PLD) from Antisocial Personality
Disorder (ASPD), as per DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria and guidelines
.
.

Overlapping criteria

Criteria unique to Antisocial
Personality Disorder

ASPD criterion A.1) Failure to conform to
social norms with respect to lawful behaviours as
indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are
grounds for arrest*.

A.4) Irritability and aggressiveness, as
indicated by repeated physical fights or
assaults*.

PLD criterion B.9) Engages in petty, nonserious acts of crime.

*The irritability and anger observed in PLD
does not typically escalate to the point of
physical aggression.

*The types of crimes identified in PLD are less
serious than the types of crimes identified in
ASPD.
ASPD criterion A.2) Deceitfulness, as indicated
by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning
others for personal profit or pleasure*.

A.5) Reckless disregard for safety of self or
others

PLD criterion A.1) Stability in lying behaviours
across time, with lying occurring at an
abnormally high frequency when compared to
societal standards.
*The lying observed in PLD is not for personal
profit or pleasure.
ASPD criterion A.3) Impulsivity or failure to
plan ahead

A.7) Lack of remorse, as indicated by being
indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt,
mistreated, or stolen from another.

PLD criterion B.3) General impulsivity across a
variety of domains.
ASPD criterion A.6) Consistent irresponsibility,
as indicated by repeated failure to sustain
consistent work behaviour or honour financial
obligations.

C.) There is evidence of conduct disorder with
onset before age 15 years.

PLD criterion B.10) Has difficulties
maintaining stable employment, i.e., frequent job
changes and/or multiple sackings.
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Table 11
Differential diagnosis of Pathological Lying Disorder (PLD) from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder (NPD), as per DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria and guidelines
.

Overlapping criteria

Criteria unique to Narcissistic
Personality Disorder

NPD criterion A.1) Has a grandiose sense of
self-importance (e.g., exaggerates achievements
and talents, expects to be recognized as superior
without commensurate achievements)*.

A.3) Believes that he or she is "special" and
unique and can only be understood by, or
should associate with, other special or highstatus people (or institutions)*

PLD criterion A.4) Falsehoods are selfaggrandising and portray the pseudologue in a
positive light.
Behaviourally these criteria appear similar but
the underling mindset and motivation is very
different. While the pathological liar engages in
exaggerations about their achievements this
appears to come from a place of insecurity rather
than a place of grandiosity as is seen in
narcissism.
A.4) Requires excessive admiration
NPD criterion A.2) Is preoccupied with
fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance,
beauty, or ideal love.
PLD criterion A.4) Falsehoods are selfaggrandising and portray the pseudologue in a
positive light.
NPD criterion A.7) Lacks empathy: is unwilling
to recognize or identify with the feelings and
needs of others*.

A.5) Has a sense of entitlement, i.e.,
unreasonable expectations of especially
favourable treatment or automatic compliance
with his or her expectations.

PLD criterion B.6) Diminished capacity for
empathy, but empathic responding is possible:
can show regard for other people’s feelings,
needs and suffering.
*Empathic potential is greater in PLD than NPD
A.6) Is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes
advantage of others to achieve his or her own
ends
A.8) Is often envious of others or believes that
others are envious of him or her
A.9) Shows arrogant, haughty behaviours or
attitudes
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Table 12
Differential diagnosis of pathological lying disorder (PLD) from Borderline Personality
Disorder (BPD), as per DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria and guidelines
.
.

Overlapping criteria
BPD criterion A. 1) Frantic efforts to avoid real
or imagined abandonment.
PLD criterion B.4) Hypersensitive and
hypervigilant to being criticised, disliked or
rejected, which often results in unhelpful
attempts to secure admiration or positive regard
through lying.
BPD criterion A.3) Identity disturbance:
markedly and persistently unstable self-image or
sense of self.

Criteria unique to Borderline
Personality Disorder
A.2) A pattern of unstable and intense
interpersonal relationships characterized
by alternating between extremes of
idealization and devaluation.

A.6) Affective instability due to a marked
reactivity of mood (e.g., intense episodic
dysphoria, irritability, or anxiety usually
lasting a few hours and only rarely more than a
few days).

PLD criterion B.5) Identity disturbance:
markedly and persistently unstable self-image or
sense of self.
A.7) Chronic feelings of emptiness.
BPD criterion A.4) Impulsivity in at least two
areas that are potentially self-damaging (e.g.,
spending, sex, substance abuse, reckless driving,
binge eating).
PLD criterion B.3) General impulsivity across a
variety of domains.
BPD criterion A.5) Recurrent suicidal
behaviour, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating
behaviour*.

A.8) Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty
controlling anger (e.g., frequent displays of
temper, constant anger, recurrent physical
fights).

PLD criterion B.11) Intermittent suicidal
ideation and para-suicidal gestures.
*Suicidal ideation appears to be less extreme
and less frequent in Pathological Lying
Disorder.
A.9) Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation
or severe dissociative symptoms.
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Table 13
Differential diagnosis of Pathological Lying Disorder (PLD) from Histrionic Personality
Disorder (HPD), as per DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria and guidelines
.
.

Overlapping criteria
None

Criteria unique to Histrionic
Personality Disorder
A.1) Is uncomfortable in situations in which he
or she is not the centre of attention.
A.2) Interaction with others is often
characterized by inappropriate sexually
seductive or provocative behaviour.
A.3) Displays rapidly shifting and shallow
expression of emotions.
A.4) Consistently uses physical appearance to
draw attention to self.
A.5) Has a style of speech that is excessively
impressionistic and lacking in detail.
A.6) Shows self-dramatization, theatricality,
and exaggerated expression of emotion.
A.7) Is suggestible, i.e., easily influenced by
others or circumstances.
A.8) Considers relationships to be more
intimate than they actually are.

254

Table 14
Differential Diagnosis of Pathological Lying Disorder (PLD) from Factitious Disorder
(FD), as per DSM-IV-TR Diagnostic Criteria and Guidelines
.
.

Overlapping criteria
FD criterion C) External incentives for the
behaviours (such as economic gain, avoiding
legal responsibility of improving well-being, as
in Malingering) are absent.

Criteria unique to Factitious
Disorder
A) Intentional production or feigning or
physical or psychological signs or symptoms.

PLD
criterion
A.2)
Falsehoods
are
communicated as a psychological strategy or as
a means of meeting an inner psychological need;
they are not designed by motivation to gain
material objects or financial advancement.
B) The motivation for the behaviour is to
assume the sick role.

Table 15
Differential diagnosis of Pathological Lying Disorder (PLD) from Malingering, as per
DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria and guidelines
.
.

Overlapping criteria
None

Criteria unique to Malingering
The intentional production of false or grossly
exaggerated physical or psychological
symptoms
Motivated by external incentives such as
avoiding military duty, avoiding work,
obtaining financial compensation, evading
criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs.
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Through the process of comparing and contrasting diagnostic criteria it was observed that
construct divergence was sufficient to support phenomenological independence. On
average there was a 26.85% overlap, with a range of 0% (Histrionic Personality Disorder
and Malingering) and 50% (Antisocial Personality Disorder) and a median overlap of
33.3% (Narcissistic Personality Disorder and Factitious Disorder).

Borderline

Personality Disorder had the second highest degree of overlap at 44.4%. While some
may argue that a construct must hold complete neutrality from other constructs to be
considered unique, it is not uncommon for disorders, especially Axis II personality
disorders, to hold overlapping criterion. Herson and Turner (2003) for example, found
that there is up to 50% overlap between the criteria of personality disorder diagnoses;
which is somewhat consistent with the findings of this dissertation.

With regards to Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) four of the core DSM-IV-TR
criteria could be reliably witnessed in the pathological liars seen in both studies,
including: 1) Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviours as
indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest; 2) deceitfulness, as
indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or
pleasure; 2) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead and; 3) consistent irresponsibility, as
indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behaviour or honour financial
obligations. While the DSM-IV-TR stipulates that a person only needs to have three
criterion to be classified as a person with ASPD, the prototypical pathological liar, as
seen in Study 1 and 2, did not meet the core requirements of “pervasive disregard for and
violation of the rights of others occurring since age 15”, nor did they meet the
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requirement of having conduct disorder before age 15. So while there was some criteria
overlap with ASPD, there were key components missing that would exclude the typical
pathological liar from a diagnosis of ASPD. If I were to give an impression of what
separates the two constructs I would say that unlike persons with ASPD, pseudologues
are not motivated by a will to harm others or to gain materially. While their lying does
cause harm, it is neither to the same extreme as ASPD, nor is it achieved in the same
calculating and malicious way. Unlike persons with ASPD, pseudologues do not derive
sadistic and macabre pleasure from their actions, the personal pleasure pseudologues seek
is more akin to self-soothing. The aggression and violence so often observed in ASPD is
also absent in the pseudologue’s makeup. And even though pseudologues may engage in
unlawful behaviours, they are of a less severe nature than what is observed in ASPD.
Differences are also seen in the severity of unlawful behaviour, with pseudologues only
identified as engaging in petty acts of crime in Study 1, Part 2, which compares to more
serious acts by persons with ASPD.

With regards to Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD), the DSM-IV-TR specifies that
individuals must meet five or more of the criteria to attract a formal diagnosis. Again, as
with ASPD, there was some overlap between NDP and pathological lying but not enough
to warrant a collapsing of constructs. From the diagnostic prototype created in section
5.2.2, it is observed that the typical pathological liar would potentially possess three of
the nine criterions for NPD, falling short of the diagnostic threshold. When formulating
the differential diagnosis profile between Pathological Lying Disorder and Narcissistic
Personality Disorder the main point of difference seemed to be the concept of
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grandiosity. Potentially what is observed in pathological liars is a narcissistic defence,
rather than a primary form of narcissism. For instance, while the pathological liar does
engage in exaggerations about their achievements, these exaggerations mostly come from
a place of insecurity rather than a place of grandiosity. In contrast to the Narcissist, the
pseudologue’s schemas do not reflect a person who believes they are special or unique.
And while there may be occasions where pseudologues manipulate others, the majority of
their actions are not governed by motivations of interpersonal exploitation. Potentially
what underlies these constructural differences is a disparity in empathic potential, with
pseudologues possessing greater capacity to empathically engage with the feelings and
needs of others than narcissists.

Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) was also examined as a possible alternative to
pathological lying, and again, while there was some overlap, with the typical
pseudologue ticking four of the nine criterion boxes for BPD, this did not meet the
diagnostic requirement of five or more criteria. The DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria for
Borderline Personality Disorder does not state that persons with this disorder struggle
with telling the truth. However, there is a reasonable expectation that some persons with
BPD will engage in fabrications of aberrational proportions. The point of difference
appears to be that deception is not a hallmark characteristic of BPD and when they do
deceive it is more than likely done in a realistic way, probably to avoid real or imagined
abandonment or combat feelings of emptiness. Because persons with BPD are generally
impulsive, it is likely that they find themselves in situations where they impulsively
respond in a fictitious fashion, which would be similar to pseudologues. With that said,
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a person can have BPD without regularly engaging in lying, which is why criterion A.1
from the pathological lying disorder diagnostic prototype has not be placed in the
overlapping criterion section. In contrast to individuals with BPD, pseudologues do not
have pronounced issues with affective instability, labile mood, intense anger, nor do they
show relationship instability in the sense of oscillating between idealising and devaluing
friends and partners. Pseudologues do, however, experience relationship breakdowns,
which may give the impression of relationship instability.

While the majority of participants from Study 2, Part 2 believed Histrionic Personality
Disorder was in some way linked to pathological lying, when the two disorders were
systematically compared, none of their criteria were considered similar. One of the areas
of difference pertained to inappropriate sexualised and seductive behaviour, which is
typical of persons with Histrionic Personality Disorder, but not typical of pseudologues.

With regards to Factitious Disorder, only one criterion overlapped with pathological
lying: criterion C “External incentives for the behaviours (such as economic gain,
avoiding legal responsibility of improving well-being, as in Malingering) are absent”.
The main area of difference is that unlike persons with Factitious Disorder, the lies told
by pseudologues are not specifically related to or confined to assuming a sick role and
can relate to a multitude of topics. It is likely, however, that some individuals would
qualify for a dual diagnosis of both disorders.
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Apart from the admission of deceptive behaviour, malingering showed no conceptual
similarity to pathological lying. This is most evident in the resounding evidence that
pathological liars are not motivated by external, measurable gains such as avoiding
military duty; they are instead driven to meet an internal need. If a person does malinger,
they should only be considered for a diagnosis of pathological lying if they exhibit lying
behaviours in a range of other contexts not bound by external inducements.

The degree and type of overlap seen between pathological lying and the cluster B
personality disorders may indicate that pathological lying is a disorder of the self-construct
rather than a neurotic Axis I disorder. This is not to say that pathological lying can be
accounted for by a particular personality disorder, but there is a strong impression that
some of the core features underpinning all personality disorders are also common to
pseudologues. Most notably, there appears to be an underlying identity or self-disturbance.
I draw reference to the DSM-IV-TR that specifies six general diagnostic criteria for a
personality disorder. Among the criteria is that a person needs to demonstrate an enduring
pattern of inner experience and behaviour that deviates markedly from the expectations of
the individual’s culture, as manifested in two or more of the following: 1) cognition; 2)
affectivity; 3) interpersonal function and 4) impulse control. After familiarising myself
with the data I can comfortably say this criteria applies to pseudologues in that they
possess marked deviations in the way they think, function interpersonally and in how they
regulate their impulses. In addition, the excess to which they take their lying would be
viewed as a serious transgression against social moral codes. I have no doubt that a typical
pathological liar would meet three of the four elements of this first criterion resoundingly.
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The second criterion is that the enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad
range of personal and social situations.

With regards to this criteria I express zero

hesitation in saying there is an overwhelming majority opinion that pathological lying is a
pervasive and entrenched pattern of behaviour that cuts across a whole manner of contexts.
The third DSM-IV-TR criterion for general personality disorder is that the enduring pattern
leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning. Again, my interpretation of the literature is that this
criterion is common to most pseudologues.

The literature shows that pseudologues

unwittingly place themselves at incredible and repeated risk of losing employment,
relationships and damaging their reputation.

Personality disorders are also generally

characterised by the DSM as a pattern that is stable and of long duration, and its onset can
be traced back at least to adolescence or early adulthood.

Again, this is extremely

consistent with the picture drawn from all studies. The fifth criterion expresses that the
pattern cannot be better accounted for as a manifestation or consequence of another mental
disorder, and the sixth criterion specifies that the enduring pattern cannot be due to the
direct physiological effects of a substance or general medical condition. Both of these
criteria are applicable to pathological lying. What’s more, when broader, non DSM,
conceptualisations of personality disorders are taken into account, they too fit with the
characteristics seen in pathological liars. This includes, but is not limited to pervasive and
severe identity disturbances and ego-impairments.

When considering lying, as it presents co-morbidly with personality disorders, it is
important to look at the person’s other symptoms and patterns to determine whether they
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would meet criteria for a specific personality disorder and whether the function of the lie
relates to a key element of that disorder. For example, if someone meets criteria for
Borderline Personality Disorder and a practitioner was trying to ascertain whether the
person’s lies meet separate and concurrent criteria for Pathological Lying Disorder, they
would need to exclude the following functions before being confident that the lies were not
inextricably linked to the primary diagnosis of BPD: whether the lies were a form of selfharm; whether the lies were in service of compensating for real or imagined abandonment;
whether the lies were compensating for identity instability; whether the lies were told in
the context of devaluing or idealising another person, or to compensate for chronic feelings
of emptiness.

In summary, this chapter holds great significance in its deconstruction of pathological lying
and the identification of which elements make it pathological or disordered.

These

elements have been enumerated into a set of diagnostic criteria, which formed the basis for
systematic comparisons between pathological lying and a target group of psychiatric
constructs. One of the significant findings of this chapter is that there are enough unique
features to demarcate pathological lying from existing diagnostic categories.

The

conclusion of this thesis, which outlines the key achievements, limitations and future
directions, will follow.
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CONCLUSION
“People think that a liar gains a victory over his victim. What I’ve learned is that a lie is
an act of self-abdication, because one surrenders one’s reality to the person to whom one
lies, making that person one’s master, condemning oneself from then on to faking the
sort of reality that person’s view requires to be faked…The man who lies to the world, is
the world’s slave from then on…There are no white lies, there is only the blackest of
destruction, and a white lie is the blackest of all.”
- Ayn Rand
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The overarching aim of this thesis has been to identify and stabilise the key features of
pathological lying and provide a consistent description. Secondary to this aim, was the
ambition to clarify, if possible whether pathological lying could be recognised as a
distinct condition with formal diagnostic criteria. A third aim has been to broaden and
deepen the understanding of this perplexing condition. Specific aims at the beginning of
each chapter supported these. The work in this thesis has given a clearer understanding
of pathological lying, an understanding that can now help inform psychiatry’s approach
to identifying pathological liars and hopefully progress the way in which mental health
professionals conceptualise and treat persons affected by it.

With regards to the first aim, I have arrived at five separate but complementary
descriptions of pathological lying arising from three different data sources. The first
description was a tangible outcome of Study 1, Part 1’s literature review and was created
by comparing and contrasting 32 published definitions. By arranging the definitions
according to theme strength, I was able to identify 11 themes that carried an authors’
endorsement rating of 20% or more. I then combined these 11 themes into a definitional
description, which can be viewed on page 65. This process reflected that while no
definitional consensus exists, there are some key elements that appear consistently in
working definitions of the construct. It also provided an opportunity to discard some of
the weaker themes and concentrate on the themes that are inextricably and historically
linked to the core construct.
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The second description was drawn out in Study 1, Part 2, when I developed an
empirically supported profile of pathological lying that was based on 64 case study
reports. This time, there were 11 themes that carried an endorsement rating of 50% or
more, indicating that there is more theme consistency when comparing case studies as
opposed to comparing definitions. These themes formed a profile, which was then
converted into a provisional diagnostic prototype (third description), outlined in Chapter
Five. Again this process highlighted that while individual nuances exist between cases,
there are enough common characteristics to support a claim for construct autonomy.
While there were some areas of thematic divergence between Study 1 Part 1 (definitions
from literature) and Study 1 Part 2 (64 case studies) as discussed in Chapter 2, all
descriptions overlapped in the main, with no significant contradictory themes identified.

The fourth description emerged from Study 2, Part 2, which also aimed to stabilise the
construct’s identity, but this time it was done through thematic analysis of 14 interview
transcripts and 21 unique case studies. One of the exciting outcomes of this work has
been the development of diagnostic criteria, which is based on these repeated clinical
observations. The diagnostic profile derived from this data is outlined in Chapter Five.
The final description was again formatted as proposed diagnostic criteria, but this time
the criteria combined the two data sources – 64 case studies and 14 interview transcripts.

The second central aim of this thesis was to clarify whether pathological lying could be
recognised as a distinct condition with formal diagnostic criteria. Participants from
Study 2, Part 2 were asked how they would conceptualise pathological lying to be
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different to or the same as several psychiatric conditions. Many participants initially
assumed that pathological lying would be accounted for or at least linked to another
DSM-IV-TR disorder, however, when asked to systematically distinguish constructs,
criterion by criterion, most participants came to realise that no one DSM-IV-TR
condition could account for pathological lying. In Chapter Five I developed differential
diagnosis tables showcasing diagnostic overlap and delineation between pathological
lying and a target group of DSM-IV-TR disorders.

This process highlighted that

elements of pathological lying overlap with Cluster B personality disorders, but that
enough feature divergence exists to support its own categorisation as a condition.

The third and final main aim was to broaden and deepen an understanding of this
perplexing condition. This aim was achieved throughout the thesis, but one of the more
notable contributions came from Study 1, Part 2, where aetiological risk factors were
identified and organised according to frequency across 64 case study reports. Another
significant contribution came from Study 2, Part 2, where participants discussed and
reflected on aetiological and motivational factors. According to the trends identified in
both studies traumatogenic aetiological factors prevail over physiological factors. It was
also observed that intrapsychic motivations determined pseudologue’s behaviours over
and above external incentives. It is noted, however, that greater evidence of
neurobiological determinants may emerge once larger subject samples become available.
It is also important to note that it is not yet clear whether the prevalence of trauma
identified across the studies was clinically significant and exceeds rates of trauma in the
general population.
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Intrapsychic function of pathological lying
With regards to this third aim, I have considered in depth the aetiological and
motivational data, initially addressed in Study 1, Part 2 and Study 2, Part 2. When I first
came across Yang et al.’s (2007) study I was excited that research into pathological lying
was finally moving into a new “scientific” frontier. In some respects finding a causal
neurobiological substrate to explain pathological lying would make the case for defining
and understanding pathological lying more convincing and urgent. As much as I desired
to trust Yang et al.’s (2007) methods and conclusions, and as much as it would have been
exciting to confirm King and Ford’s (1988) summation that 40% of pseudologues possess
central nervous system dysfunction, I could not be convinced that there was enough data,
as it currently stands, to support a unitary and specific neurobiological theory. In other
words, there was no one part of the brain that was reliably implicated in the development
and/or perpetuation of pathological lying. The theory that appears more consistent with
the literature is that pathological lying emerges in the context of deep psychosocial
disturbances, such as losing a parent prematurely, and that lying develops as a
psychological strategy aimed at protecting the pseudologue from these disturbances.

More specifically, pathological lying appears to represent an immature and primitive
psychological defence response, reminiscent of someone who runs away from realities
rather than finding ways to accommodate and adjust to them. This suggests that the level
of life distress experienced outweighs the internalised resources pseudologue’s possess to
deal with those stressors. Primitive defence responses are so labelled because they are a
first line defence, often originating in childhood. When expressed in childhood they can
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be useful, but when continued into adulthood they often lose their effectiveness and the
long-term consequences begin to offset the original benefits. For example, if a young
child is faced with an immovable stressor, denying its existence can help them cope in the
moment. If, however, an adult faces the same stressor, but because of their age, strength
and resources, they are now capable of moving away from the stressor, denying its
existence will result in unnecessary exposure. Pseudologia fantastica seems to fall into
this category of primitive defence because it involves the denial of reality. Such denial
processes deviate markedly from coping strategies employed by most mentally sound
adults, who in contrast form strategies that allow them to acknowledge, adjust to and
integrate distressing or uncomfortable phenomena. It is as one participant, Ann, said in
Study 2, Part 2 that perhaps the other strategies that the rest of us would do rather than
lying have atrophied and fallen out of their behavioural repertoire.

Many of the pathological lies described in the literature and in the studies of this thesis
behaviourally resemble one of two primitive defence types, a narcissistic defence and a
victim defence. In the context of a narcissistic defence the falsehoods are designed to
mask the painful inadequacies of the pseudologue’s existence and project an image that
casts them in good favour. The behaviours associated with the defence may mimic a
narcissistic personality structure, but closer examination of the underlying psyche reveals
a very opposite reality, that is, the pseudologue is a person dominated by feelings of
shame, worthlessness, failure, rejection, emptiness and brokenness, thus why it is labelled
a narcissistic defence as opposed to pure narcissism. In the context of the victim defence,
the pseudologue repeatedly projects a false or exaggerated image of sufferance and
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victimisation that provides refuge from responsibility and inadequacy and/or elicits
caring and sympathy from others. Over time pseudologues of both defence persuasions
develop fantasies about a wished for ideal that often feels cruelly beyond their grasp. As
the gap between their reality and the life they yearn for expands it starts to become too
distressing, too devastating, and so they come to prefer the company of their fantastical
confabulations over and above activating beneficial changes in their life.

The

pseudologue creates these stories as much for their own pleasure as they do for their
audiences, which is why it is understandable that they may from time to time suspend
disbelief and allow themselves to fall down the rabbit hole and become duped by their
own fictions. The defence can also resemble a dissociative daydream that protects the
pseudologue from integrating real and perceived horrors into their world and self-view.
On an inter and intra-personal level they appear socially outcast and overrun by inner
demons, which prevent them from ever truly connecting authentically to themselves and
the world around them.

Both defence types work to keep others at a manipulable

distance, protecting their inner self from ever being discovered, rejected, or negatively
evaluated. Deep down, underneath all of the lies, there appears to exist a sadness that
cannot be quashed, a need for acceptance that cannot be quenched and a denial of one’s
self-worth that generates such intense pain that they flee the feelings by hiding
themselves behind a labyrinth of lies.

With regards to some of the other aims articulated throughout this thesis I have identified
the volume and type of literature dedicated to the focal construct, which confirms Dike’s
(2008) assertion that pathological lying tinkers on the fringes of psychiatric research.
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Very little research exists, and the research that does exist holds questionable validity
because of the lack of consensus around diagnosis and definition. In response to the
dearth of research I developed a more objective and more scientific research method –
interviewing multiple clinicians about their experiences with pathological liars both
clinically and non-clinically. I am unaware of any similarly designed study across the
pathological lying literature. This research approach served the purpose of providing
rich exploratory data on a population that by all accounts is difficult to identify and
recruit for research. By targeting clinicians rather than pseudologues the information I
gathered was undoubtedly more extensive, more clinically relevant and was less subject
to deception and prevarication. Through this interview method I was able to identify that
“pathological lying” is a widely recognised expression, with all clinicians expressing
some acquaintance with the term. However, not all clinicians were comfortable using the
term in a clinical context because of its pejorative connotations. While it may well be the
case that the term carries stigmatising weight, its strength as a term of reference lies in its
recognisability and in its acknowledgement that it is a condition of pathological
proportions. It is unclear if an alternative term would increase empathic understanding,
or if it too, would eventually become marred by association with liars.
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Limitations and future directions
Chapters One and Two detailed the methodological limitations that abound in the preexisting literature, with a particular focus on the difficulties related to case study-based
research. The principal concerns expressed were that case study research is limited in its
ability to foster generalisable, reliable, and valid phenomenological assertions, and as
such, has long been viewed as a less sophisticated, front-line investigation tool. Despite
the limitations surrounding case study research, Study 1, Part 2 and Study 2, Part 2, used
case studies as a primary data source. The reason I have opted for this method is the
same as previous researchers - the choices for alternative methodology are extremely
limited and will remain limited until formally ratified diagnostic criteria are established.
Because large-scale experimental design was ruled out as a feasible option, I reassessed
the value of case-study material and considered ways in which I could enhance its
integrity and provide a more integrated, holistic clinical picture of pathological lying.
Two ideas came to mind, the first was to meta-analyse published case studies from a
variety of sources, the second was to interview a sample of clinicians and ask them to
describe multiple cases. Both ideas resulted in a larger collection of cases and therefore a
more nomothetic understanding. And so while the case study limitations apply to the
outcomes of Study 1 and 2, the impact of these limitations has been tempered by the
utilisation of meta-analytic methods.

One of the more central limitations of this thesis is the potential for multilayered
researcher bias. Two levels of bias need to be understood and openly acknowledged.
The first comes from the original clinician who has had direct contact with the person
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described in the case study. In Study 1, Part 2 the clinician was usually a psychiatrist,
psychiatry registrar, psychologist, social worker or a psychotherapist. In Study 2, Part 2,
the clinician was either a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist. The information reported
by these clinicians about their case studies is naturally influenced by a multitude of
factors including their years and type of clinical and personal experience, gender, age,
nationality,

ethnicity,

training quality, training type, theoretical

philosophies,

paradigmatical leanings, clinical designation, treatment models, transference experiences
and so forth.

Because it is impossible for them to relay everything about a case,

clinicians must decide, consciously or not, what information they include and what
information they omit, which means the interpretations they finally come to are
unavoidably subjective and cannot be verified or corroborated (Shaughnessy,
Zechmeister & Zechmeister, 2006). Anyone reading these case study reports has little
recourse to question or seek clarification on what has been published and has to take the
clinician’s statements at face value (Song et al., 2010).

The second level of bias requiring consideration is the bias of the meta-analyser.
Essentially the meta-analyser brings into the equation their own predispositions, which
are influenced by the same factors cited above. Invariably the meta-analyser will read,
interpret, critique and present the data in a manner that fits comfortably with how they
typically make sense of information and they will unintentionally discard, overlook,
reshape, misinterpret, misunderstand or ignore data that falls outside their area of training
or expertise. This type of bias is commonly referred to as confirmation or citation bias
(Baneyx, 2008; Dickersin, Chan, Chalmers, Sacks & Smith, 1987; Easterbrook, Berlin,
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Gopalan & Matthews, 1991; Wickens & Hollands, 2000). Citation bias occurs when
authors use or discard citations on the basis of confirming their argument (Gotzsche,
1987; Ravnskov, 1995). Generally speaking, a citation is more likely to be included in a
publication if its results or views support the author’s argument (Gotzsche, 1987;
Ravnskov, 1995). The parts of this dissertation most vulnerable to citation bias would be
the thematic analysis of the case studies for Study 1, Part 2 and the nomothetic profile
arrived at for Study 2, Part 2. These sections are most at risk because there is an inherent
and human temptation to include quotes, which are weakly correlated to a theme, in order
to bolster the perceived strength of any one theme; ultimately, citation bias can make a
theme look better supported than it actually is. Measures taken to minimise this type of
bias included using a focus group to construct interview questions (which become theme
categories) rather than use researcher-determined questions, utilising the services of an
independent rater and scorer in Study 2, Part 2, subjecting the data and their
corresponding analyses to supervisor scrutiny, and meticulously detailing and describing
the processes used to arrange and interpret the data so external examination and
replication could be possible. Despite these legitimate efforts, it is acknowledged that it
would have been best practice to enlist the services of one or two independent raters who
could have co-analysed the 64 case studies from Study 1, Part 2 and co-analysed all
transcripts from Study 2, Part 2; a measure that was considered beyond the scope of this
dissertation.

Despite these limitations, there was a senior psychologist, (primary

supervisor), who oversaw the entire process and who also audited the systems used to
generate the data and data-analysis of this dissertation.
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A limitation that is associated with the design of Study 2, Part 2 is retrospective recall
error. Recall error occurs when participants are asked to draw on memories of past
events, which was required of the clinicians in Study 2. Research has informed us that
retrospectively designed studies, such us this one, are susceptible to validity threats,
which are confounded by methodological problems associated with the participant’s
memory, selective perception and recall bias (e.g., Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Oberauer &
Lewandowsky, 2008; Sprangers & Hoogstraten, 1989). With regards to Study 2, Part 2,
there were a number of participants who were relaying details about cases that had
transpired years before the interview; in fact none of the cases were classified as current,
which raises questions about memory interference effects. In an effort to minimise recall
errors, I chose not to provide my own definition of pathological lying, so that participants
would not conform their responses to this definition. I also preferenced open-ended
questions over and above closed-answer questions for two reasons, firstly, the recall
memory required to answer open questions is regarded to be less vulnerable to
contamination, and secondly, it is harder for participants to mould their answers to the
researcher’s expectations when asked open-ended questions.

Despite the concerns about sample size, a deliberate decision was made to use qualitative
techniques over and above quantitative in Study 2, Part 2. This decision was considerate
of the dilemma that while greater numbers of clinicians could have been accessed if
different methods were utilised, such as questionnaires, it would have been inappropriate
to use such methods because the foundation work of defining and understanding the
construct needed to be done first; this investigative groundwork could not have been done
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without first using qualitative techniques such as interviews.

Now that there is a

provisional diagnostic prototype, it is possible to utilise quantitative methods to verify
these preliminary findings. With regards to future directions, I would like to disseminate
the proposed criteria to a large consortium of clinicians and receive their written feedback
on the criteria. It is anticipated that consensus around symptom frequency will increase
when practitioners are asked to explicitly consider certain features.

One of the questions that I have about outcome validity is whether or not the case studies
captured for this thesis are representative of all types of pseudologues or whether, in fact,
this thesis is capturing a specific type of pathological liar. It is important to consider
whether the pseudologues who come to treatment and/or get revealed as habitual liars are
qualitatively different to pseudologues who remain avoidant of treatment and/or
undetected as liars. In Study 1, Part 2, I alluded to the possibility that pseudologues that
get caught out as liars and then become subjects for publishable case study material may
represent a lower-functioning subtype, a subtype, which does not possess adequate
executive functioning to lie skilfully.

Alternatively, pseudologues who seek out

treatment may represent individuals who possess more insight into their condition and/or
may represent a subtype who experience their behaviour as ego-dystonic. It is also
feasible that pseudologues who avoid treatment may represent a “treatment resistant”
variant, which is more entrenched and therefore more difficult to treat. One of the
advantages of Study 2, Part 2’s design was that non-clinical cases were discussed
alongside clinical ones, giving a broader and more generalisable examination of the
construct. This was considered important in light of the concern that adept prevaricators
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and/or pseudologues reluctant to seek treatment would be excluded from clinical case
studies. It would be recommended that future research pursuits engage both clinical and
non-clinical samples of pseudologues and run comparisons to see if there are qualitative
and important differences. Such an investigation would elucidate whether there should
be a bi-modal or multi-modal grouping of pathological liars or whether it can justifiably
sit as a unitary diagnostic classification.

Much of what researchers are trying to determine is the mental state and inner workings
of the pathological liar; one of the limits of this type of research is that it is hard to arrive
at convincing conclusions about cognitive and affective processes especially when
relying upon indirect measures such as therapeutic disclosures and behavioural
observations. Clinicians and researchers are therefore left to infer what is going on in the
mind of the pseudologue, which is problematic given their proclivity towards duplicity.
This may explain my observation that consensus was lowest when it came to comments
about the person’s mental or emotional state, such as, do pseudologues become deceived
by their own mendacities, do they intentionally fabricate, do they experience guilt or
distress when lying, and do they have awareness or insight into the problematic nature of
their lying. The state of our current understanding would appreciably benefit from
research that captures the inner mindset of the pseudologue; how this would be achieved,
however, is not yet clear, although Powell, Gudjonsson and Mullen’s (1983) guilty
knowledge test may be one example of how lie detecting technology could be used to
measure physiological arousal in identified pseudologues.
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In Study 1, Part 2 children under the age of 10 were excluded, out of concern that
normative child behaviour would be misinterpreted as pathological lying. In Study 2,
Part 2, the youngest case study was in his mid adolescence. The absence of child data is
problematic, especially given most of the evidence supports that this is a condition, which
originates in childhood and/or adolescence and takes on a lifelong course. In future it
would be advisable that researchers consider pathological lying as it presents within
children, adolescents and adults with a view to developing modified criteria, which takes
into account the nosological differences between age groups.

Despite these limitations, this thesis is a substantial body of work, which illuminates the
nosology of pathological lying to a depth and degree not published since 1915 (Healy &
Healy, 1915). Readers can take confidence in knowing that all efforts were made to
follow reliable and valid methods for data extraction and analysis and that the findings
presented here are an accurate representation of the construct.
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Future Directions
It is evident that research standards cannot progress until definitional consensus is
reached and a measure is developed to reliably and validly identify pathological liars.
There needs to be further evidence to support the results presented here. The next step
would be to take the provisional diagnostic prototypes presented in the previous chapter
and disseminate them to a large number of mental health professionals for feedback and
scrutiny. The feedback would be used to determine criteria fit and to guide the removal
of inappropriate criteria and the addition of overlooked criteria.

Once large-scale

scrutiny is completed we will be better positioned to create a psychometric tool that can
identify pathological liars. Given deceit and low self-awareness sit at the heart of this
condition, it may be appropriate to create a questionnaire that can be completed by family
or friends as well as the identified patient. Once a measure has undergone the rigorous
testing needed to establish validity and reliability coefficients, it could be used clinically
to identify and differentiate clients who possess pseudological traits, track treatment
progress and recruit pathological liars for randomised controlled studies.

The ultimate aim of my research was to feel closer to an understanding of why this
phenomenon occurs and how we can properly identify and treat it. Listening to the
participants from Study 2, Part 2 and reading the case studies from Study 1, Part 2
reinforced to me that this is a slippery condition to identify and treat. I am fascinated by
people’s experiences in treating this condition. I found for example, Dithrich’s (1991)
case study extremely informative and I have since placed greater emphasis on observing
people’s pseudological defences rather than challenging them, and using the content of

278

their fantasies to guide my understanding of their internalised conflicts and dilemmas.
Despite collecting information about treatment during the interviews of Study 2, Part 2, a
summary of those findings is considered beyond the scope of this thesis. In the future, I
would like to write up an interpretation of this data. An indication of what was said by
the clinicians includes: long-term psychotherapy is a must; even intensive in-patient
therapies are not enough to shift the entrenched and protracted lying patterns; the
therapist often experiences confusion, perplexion and negative counter-transference; the
impulse to lie can become so automatic and immovable that treatment needs to target the
aftermath over and above the prevention, for instance what they should do once the lie
escapes; that developing therapeutic safety is key and, that helping the person develop a
more robust sense of self is imperative.

In final summary, this thesis represents an enormously exciting achievement – the
identification and stabilisation of the nebulous condition known as pathological lying or
pseudologia fantastica. Across the research I have not been able to locate a body of work
that has gone to such depths to try and delineate the core constellation of symptoms and
corresponding aetiological predispositions. One of the most powerful and potentially
transforming outcomes of this thesis is the establishment of diagnostic criteria, which has
proven delineable from other closely associated conditions. This achievement puts to bed
doubts around whether pathological lying exists and whether or not it can be
distinguished from other disorders. Once the diagnostic criteria established in this thesis
undergoes rigorous re-testing, it can be used as a basis for identifying and recruiting
pathological liars for large-scale scientific study, which will effectively transform how
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we examine this population.

This achievement cannot be understated, as for years

pathological lying research has lingered behind other areas of psychiatric interest, and it
is only now that we have diagnostic criteria, that research in this area can emerge from
the dark ages of relying on case study data and into more robust and convincing
experimental design.
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Afterword
Having reached the final stages of my research, I find myself no less fascinated by this
condition and the people it affects. Working with pathological liars has provided me with
an opportunity to anecdotally examine the applicability of my research findings to real
life cases. So far, I have found no inconsistencies between the research and my clinical
experience. What is more, the colleagues that have sought my counsel have found the
research to be helpful and illuminating. When I share these research findings with clients
they report feeling relieved and understood, it is as if this information reassures them that
they are not “freaks”, or “bad” nor are they alone, and nor is it a simple life dilemma that
they can wish themselves out of. I have also had a few of the participants from Study 2,
Part 2, approach me to say that they have come across new pathological liars since being
interviewed, and that they now feel more confident in detecting and understanding the
once bizarre and rare presentation.

I have been reassured by how closely the aetiological data overlaps with what I have
observed in my own clients. One of the more reliable aetiological features is attachment
disruption, with every one of my clients and every case I have consulted on, experiencing
some variation of attachment trauma during their formative years.

The spread of

attachment disruption has included: an adolescent male who went into foster care at the
age of two; an adolescent female who never knew her father because she was born out of
an extramarital affair; an adolescent whose father refused to live with her and her family
and then secretly married another woman before moving interstate, and a man who was
placed into boarding school from four and half years of age. I am not the first person to
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draw a link between attachment trauma and lying, with Hughes (1997) finding a
connection between the two constructs in both research and clinical experience. My
provisional formulation is that attachment trauma rocks the foundation of a person’s selfworth; it is as if these children grow up with an impregnable doubt about their goodness
and ‘lovability’. The self-narrative may well look like “if the people who are meant to
love me don’t, who will?” Or, “if the one person in the world who is meant to stand by
me forever, hasn’t, who would?” Being left, abandoned, overlooked or abused by the one
person who is entrusted to love us unconditionally conjures up unbearable pain. Left
behind are scars that are vulnerable to re-opening and so these children grow up
hypervigilant and sensitised to any new form of disapproval or rejection. The lying that I
have seen emerge in these clients appears to provide them with safe harbour from being
forgotten, disliked, or viewed disapprovingly.

Across all of the cases I have personally worked with or consulted on, it was evident that
they have grown up without a script or model for securing attention and love through
healthy or socially accepted avenues. These clients have instead come to believe that
lying can draw people in while simultaneously keeping their inner self private and
protected against repudiation.

Across the various cases I have identified at least nine

different functions of pathological lying: 1) to manufacture a sense of control in a world
that feels beyond their control; 2) to secure positive regard from others and inflate their
likeability; 3) to gain and hold other people’s attention in a world where they feel
forgotten and overlooked; 4) to elicit care, concern or sympathy from others, especially in
neglectful family systems; 5) to avoid being held in negative regard and/or feel any form
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of disapproval or rejection; 6) to deny painful realities, such as having no friends; 7) to
deny and distract themselves from genuine trauma, such as sexual abuse; 8) to give the
impression of being amazingly talented, and 9) to disguise feelings of self-rebuke and
worthlessness.

With each of these functions I have worked closely with the client to

come up with alternative strategies for meeting their needs so that they can let go of the
habit of lying.

In my foreword I hoped that the insights gained from my research would provide
practitioners with a clearer understanding of pathological lying and the ways in which it
could be treated. I cannot yet speak to the effects this research will have on others, but I
can speak about the personal impact it has had on me. I now feel more confident that this
is a condition of unique parameters that requires skilful therapeutic examination. I
believe that it is now more evident that an internal need motivates the pseudologue to lie
and that key to engaging, understanding and treating this group, is finding out the
psychological function of the behaviour. I have greater appreciation for the fragility that
underscores this phenomenon, and that therapists need to create an environment that feels
safe and containing before gently unwrapping the outer layers of their client’s defence. I
have more and more confidence that the lying observed across pseudologues represents a
defensive manoeuvre that has accompanied them for so long that they cannot identify
when it started, or why, nor do they realise with absolute conscious awareness when and
how it operates. My compassion for pathological liars has grown, and grows ever more
broadly when I consider for a second the enormous costs they come to bear. I remember
the insightful words of one the participants from Study 2, Part 2, Ann, who said she had
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previously focused so much on the hurt and costs to others that she had overlooked the
enormous interpersonal cost that comes from never being truly authentic in this world.
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Appendix One

Table 16
Search Results From PsycArticles Database, Retrieved March 2009
Search term entered
into database search
engine

Number of retrieved
search results

Number of relevant
search results

Number of
irrelevant search
results

Pathological Lying

56

1

55

Pathological Liar

0

0

0

Pathological Lies

1

0

1

Pseudologia
fantastica
Mythomania

14

2

12

3

1

2

Chronic Lying

5

0

5

Chronic Liar

0

0

0

Compulsive Lying

2

0

2

Compulsive Liar

3

0

3

Impulsive Lying

0

0

0

Impulsive Liar

0

0

0

Habitual Lying

5

0

5

Habitual Liar

2

0

2

Abnormal lying

1

0

1

Problematic Lying
(March 2010)
Problematic Liar
(march 2010)
Lying

1

0

1

0

0

0

9336

?

?

309

Table 17
Search Results From ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Database, Retrieved June 2010
Search term entered Number of retrieved Number of relevant Number of
into database search search results
search results
irrelevant search
engine
results
Pathological Lying

4

0

4

Pathological Liar

2

1

1

Pathological Lies

0

0

0

Pseudologia
Fantastica
Mythomania

0

0

0

2

0

2

Chronic Lying

0

0

0

Chronic Liar

0

0

0

Compulsive Lying

1

? French Text

? French Text

Compulsive Liar

0

0

0

Impulsive Lying

0

0

0

Impulsive Liar

0

0

0

Habitual Lying

0

0

0

Habitual Liar

0

0

0

Abnormal lying

0

0

0

Problematic Lying

0

0

0

Problematic Liar

0

0

0

3324

?

?

Lying
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Table 18
Search Results From PsychInfo Database, RetrievedJune 2011
Search term entered
into database search
engine

Number of retrieved
search results

Number of relevant
search results

Number of irrelevant
search results

Pathological Lying

69

37

32

Pathological Liar

10

4

6

Pathological Lies

2

1

1

Pseudologia
Fantastica
Pseudologia
Phantastica
Mythomania

41

29

12

31

16

15

51

32

19

Mythomanic

8

4

4

Chronic Lying

2

1

1

Chronic Liar

0

0

0

Compulsive Lying

2

2

0

Compulsive Liar

2

1

1

Impulsive Lying

1

0

1

Impulsive Liar

0

0

0

Habitual Lying

1

0

1

Habitual Liar

3

2

1

Abnormal lying

0

0

0

Problematic Lying

0

0

0

Problematic Liar

0

0

0

3351

?

?

Lying
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Table 19
Search Results From Pubmed Database, Retrieved June 2011
Search term entered
into database search
engine

Number of retrieved
search results

Number of relevant
search results

Number of irrelevant
search results

Pathological lying

23

13

10

Pathological liar

4

1

3

Pathological Lies

2366

?

?

27

21

6

Pesudologia
Fantastica
Pseudologia
Phantastica
Mythomania

12

8

4

17

14

3

Mythomanic

1

0

1

1040

0

1040

Chronic Liar

1

0

1

Compulsive Lying

30

3

27

Compulsive Liar

1

1

0

Impulsive Lying

27

1

26

Impulsive Liar

0

0

0

Habitual Lying

49

3

46

Habitual Liar

1

1

0

Abnormal lying

744

1

743

Problematic Lying

60

3

57

Problematic Liar

0

0

0

29342

?

?

Chronic Lying

Lying
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Appendix Two
Table 20
Author(s)
Healy & Healy

Date of
Publication
1915

Definition
“Pathological lying is falsification entirely disproportionate to
any discernible end in view, engaged in by a person who, at the
time of observation, cannot definitely be declared insane,
feebleminded, or epileptic. Such lying rarely, if ever, centres
about a single event; although exhibited in very occasional
cases for a short time, it manifests itself most frequently by far
over a period of years, or even a life time. It represents a trait
rather than an episode.
Extensive, very complicated
fabrications may be evolved”(p. 3).

Koppen (as cited
in
Healy
&
Healy, 1915)

Pre 1915

“The pathological lie is active in character, a whole sequence
of experiences is fabricated and the products of fancy brought
forward with a certainty that is astonishing. The possibility
that the untruth may be at any minute demolished does not
abash the liar in the least. Remonstrances against the lies make
no impression. On closer inspection we find that the liar is no
longer free, he has ceased to be master of his own lies, the lie
has won power over him, it has the worth of a real experience.
In the final stage of the evolution of the pathological lie, it
cannot be differentiated from delusion. Pathological lies have
long been credited to hystericals, they are now known to arise
in alcoholics, imbeciles, degenerates. All pathological liars
have a purpose, i.e., to decorate their own person, to tell
something interesting, and an ego motive is always present.
They all lie about something they wish to possess or be” (p.
15).

Risch (as cited in
Healy & Healy,
1915)

Pre 1915

“1. Mental processes similar to those forming the basis of the
impulse to literary creation in normal people lie at the
foundation of the morbid romances and fancies of those
afflicted with pseudologia fantastica. The coercive impulse for
self-expression, with an accompanying feeling of desire and
dissatisfaction, plays a similar part in both. That the making up
of tales is an end in itself for the abnormal swindler, just as it is
for the normal author seems clear to Risch. 2. The morbid
impulse which forces “zum fabulieren” is bound up with the
desire to play the role of the person depicted. Fiction and real
life are not separated as in the mind of the normal author. 3.
The bent of thought is egocentric, the morbid liar and swindler
can think of nothing but himself. 4. There is a reduction of the
powers of attention in these cases; only upon supposition that
this faculty is disturbed can we account for the discrepancies in
the statements of patients. One has the impression that their
memory for their delinquencies is not clear.
Careful
investigation proves that they do not like to remember them
and this dislike has to be overcome. 5. There is a special
weakness in judgment, which for general purposes is sound.
The train of thought is logical, but in ethical discernment the
lack appears. The pathological liar does not face openly the
question of whether his lies can be seen through” (p. 16).
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Vogt (as cited in
Healy & Healy,
1915)

Pre 1915

“Characterised the pathological lie as active, more elaborately
constructed, more inclusive, and leaving the ground of reality
more readily than ordinary lies. Such lies he does not always
find egocentric. To the pathological liar his own creation is
reality, so he walks securely, is open and amiable. All these
cases are gifted with lively imaginations and inclined to
autosuggestion. Vogt calls the pathological lie a wish
psychosis. This statement opens the way to an interesting and
valuable interpretation of the psychological significance of the
phenomenon of the mental life. He finds many more girls than
boys among his cases; boys lie from need of defense and
protection, girls more from autosuggestion. This type of lie is
of greater interest to social than to clinical psychology” (p.19).

Wendt (as cited
in
Healy
&
Healy, 1915)

Pre 1915

“understands by pseudologia fantastica not merely the bare
habit of telling fantastic lies, and what they bring forth, but
rather the yielding up of consciousness of reality in the
presence of the morbidly fantastic wish in its widest
consequences. Since the wish in order to exist is not permitted
to lose entirely the conscious presentation of what it hopes for,
so memory and recognition of reality emerge disconnected in
consciousness, and a condition described as double
consciousness arises. In this state of mind two forms of life
run side by side, the actual and the desired, finally the latter
becomes preponderant and decisive” (p. 24).

Deutsch

1921

“I should like clearly to define the term. A pseudology is
actually a daydream communicated as reality. All those things
that provide the content of a day-dream – proliferating wishes
of an ambitious or erotic nature, apparent complete
independence of the wish-fulfilment produced in the fantasy
from the conditions of real life – also provide the raw material
for the making of a pseudology. A daydream can move within
the narrow corrective limits of an undesired existing situation,
or it may develop into a fantastic structure in the most blatant
conflict with reality; the material of a pseudology is
quantitatively variable in the same way. The pseudologist lies,
creating his wish-fulfilment edifice, ranging from banal love
affairs and the satisfaction of minor ambitions to the most
complicated of involved romantic adventures, always putting
himself in the centre of the fantasy, just as the day dreamer
does.
There is one difference between them.
The
characteristic of the daydreamer is that he shamefully keeps his
daydreams to himself, while the pseudologist insistently
communicates his fantasies to others as if they were reality; he
clearly has no other purpose than to achieve the satisfaction
inherent in the communication. In his case the chief
motivation obviously lies in the revelation of the fantasies that
are usually concealed with scrupulous modesty” (p. 373).

Wiersma

1933

Wiersma provides a detailed summary justifying the use of the
term pseudologia fantastica and in doing so outlines the main
characteristics of the syndrome as per their conceptualisations.
The first “criteria” was that the stories are not told for personal
procurement or profit. Even though some pathological liars lie
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to receive financial gain, it can still be considered pathological
lying if the person lies far in excess of what is necessary to
secure the financial rewards, and if the lying is present in
situations where no pecuniary profit is possible. The second
feature is that the patient possesses an impaired ability to
distinguish between fiction and reality and that this and their
other symptoms cannot be accounted for by an intellectual
defect or disorders of delusion. Judgement is considered to be
within normal limits, and when the patient’s attention is alerted
to their lies, there is a capacity to at least partially recognise
the falseness of their narratives, but this reality testing is rarely
initiated voluntarily, as the patient often completely absorbs
themselves in the “interesting and beautiful parts he himself
played in it” (p. 57).
Selling

1942

“The simplest definition of a pathological liar that I know of is
a pathological liar is a person having a constellation of
symptoms caused by disease of the total personality,
characterised psychopathologically by a very definite tendency
to tell untruths about matters which perhaps could be easily
verified and which untruths may serve no obvious purpose
either in the personality of the individual or in the situation
which he finds himself. The pathological liar is characterised
clinically by a constellation of traits, which prevent him from
giving full cooperation to the examiner and responding
normally to treatment from the point of view of having
adequate insight and a normal truth-telling capacity. The
definition of the pathological liar can be extended to include all
those whose lying is seemingly purposeless and it can be
limited to those who by virtue of obvious mental disease,
particularly a diagnosable psychopathic personality of some
type, exhibit as a major symptom the lack of ability to stick to
the verifiable word” (p. 336).

Davidoff (as cited
in Ford, King &
Hollender, 1988)

1942

“such a lie is not determined by situational factors,
unconscious motivations predominate, the lie appears to be
compulsive and fantastic, and it is destructive to the liar. In
general, lying becomes pathological when it interferes with
normal development or is destructive to the quality of life of
the person involved” (p. 555).

Hoyer

1959

“Healy describes pathological lying as follows, and gives as
synonyms, pseudologia fantastica and mythomania: ‘It is
falsification entirely disproportionate to any discernible end in
view, engaged in by a person who, at the time of observation,
cannot definitely be declared insane, feebleminded or epileptic.
Such lying rarely, if ever, centres about a single event; it
manifests itself more frequently over a considerable period of
years – or even a lifetime. Extensive, very complicated
fabrication may be evolved” (p. 206).

1983

Powell, Gudjonsson and Mullen (1983) provide an uncited
detailed definition of pathological lying, which appears to have
trace elements of Healy and Healy’s (1915) definition. They
define pseudologia fantastica as: “The condition is
characterised by gross falsifications, often involving a tissue of

Powell,
Gudjonsson
Mullen

&
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fantastic lies, which are built into a complex system of
deception. Though these patients are not definitely deluded,
their fabrications, which begin in conscious deceptions become
extensive and complex fantasies, which take on a life of their
own and in which the subject seems eventually to believe.
Thus when the pseudologic is actually enmeshed in his
fantastic lies he may be extremely difficult to distinguish from
the patient in the grip of an extensive delusional system.
Pseudologia fantastica usually represents a persistent
characterological trait rather than any form of process and is
therefore most frequently classified with the personality
disorders or psychopathies.” (p. 141).
Snyder

1986

Snyder (1986) provided a summary of the key elements of the
“syndrome” as per the information provided by a psychiatric
dictionary (Hinsie, 1974) and a general psychiatry textbook
(Kaplan, 1985). The key characteristics described in Snyder’s
introduction included, there is a “superstructure of some
actualities erected on a foundation of fantasy”, it is difficult to
delineate whether the lies are conscious, unconscious or the
result of a delusional distortion, the fantasy is abandoned once
the pseudologue is presented with contradictory evidence,
pseudologues seem compelled to act out their fantasies
repeatedly, and the lies are often in service of bolstering selfesteem or providing narcissistic gratification” (p. 1287).

Kerns*

1986

Kerns (1986) discussed lying and its numerous manifestations
within pseudologia fantastica, delusions and confabulation.
Kerns explores the different lying forms in an attempt to
delineate and produce a differential understanding and
diagnosis of the three constructs. In his review of the literature
he identified five criteria on which all three constructs could be
uniquely determined and differentiated. The first criteria was
whether the falsification was constructed and told in a state of
consciousness or unconsciousness; the second, pertained to the
motivational goal, and whether the lie served an inner,
psychological need or a situational goal; the third related to
memory and whether or not memory impairment underpins the
falsifications; the fourth criteria pertained to sensorium and
whether the person is awake, alert, and oriented to important
environmental cues and information and finally, the fifth
characteristic related to content in two important domains
including whether or not the falsifications are reasonable and
believable, and whether the lies appear self-aggrandising or
emotionally neutral. Kerns does not specify which of these
criteria relate to pseudologia fantastica and for that reason his
definition is not included here for analysis (p. 15).

1987

“Powell (1983) has written that ‘the condition is characterised
by gross falsifications, often involving a tissue of fantastic lies
which are built into a complex system of deception. Though
these patients are not definitely deluded their fabrications
which begin in conscious deceptions become extensive and
complex fantasies which take on a life of their own and in
which the subject seems eventually to believe. Thus when the
pseudologic is actually enmeshed in his fantastic lies he may

This
definition
was not included
because
Kerns
does not specify
which of his
characteristics
apply
to
pseudologia
fantastica.

Matas & Marriott
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be extremely difficult to distinguish from the patient in the grip
of an extensive delusional system. Pseudologia fantastica
usually represents a persistent characterological trait.’ (p. 305).
Ford, King
Hollender

&

1988

Ford, King and Hollender, refer to Selling’s (1942) definition
of what constitutes a pathological liar and combine it with
Davidoff’s definition.
“a person having a constellation of symptoms caused by a
disease
of
the
total
personality
characterised
psychopathologically by a very definite tendency to tell
untruths about matters which perhaps could be easily verified
and which untruths may serve no obvious purpose either in the
personality of the individual or in the situation which he finds
himself” (Selling, 1942).
“Davidoff provided a number of additional characteristics of
the pathological lie. For instance, such a lie is not determined
by situational factors, unconscious motivations predominate,
the lie appears to be compulsive and fantastic, and it is
destructive to the liar. In general, lying becomes pathological
when it interferes with normal development or is destructive to
the quality of life of the person involved.” (p. 554).

Sharrock
Cresswell

&

1989

“Pathological lying, which in its extreme form has been called
Pseudologia Fantastica (Delbruck, 1891), was defined by
Healy and Healy (1915) as the falsifications of the sane
‘disproportionate to any discernible end’; this definition
excludes so called ‘con men’ whose lying serves the purpose
of material gain” (p. 323).

1991

“Pseudologia fantastica involves representing certain fantasies
as real occurrences. These fantasies often involve dramatic,
grandiose, and exaggerated events consciously acknowledged
as false by the patient, yet presented as truth” (p. 657).

Mountz

1992

“Pathological lying is an uncommon disorder characterised by
the telling of “untruths about matters which perhaps could be
easily verified and which untruths may serve no obvious
purpose either in the personality of the individual or in the
situation (in) which he finds himself” (Selling, 1942). Such
lying is usually not determined by situational factors, and the
lie appears to be compulsive and fantastic (Davidoff, 1942;
King & Ford, 1988). Once a lie is produced, the individual
often perpetuates the untruth by building further falsehoods
upon it in a seemingly conscious effort to substantiate the
original lie. The lies are often produced with such zeal that the
sufferer may partially convince him or herself that they have
some basis in fact. When specifically confronted with the
improbability of a particular story, however, the affected
individual can usually acknowledge the inconsistencies or false
premises of his or her productions. This type of lying has also
been referred to as pseudologia fantastica.” (p. 442).

Leung, Lai, Shum
& Lee

1995

Leung et al. (1995) do not attempt to define pseudologia
fantastica, but do provide an orienting definition to frame their
case study presentation. Leung et al. reference King and

Dithrich

Modell,
& Ford
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Ford’s (1988) definition: “Pseudologia fantastica or
pathological lying has been defined in various ways in the
Western literature since its first description in 1891. King and
Ford concluded in their review that it was characterised by
ingredients of truth among falsehoods, the endurance of efforts
and the self-aggrandising quality of stories, and that it could be
distinguished from delusions. The essential psychopathology
includes conscious lying and denial, with a preconceived goal”
(p. 321).
Korkeila, Martin,
Taiminen,
Heinimaa,
&
Vuorinen

1995

“Kaplan and Sadock (1991) define PF as a practice of habitual,
uncontrollable lying in a manner intriguing to the listener.
This pathologic lying is not limited to the history of symptoms
of an illness. The patients frequently give conflicting accounts
concerning other areas of their life. It has been described as a
frequent form of acting out in patients with borderline or
antisocial personality” (p. 367).

Akimoto

1997

“The most common features of pseudologia phantastica as a
type of personality disorder as described by Kraepelin (1915),
may be supplemented and summarized as follows: (i) the
content of the lies is remarkably fantastical, having a
superstructure of some actualities erected on a foundation of
fantasy (Hinsie & Campbell, 1960); (ii) the main motive of the
lies is the patient’s need to produce narcissistic gratification
and an increase in self-esteem, exemplified as expansive, selfelevating distortions of life history and status using aliases
(Akimoto, 1947; Takashima, 1953); (iii) external incentives for
lying, such as economic gain or avoiding legal responsibility,
are secondary; (iv) the pattern of lying is persistent, inflexible
and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to
adolescence or early adulthood; (v) there is a defect in
understanding reality (i.e. perceiving and interpreting self,
other people, and events; ss’s ‘Verhaltnis-blodsinn; and (iv)
there is a disregard for, or violation of, the rights of others and
a lack of remorse for them” (p. 193).

Hardie & Reed

1998

“’Pathological’ lies are then distinguished from ‘normal’ lies
by their obviously untrue nature, and in that they are
determined by unconscious motives as opposed to situational
factors, that the lie appears to be compulsive and fantastic, and
that it is destructive to the liar” (p. 198).

Green,
James,
Gilbert & Byard

1999

“Pseudologia fantastica refers to a condition where repeated
lying leads to a complicated system of deception” (p. 254).
“The diagnostic criteria for pseudologia fantastica cited by
Dupre in 1909 are that ‘1) the story must be probable and keep
a certain reference to reality, 2) the imaginary ‘adventures’
must manifest in multiple circumstances and in a durable
manner, and 3) the themes of these ‘adventures are varied by
the hero or victim is almost always the subject’” (p. 255).

Newmark,
Adityanjee
Kay

1999
&

“Lying as a pathological process has been defined as
disproportionate to practical gain, often extensive or
complicated, and manifested over several years or even a
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lifetime. This type of lying includes people who lie for the
sake of lying and take pleasure in this process. Pseudologia
fantastica has been described as a way to act out fantasy.
Questions are answered with fluency, and the story appears to
be believed by the pseudologic himself (Sims, 1988)” (p. 90).
Teaford, Shaw,
Reiss
&
Lotspeich’s
(2002)

2002

“While some argue that PF is merely a ‘pretentious synonym
for abnormal lying’ (Burt, 1938), specific criteria have been
proposed that include (1) stories that are built on a foundation
of truth, (2) stories that are enduring, (3) stories that are selfaggrandizing, (4) stories that are not told for profit per se, and
(5) stories that are non-delusional in that the person telling the
story can acknowledge its falsity if confronted (King & Ford,
1988).” (p. 165)

Hausman

2003

Hausman (2003) saw Dike and Griffith present at the
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law in October
(2002?), where they defined the concept of pathological lying
as: “repeated lies told over a number of years for which an
external reason is not easily discernable. These lies are often
“woven into complex narratives”. In pathological lying telling
lies may often seem to be an end in itself… the pathological
liar may become a prisoner of his lies and the desired
personality of the pathological liar may overwhelm the actual
one.”
Hausman surmised that Dike said pathological lying appears to
be unplanned and impulsive and that it is questionable whether
it is always a conscious act and whether pathological liars have
control over their lies.

Mitchell
Francis

&

2003

These authors endorsed an eight-pronged criteria model to
define pseudologia fantastica, which they borrowed from the
work of Newmark and Kay (1999) and King and Ford (1988).
“One feature associated with factitious disorder is pseudologia
fantastica, a rare clinical syndrome characterised by the
construction of falsehoods, which presumably satisfy pressing
psychological needs (King & Ford, 1988; Newmark & Kay,
1999). Pseudologia fantastica is distinguished by several
characteristics. First, the fabrications may be improbable, but
are usually marked by a kernel of truth. Second, the
fabrications are not so bizarre as to defy reality (as common in
delusions). Third, the fabrications are shared with multiple
persons and address multiple domains of the patient’s life (e.g.,
employment, marital, legal). Fourth, there is no external
reward for the fabrications, as is the case with malingering.
Fifth, the patient is the ‘hero’ or ‘star’ of the fabrications (e.g.,
they are not preoccupied with making up stories about other
people).
Finally, the patient demonstrating pseudologia
fantastica can acknowledge the fabrication if confronted with
the truth, unlike a delusional patient (King & Ford, 1988;
Newmark & Kay, 1999)” (p. 187).

Grubin

2005

Refers to Dike, Baranoski and Griffith’s (2005) definition, but
does not endorse it, rather Grubin critiques the merits of their
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definition, for instance: “Why is it relevant that the lies seem
pointless? From a psychiatric point of view, lying is simply a
type of behaviour, albeit a complex one, that demands an
appreciation of the abstract concept of truth. What makes a
behaviour psychiatrically abnormal is not its degree or its
purpose, but the extent to which the individual has power over
it. The fact that a behaviour may cause the individual more
harm than good and that there does not seem to be a rational
reason for it may be indicators of psychiatric morbidity, but
neither is necessary or sufficient to establish a disorder. What
these indicators suggest, however, is an apparent lack of
control. For pathological lying to exist, therefore, the
individual must lie despite himself, just as someone with an
anxiety disorder cannot help feeling anxious.
Dike, Baranoski
& Griffith (2005)

2005

“We shall define pathological lying as Healy and Healy did,
but without the quagmire of aetiology. Pathological lying is
falsification entirely disproportionate to any discernible end in
view, may be extensive and very complicated, and may
manifest over a period of years or even a lifetime.”
They also provide a list of “functional elements” – “the
repeated utterance of untruths; the lies are often repeated over
a period of years, with the lies eventually becoming a lifestyle;
material reward or social advantage does not appear to be the
primary motivating force but the lying is an end in itself; an
inner dynamic rather than an external reason drives the lies,
but when an external reason is suspected, the lies are far in
excess of the suspected external reason; the lies are often
woven into complex narratives.”

Van Atta

(2005)

Has not provided a definition per se, but does say:
“pseudologia fantastica refers to the fabrication of events as a
defense against the re-experiencing of psychological trauma.”
Van Atta also says: “is not sociopathological in that it is not
aimed at criminal objectives. Instead, it is motivated by both
extrinsic and intrinsic considerations. It is lying that may
deceive others but is intended primarily to be self-deluding. If
one is successful in deluding the other, then the capacity of the
lie to delude the self is preserved and strengthened.”

Birch, Kelln &
Aquino

2006

“In summary, there is consensus in the literature about the
central features that characterise PF and distinguish it from
other classes of aberrant behaviour. These features include
excessive, impulsive lying that usually has an onset in
adolescence and is of chronic duration. Lies in PF often have a
fantastical quality, are easily verifiable, and are destructive to
the liar. In addition, the lying is primarily stimulated by
internal, psychological motives (e.g., self-esteem regulation or
fantasy fulfilment), rather than by external, situationallydetermined motives (e.g., financial gain or punishment
avoidance). Finally, there is often an impaired distinction
between fiction and reality, but this impairment is not of
delusional severity, or due to organic memory impairment” (p.
304).
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Dike

2008

In this commentary piece Dike (2008) presents a illustrative
case vignette, which he says highlights his observation that
pathological liars seem to lie excessively, tell lies that are
easily verifiable to be untrue, that the lying is mostly unhelpful
to the person in any apparent way and can actually be harmful
to the liar, and yet the lies are told repeatedly over time.

Langer

2010

“The term ‘pseudologia phantastica’ has several definitions,
and a variety of aetiologies are ascribed to it. Dike, Baranoski,
and Griffith (2005), contemporary proponents of the use of the
concept, quoting a 1926 work by Healy and Healy, define it as
“…falsification entirely disproportionate to any discernible end
in view, may be extensive and very complicated and may
manifest over a period of years or even a lifetime” (p. 343).
They continue: ‘Consciousness of the real situation was said to
be clouded in the minds of the pathological liar…’ (p. 344).
The concept, as Dike and colleagues (2005) use it, is more of a
phenomenological description than a specific diagnosis, and in
fact cuts across a number of diagnoses. Fenichel’s paper
describes its use as a type of defense. Its use as a defense is
most peculiar because – unlike any other defense than
“projective identification” – its use requires the participation of
(at least) two people” (p. 14).
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Table 21
Definitional theme

Falsification entirely disproportionate to any
discernible end in view.
Even though some pathological liars lie to received
financial gain, it can sill be considered pathological
lying if the person lies far in excess of what is
necessary to secure financial rewards
And which untruths may serve no obvious purpose
either in the personality of the individual or in the
situation which he finds himself…all those whose
lying is seemingly purposeless.
Disproportionate to practical gain

Authors endorsing it

Number of
endorsements
of identified
theme

Healy & Healy (1915)
Wiersma (1933)
Selling (1942)
Hoyer (1959)
Ford, King & Hollender (1988)
Sharrock & Cresswell (1989)
Modell, Mountz & Ford (1992)
Newmark, Adityanjee & Kay
(1999)
Hausman (2003)
Mitchell & Francis (2003)
Dike, Baranoski & Griffith
(2005)
Langer (2010)

12

Wiersma (1933)
Sharrock & Cresswell (1989)
Akimoto (1997)
Teaford, Shaw, Reiss and
Lotspeich’s (2002)
Mitchell & Francis (2003)
Dike, Baranoski & Griffith
(2005)
Birch, Kelln, & Aquino (2006)

8

Davidoff (1942)
Ford, King & Hollender (1988)
Modell, Mountz & Ford (1992)
Hardie & Reed (1998)
Mitchell & Francis (2003)
Dike, Baranoski & Griffith
(2005)
Birch, Kelln & Aquino (2006)

8

For which an external reason is not easily discernible
No external reward
When an external reason is suspected, the lies are far
in excess of the suspected external reason
The stories are not told for personal procurement or
profit
External incentives for lying, such as economic gain
or avoiding legal responsibility, are secondary
Material reward or social advantage does not appear
to be the primary motivating force but the lying is an
end in itself
the lying is primarily stimulated by internal,
psychological motives (e.g., self-esteem regulation
or fantasy fulfilment), rather than by external,
situationally-determined motives (e.g., financial gain
or punishment avoidance)
Such a lie is not determined by situational factors,
unconscious motivations predominate
Satisfying pressing psychological needs
An inner dynamic rather than an external reason
drives the lies
The lying is primarily stimulated by internal,
psychological motives, rather than by external,
situationally-determined motives
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Mix of different inner dynamics identified
All pathological liars have a purpose i.e. to decorate
their own person, to tell something interesting, and
an ego motive is always present
It is lying that may deceive others but is intended
primarily to be self-deluding.
Wish psychosis
Proliferating wishes of an ambitious or erotic
nature…The pseudologist lies, creating his wishfulfilment edifice.
Wish fulfilment
They all lie about something they wish to possess or
be.
Two forms of life run side by side, the actual and the
desired
Lies are often in service of bolstering self-esteem
Lies are often in service of providing narcissistic
gratification

Koppen (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Van Atta (2005)
Vogt (From Healy & Healy,
1915)
Wendt (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Deutsch (1921)
Birch, Kelln & Aquino (2006)
Koppen (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Risch (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Wendt (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Snyder (1986)
Akimoto (1997)
Birch, Kelln & Aquino (2006)
Snyder (1986)
Akimoto (1997)
Leung, Lai, Shum & Lee (1995)
Akimoto (1997)
Teaford, Shaw, Reiss and
Lotspeich’s (2002)
Van Atta (2005)
Langer (2010)

12

Van Atta (2005)

1

Koppen (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Risch (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Vogt (From Healy & Healy,
1915)
Wendt (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Deutsch (1921)
Birch, Kelln & Aquino (2006)

6

Snyder (1986)
Akimoto (1997)

3

Self-aggrandising
Exemplified as expansive, self-elevating distortions
of life history and status using aliases
Pseudologia fantastica refers to the fabrication of
events as a defence against the re-experiencing of
psychological trauma
Type of defence
It is lying that may deceive others but is intended
primarily to be self-deluding.
Wish psychosis
Proliferating wishes of an ambitious or erotic
nature…The pseudologist lies, creating his wishfulfilment edifice.
Wish fulfilment
They all lie about something they wish to possess or
be.
Two forms of life run side by side, the actual and the
desired
Lies are often in service of bolstering self-esteem
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Lies are often in service of providing narcissistic
gratification
Pseudologia fantastica refers to the fabrication of
events as a defence against the re-experiencing of
psychological trauma
Type of defence
Self-aggrandising
Exemplified as expansive, self-elevating distortions
of life history and status using aliases
These fantasies often involve dramatic, grandiose,
and exaggerated events
It is motivated by both extrinsic and intrinsic
considerations
Lies in a manner intriguing to the listener
Caused by disease of the total personality
Cannot definitely be declared insane, feebleminded,
or epileptic.
Cannot be accounted for by an intellectual defect or
disorders of delusion
Falsifications of the sane
Is not limited to the history of symptoms of an illness

Birch, Kelln & Aquino (2006)
Snyder (1986)
Akimoto (1997)

2

Van Atta (2005)
Langer (2010)

2

Leung, Lai, Shum & Lee (1995)
Akimoto (1997)
Teaford, Shaw, Reiss and
Lotspeich’s (2002)
Dithrich (1991)

3

1

Van Atta (2005)

1

Korkeila, Martin, Taiminen,
Heinimaa & Vuorinen (1995)
Selling (1942)
Ford, King & Hollender (1988)
Healy & Healy (1915)
Wiersma (1933)
Hoyer (1959)
Sharrock & Cresswell (1989)
Korkeila, Martin, Taiminen,
Heinimaa & Vuorinen (1995)
Teaford, Shaw, Reiss and
Lotspeich’s (2002)
Birch, Kelln & Aquino (2006)

1

Healy & Healy (1915)
Hoyer (1959)
Green, James, Gilbert & Byard
(1999)
Mitchell & Francis (2003)

4

Healy & Healy (1915)
Hoyer (1959)
Akimoto (1997)
Green, James, Gilbert & Byard
(1999)
Newmark, Adityanjee & Kay
(1999)
Teaford, Shaw, Reiss and
Lotspeich’s (2002)
Hausman (2003)
Dike, Baranoski & Griffith
(2005)
Birch, Kelln & Aquino (2006)
Langer (2010)
Leung, Lai, Shum & Lee (1995)

11

2
7

Not delusional
Not from organic memory impairment
Rarely centres around a single event
Must manifest in multiple circumstances
The fabrications are shared with multiple persons
and address multiple domains of the patient’s life.
Manifests most frequently by far over a period of
years or even a lifetime
Of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at
least to adolescence or early adulthood
In a durable manner
Manifest over several years or even a lifetime
Stories that are enduring
Usually has an onset in adolescences and is of
chronic duration
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The pattern of lying is persistent, inflexible
Characterised by the endurance of efforts
Represents a trait rather than an episode.
Constellation of traits
Usually represents a persistent characterological trait
rather than any form of process.
The lies eventually becoming a lifestyle
May involve extensive and very complicated
fabrications
Built into a complex system of deception.
Repeated lying leads to a complicated system of
deception
Often woven into complex narratives

Brought forward with a certainty that is astonishing
The lies are often produced with such zeal
The possibility that the untruth may be at any minute
demolished does not abash the liar in the least
Very definite tendency to tell untruths about matters
which perhaps could be easily verified
Obviously untrue nature
Easily verifiable to be untrue

Destructive to the liar. In general, lying becomes
pathological when it interferes with normal
development or is destructive to the quality of life of
the person involved.
The lying is mostly unhelpful to the person in any
apparent way and can actually be harmful to the liar
Remonstrances against the lies make no impression
He has ceased to be master of his own lies, the lie
has won power over him
Lack of ability to stick to the verifiable word.

Healy & Healy (1915)
Selling (1942)
Powell, Gudjonsson & Mullen
(1983)
Matas & Marriott (1987)

4

Dike, Baranoski & Griffith
(2005)
Healy & Healy (1915)
Koppen (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Risch (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Hoyer (1959)
Powell, Gudjonsson & Mullen
(1983)
Matas & Marriott (1987)
Green, James, Gilbert & Byard
(1999)
Newmark, Adityanjee & Kay
(1999)
Hausman (2003)
Dike, Baranoski & Griffith
(2005)
Langer (2010)
Koppen (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Modell, Mountz & Ford (1992)
Koppen (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Risch (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Selling (1942)
Ford, King & Hollender (1988)
Modell, Mountz & Ford (1992)
Hardie & Reed (1998)
Birch, Kelln & Aquino (2006)
Dike (2008)
Davidoff (1942)
Ford, King & Hollender (1988)
Hardie & Reed (1998)
Birch, Kelln & Aquino (2006)
Dike (2008)

1

Koppen (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Koppen (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Vogt (From Healy & Healy,
1915)
Selling (1942)

1

11

2

8

5

8
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Extensive and complex fantasies, which take on a
life of their own
The pathological liar may become a prisoner of his
lies
The desired personality of the pathological liar may
overwhelm the actual one

Powell, Gudjonsson & Mullen
(1983)
Matas & Marriott (1987)
Hausman (2003)
Korkeila, Martin, Taiminen,
Heinimaa & Vuorinen (1995)
Grubin (2005)

Uncontrollable lying
For pathological lying to exist, the individual must
lie despite himself, just as someone with an anxiety
disorder cannot help feeling anxious.
The lie appears to be compulsive
Pseudologues seem compelled to act out their
fantasies repeatedly
The essential psychopathology includes conscious
lying and denial, with a preconceived goal
It has the worth of a real experience.

Davidoff (1942)
Snyder (1986)
Ford, King & Hollender (1988)
Modell, Mountz & Ford (1992)
Hardie & Reed (1998)
Leung, Lai, Shum & Lee (1995)

5

1

Koppen (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Risch (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Vogt (From Healy & Healy,
1915)
Wendt (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Wiersma (1933)
Powell, Gudjonsson & Mullen
(1983)
Matas & Marriott (1987)
Modell, Mountz & Ford (1992)
Akimoto (1997)
Birch, Kelln & Aquino (2006)
Newmark, Adityanjee & Kay
(1999)
Van Atta (2005)

12

The patient often completely absorbs themselves in
the “interesting and beautiful parts he himself played
in it”

Wiersma (1933)
Powell, Gudjonsson & Mullen
(1983)

2

Inadequate insight
A pseudology is actually a daydream communicated
as reality….the pseudologist insistently
communicates his fantasies to others as if they were
reality

Selling (1942)
Deutsch (1921)
Dithrich (1991)
Newmark, Adityanjee & Kay
(1999)

1
3

Fiction and real life are not separated
Leaving the ground of reality more readily than
ordinary lies.
Yielding up of consciousness of reality…recognition
of reality emerges disconnected in consciousness.
The patient possesses an impaired ability to
distinguish between fiction and reality
Their fabrications, which begin in conscious
deceptions become extensive and complex fantasies,
which take on a life of their own and in which the
subject seems eventually to believe.
The sufferer may partially convince him or herself
that they have some basis in fact.
The story appears to be believed by the pseudologic
himself
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Involves representing certain fantasies as real
occurrences
As a way to act out fantasy
Although these patients are not definitely deluded…
Can be distinguished from delusions
Stories that are non-delusional
There is often an impaired distinction between
fiction and reality, but this impairment is not of
delusional severity
In the final stage of the evolution of the pathological
lie, it cannot be differentiated from delusion
Although these patients are not definitely
deluded….when the pseudologic is actually
enmeshed in his fantastic lies he may be extremely
difficult to distinguish from the patient in the grip of
an extensive delusional system.
It is difficult to delineate whether the lies are
conscious, unconscious or the result of a delusional
distortion
It is difficult to delineate whether the lies are
conscious, unconscious or the result of a delusional
distortion
Consciousness of the real situation was said to be
clouded in the minds of the pathological liar
The bent of thought is egocentric…can think of
nothing but himself
Always putting himself in the centre of the fantasy
Absorbs themselves in the “interesting and beautiful
parts be himself played in it”
The hero or victim is almost always the subject
The patient is the ‘hero’ or ‘star’ of the fabrication
(they are not preoccupied with making up stories
about other people)
Their memory of their delinquencies is not clear
There is special weakness in judgement, which for
general purposes is sound.
Judgement is considered to be within normal limits
Habit of telling fantastic lies
The lies appear fantastic
Often involving a tissue of fantastic lies
Act out their fantasies repeatedly

Powell, Gudjonsson & Mullen
(1983)
Leung, Lai, Shum & Lee (1995)
Teaford, Shaw, Reiss and
Lotspeich’s (2002)
Birch, Kelln & Aquino (2006)

4

Koppen (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Powell, Gudjonsson & Mullen
(1983)
Snyder (1986)
Matas & Marriott (1987)

1

Snyder (1986)
Langer (2010)

2

Risch (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Risch (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Deutsch (1921)
Wiersma (1933)
Green, James, Gilbert & Byard
(1999)
Mitchell & Francis (2003)

1

Risch (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Risch (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Wiersma (1933)

1

Wendt (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Davidoff (1942)
Powell, Gudjonsson & Mullen
(1983)
Matas & Marriott (1987)
Ford, King & Hollender (1988)

9

3

5

2
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The content of the lies is remarkably fantastical
Lies in pseudologia fantastica often have a fantastical
quality.

Characterised by gross falsifications

Construction of falsehoods
Abnormal truth-telling capacity
When the patient’s attention is alerted to their lies,
there is a capacity to at least partially recognise the
falseness of their narratives, but this reality testing is
rarely initiated voluntarily.
The fantasy is abandoned once the pseudologue is
presented with contradictory evidence.

Modell, Mountz & Ford (1992)
Akimoto (1997)
Hardie & Reed (1998)
Birch, Kelln & Aquino (2006)

Powell, Gudjonsson & Mullen
(1983)
Matas & Marriott (1987)
Mitchell & Francis (2003)
Selling (1942)
Wiersma (1933)
Snyder (1986)
Dithrich (1991)
Modell, Mountz & Ford (1992)
Teaford, Shaw, Reiss and
Lotspeich’s (2002)
Mitchell & Francis (2003)

2

Snyder (1986)
Leung, Lai, Shum & Lee (1995)
Akimoto (1997)
Teaford, Shaw, Reiss and
Lotspeich’s (2002)
Mitchell & Francis (2003)

5

Wendt (from Healy & Healy,
1915)
Snyder (1986)
Korkeila, Martin, Taiminen,
Heinimaa & Vuorinen (1995)
Green, James, Gilbert & Byard
(1999)
Hausman (2003)
Dike, Baranoski & Griffith
(2005)
Dike (2008)
Birch, Kelln & Aquino (2006)

8

Modell, Mountz & Ford (1992)

1

1
1
6

Consciously acknowledged as false by the patient,
yet presented as truth
When specifically confronted with the improbability
of a particular story, however, the affected individual
can usually acknowledge the inconsistencies or false
premises of his or her productions.
The person telling the story can acknowledge its
falsity if confronted
Superstructure of some actualities erected on a
foundation of fantasy
Characterised by ingredients of truth among
falsehoods
Stories that are built on a foundation of truth
Marked by a kernel of truth
Habit of telling fantastic lies
Act out their fantasies repeatedly
A practice of habitual, uncontrollable lying
Repeated lying
Repeated utterance of untruths
The lies are told repeatedly over time.
Excessive (lying)
Once a lie is produced, the individual often
perpetuates the untruth by building further
falsehoods upon it in a seemingly conscious effort to
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substantiate the original lie
The patients frequently give conflicting accounts
concerning other areas of life
Frequent form of acting out in patients with
borderline or antisocial personality.
Disregard for, or violation of the rights of others
Lack of remorse for others
The story must be probable and keep a certain
reference to reality (Dupre1909)
The fabrications are not so bizarre as to defy reality
(as common in delusions)
Cast self as hero or victim
Hero or star
He clearly has no other purpose than to achieve the
satisfaction inherent in the communication.
Lie for the sake of lying and take pleasure in this
process

Korkeila, Martin, Taiminen,
Heinimaa & Vuorinen (1995)
Korkeila, Martin, Taiminen,
Heinimaa & Vuorinen (1995)
Akimoto (1997)
Akimoto (1997)
Green, James, Gilbert & Byard
(1999)
Mitchell & Francis (2003)

1
1
1
1
2

Green, James, Gilbert & Byard
(1999)
Mitchell & Francis (2003)
Deutsch (1921)
Newmark, Adityanjee & Kay
(1999)
Hausman (2003)
Dike, Baranoski & Griffith
(2005)

2

Newmark, Adityanjee & Kay
(1999)
Hausman (2003)
Birch, Kelln & Aquino (2006)
Mitchell & Francis (2003)
Van Atta (2005)

1

4

Telling lies may often seem to be an end in itself
Questions are answered with fluency
Impulsive and unplanned
The fabrications may be improbable
Not aimed at criminal objectives

2
1
1
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Appendix Three
Table 22
The step-by-step process for designing the data matrix for Study 2, Part 2

Step 1. The data-coding document created for the first transcript was read for the
purposes of finding themes relevant to symptoms and aetiology.
Step 2. The first identified theme relevant to symptoms or aetiology was given a
name to capture the essence of the theme and that name was placed in the first
column and first row of the matrix. All theme names underwent some form of
modification as more exemplars of the theme were found and more appropriate
names were sourced.
Step 3. The next step then involved taking any quotes from the original transcript
that reflected the theme and placing them in the second column of the matrix, using
the copy and paste function from Microsoft Word. All quotes were accompanied
by a participant code, which told the analyst which participant generated that quote
and which case study the quote pertained to.
Step 4. If the data-coding document contained any additional similar quotes
supporting the same theme, they too would be extracted from the data-coding
document and placed into the matrix under the section relating to that theme.
Step 5. The analyst then continued with the rest of the data-coding document and
repeated the process with any new or novel themes. With each new theme a new
matrix row and theme name was created.
Step 6. Once the analyst was satisfied that they had exhausted the document of any
and all themes they then moved on to the next data-coding document and
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participant transcript.
Step 7. As expected, the second data-coding document contained a mixture of
similar and disparate themes. Any themes raised in this document that were similar
to or identical to themes raised by the first document were subsumed under the
theme already tabulated. Any quotes supporting that particular theme were copied
and pasted into the second column of the matrix with the participant’s code, and the
third column then indicated that two experts had endorsed that particular theme.
Step 8. Any new or novel themes raised in the second data-coding document went
through the same process as the first data-coding document.
Step 9. This snowballing process was then repeated for each and every data-coding
document until every theme found within the raw data was represented by a theme
name, exemplar quotes and a frequency statistic.
Step 10. An inclusive thematic analysis model was adopted, which meant whole
quotes were copied and pasted to again preserve the integrity of the quote’s true
meaning and to monitor any inconsistencies in participants’ responses.
Step 11. A participant code was placed next to each quote so that there was a clear
demarcation between participant responses and to allow for easier cross-transcript
analysis.
Step 12. Before themes were included in the final results and discussion section,
two additional checking phases were implemented.

The first phase involved

searching electronic versions of each transcript for key words that would relate to
the identified themes. The transcripts were searched using the “find and replace”
function available in all Word documents. This function systematically scans entire
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documents for any words entered into the search function, thereby allowing analysts
to scan documents for any missed quotes. A range of synonyms and antonyms were
entered into the find and replace function for each theme so both similar and
counter exemplars could be located.
Step 13. In the second checking phase each transcript was closely re-read in its
entirety to ensure no relevant quote or theme was excluded from the matrix
document, to identify any counter-instances and to ensure the original meaning of
each documented quote was preserved. This process was done with particular
scrutiny to make sure no theme was given undue emphasis when placed outside of
its original context.
Step 14. Conflicting themes were placed next to each other in the matrix to allow
for easier comparison and analysis.
Step 15. As was the case in the first study, themes were collapsed if they were
considered to have overlapping principles, and themes were excluded if there was
not enough data to support them or if the opinions expressed in the dataset were too
diverse.
Step 16. After all the transcripts were analysed, the descriptive titles given in the
initial tabulation process were revised to ensure they properly surmised the theme’s
essence.
Step 17. After all processes described above were observed and all transcripts had
been gleaned of themes and supporting data, it was then possible to determine the
frequency in which the various themes presented within the data.
Step 18. A theme was given a numerical based on the number of different
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participants who supported it. Therefore if one expert raised a theme more than
once it was still only counted as one.
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Appendix Four

Table 23
Proposed diagnostic criteria for pathological lying disorder based on data from Study 1,
.
Part 2
Cluster B Personality Disorders
301.3 Pathological Lying Disorder
A. An enduring (80%) maladaptive pattern (28%) of creating and propagating
falsehoods to others (100%), that is intra-psychically motivated (31%), beginning
(at least) by early adulthood or adolescence (80%), as indicated by six or more of
the following:
1. Stability in lying behaviours across time, with lying occurring at an
abnormally high frequency when compared to societal standards (80%).
2. Falsehoods resemble stories that could be feasible and/or possible (98%),
and are not the product of delusion, hallucination or confabulation.
3. Falsehoods are self-aggrandising and portray the pseudologue in a positive
light (55%)
4. Falsehoods centre on stories of heroism and/or victimisation (53%).
5. Denies and protects lies through further lying or aggressiveness (33%), but
can admit to lies when convincingly confronted with evidence of their
falsehoods (56%).
6. Falsehoods are communicated without any distinct purpose or motivation
to gain material objects or advance themselves financially (47%), but
instead represent a psychological strategy such as a defence (31%).
7. Falsehoods are told with impaired self-awareness and self-deception may
occur (42%).
8. Falsehoods are intricate, complex and elaborate (41%) and can be
believable (27%).
9. Falsehoods are easily detectable (38%).
10. Lies may be based on elements of truth (25%).
B. Five (or more) of the following must also be present to make this diagnosis:
1. Disregard for personal and interpersonal wellbeing, i.e., they continue to
lie despite the risks of harm to their reputation and relationships (28%).
Has jeopardised or lost a significant relationship, job, educational or career
opportunity because of lying behaviours.
2. Engages in petty, non-serious acts of crime (30%).
3. Has difficulty maintaining stable employment, i.e., frequent job changes
and/or multiple sackings (22%).
4. General impulsivity across a variety of domains (28%).
5. Intermittent suicidal ideation and para-suicidal gestures (27%)
6. Impaired self-esteem: feelings of low self-worth and unlovability (27%).
7. Poor relationship skills and lack of close or long-term friends (25%).
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8. Impaired ability to apply reality testing to their falsehoods (31%).
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning (28%).
D. The pattern is chronic, stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back
at least to adolescence or early adulthood (80%).
E. While the disorder may originate in childhood the diagnosis should not be made
until the person reaches 18 years of age, unless the lying is causing the child
clinically significant distress or impairment in social and/or academic functioning.
F. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or consequence
of another mental disorder, i.e., the falsehoods should not represent delusions,
hallucinations, confabulation or any psychotic illness.
G. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance or
general medical condition.
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Table 24
Proposed diagnostic criteria for pathological lying disorder based on data from Study 2,
Part 2
.
Cluster B Personality Disorders
301.3 Pathological Lying Disorder
B. An enduring (12 or 86%) and pervasive (14 or 100%) maladaptive pattern (12 or
86%) of creating and propagating falsehoods to others (14 or 100%), that is intrapsychically motivated (14 or 100%) by poor self-esteem (8 or 57%) or identity
disturbance (10 or 71%), that is not engaged in for purposes of hurting,
exploiting or maligning others (7 or 50%), beginning (at least) by early adulthood
or adolescence (12 or 86%) and present in a variety of contexts (14 or 100%), as
indicated by six or more of the following:
1. Stability in lying behaviours across time (12 or 86%), with lying
occurring at an abnormally high frequency when compared to societal
standards (13 or 93%).
2. Falsehoods are communicated to meet an inner psychological need and/or
represent a psychological strategy (14 or 100%).
3. Falsehoods are self-aggrandising and portray the pseudologue in a
positive light (8 or 57%).
4. Repeatedly fails to take ownership of lying behaviours when confronted
(9 or 64%) by denying mendacities (8 or 57%), holding onto the lie (7 or
50%) or becoming angry and aggressive (6 or 43%), but can admit to lies
after therapeutic intervention (5, or 36%).
5. Impaired capacity to regulate, control or inhibit urges to lie (14 or 100%)
as indicated by a sense that the lying is impulsive (9 or 64%), compulsive
(8 or 57%), reactive (6 or 43%), automatic (5 or 36%) and that the lies
can build up on top of each other and get out of control (7 or 50%).
6. Awareness at the time of lying can fluctuate (6 or 43%) but most
commonly falsehoods are told with impaired self-awareness (7 or 50%)
and self-deception may occur (5 or 36%).
7. Falsehoods are detectable by others (9 or 64%).
8. Falsehoods appear odd and illogical to outside observers (8 or 57%), with
some lies being trivial and small (5 or 36%).
9. Experiences negative affect (8 or 57%), as indicated by displays of
remorse, guilt, shame and/or distress after lying (5 or 36%).
C. Five (or more) of the following must also be present to make this diagnosis:
1. Disregard for personal and interpersonal wellbeing, i.e., they continue to
lie despite the risks of harm to their reputation and relationships (11 or
79%). Has jeopardised or lost a significant relationship, job, educational
or career opportunity because of lying behaviours.
2. Hypersensitive and hypervigilant to being criticised, disliked or rejected

336

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

(10 or 71%), which often results in unhelpful attempts to secure
admiration or positive regard through lying.
Identity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self-image or
sense of self (10 or 71%).
Impaired self-esteem: feelings of low self-worth and unlovability (8 or
57%).
Diminished capacity for empathy (7 or 50%) but empathic responding to
others is possible: can show regard for other’s feelings, needs and
suffering (6 or 43%).
Repeatedly fails to take responsibility for mistakes, shortcomings or
wrongdoings (6 or 43%), often resorting to deception instead.
General impulsivity across a variety of domains (7 or 50%).
Poor insight into the problematic nature of their lying habits (7 or 50%).

D. The enduring pattern of lying is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of
personal and social situations (14 or 100%).
E. The enduring pattern is maladaptive (12 or 86%) and leads to clinically
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important
areas of functioning (11 or 79%).
F. The pattern is chronic, stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced
back at least to adolescence or early adulthood (12 or 86%).
G. While the disorder may originate in childhood the diagnosis should not be made
until the person reaches 18 years of age, unless the lying is causing the child
clinically significant distress or impairment in social and/or academic
functioning.
H. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or
consequence of another mental disorder, i.e., the falsehoods should not represent
delusions, hallucinations, confabulation or any psychotic illness.
I. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance
or general medical condition.
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